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"The task is, not so much to see what no one has yet seen;
but to think what nobody has yet thought, about that which everybody sees."
(attributed to Arthur Schopenhauer)
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON LABOR MARKETS AND CITIES
Paolo Martellini
Guido Menzio
This thesis focuses on the functioning of labor markets and on how search frictions
affect the dynamics of labor productivity across space (first chapter) and over time
(second chapter).
The first chapter addresses a long-standing question concerning the sources of
the positive wage differential between large and small US cities. I build a spatial
equilibrium model that I use to measure the contribution of three channels. In the
model, larger cities are characterized by a higher frequency of interactions in the
labor market–hence better matches between workers and firms (matching)–a better
composition of peers workers learn from (knowledge diffusion), and positive sorting of
high-skilled workers through migration across cities (sorting). I find that the aggregate
implications of policies that change the size and composition of cities are determined
by how such policies influence matching, knowledge diffusion, and sorting. Concretely,
I show that an expansion of housing supply in large, productive, cities reduces the
extent of sorting and knowledge diffusion in those cities. As a consequence, the
aggregate income gain from implementing such policy is considerably smaller than in
a hypothetical scenario in which the productivity of cities was invariant to the policy.
The second chapter extends the traditional search and matching model of the labor
market to account for long-run growth in the efficiency of the search technology. We
provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which such long-run growth does
not trigger a secular decline in unemployment (consistently with US data), but it
contributes to labor productivity growth. Intuitively, a higher meeting probability
in the labor market allows firm-worker pairs to be more selective with respect to the
quality of the matches they create. Simple calculations show that this channel may
be responsible for approximately one fourth of US labor productivity growth over the
last 30 years.
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iv

LIST OF TABLES

v

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

vi

1 THE CITY-SIZE WAGE PREMIUM: ORIGINS AND AGGREGATE IMPLICATIONS by Paolo Martellini
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 Quantitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4 Endogenous Market Tightness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.5 Large Cities and Housing Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.6 Optimal Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.7 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1
1
10
23
50
53
60
69
73
77

2 DECLINING SEARCH FRICTIONS, UNEMPLOYMENT,
GROWTH by Paolo Martellini and Guido Menzio
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Baseline model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Generalizations and variations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Identification and calculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

AND
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

89
89
97
110
117
123
126

LIST OF TABLES
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4

Parameter Values. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Decomposition of the city-size wage premium (%). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Targeted moments computed on the sample of non-movers . . . . . . . . . .

Targeted moments in the data and in the model.

v

32
37
50
87

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14

City-Size Wage Premium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Identification of the Knowledge Diffusion Technology
Job-to-Job Transition Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Migration Hazard Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Population Share in Large Cities . . . . . . . . . . .
College Share in Large Cities . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wage of Movers and Non-Movers . . . . . . . . . . .
Job Tenure and Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Decomposition of the City-Size Wage Premium . . .
Housing Regulation and Human Capital . . . . . . .
Housing Regulation and Aggregate Income Gains . .
Knowledge Diffusion Externality . . . . . . . . . . . .
Life-cycle Wage Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Job Tenure and Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

2
34
38
40
41
42
44
46
48
58
59
66
86
88

2.1
2.2
2.3

Beveridge Curve US: 1927-2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Unemployment and Vacancy Rates US: 1927-2018 . . . . . . . . . . . .
UE and EU Rates US: 1948-2018 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

91
92
92

vi

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Chapter 1
THE CITY-SIZE WAGE PREMIUM:
ORIGINS AND AGGREGATE
IMPLICATIONS
By Paolo Martellini†

1.1

Introduction

Why do workers in larger cities earn higher wages? What are the aggregate implications
of spatial wage differentials? Figure 1.1 shows the average hourly wage of workers
who live in large cities (blue thick line) and in small cities (red thin line) plotted
against labor market experience.1 It is easy to observe the existence of a city-size
wage premium that is equal to about 15% at labor market entry, and grows up to 38%
after 20 years.
This paper is about understanding the origins and aggregate implications of the
city-size wage premium documented in Table 1.1. In particular, I consider three
possible sources of heterogeneity between small and large cities, that I embed into a
spatial equilibrium life-cycle model of workers’ location choice and wage growth.
First, I treat each city as a local labor market characterized by search frictions,
and I allow the rate at which workers sample job offers to be affected by city size. The
argument for the existence of non-constant returns to scale is that the concentration
†University of Pennsylvania.
Throughout the paper, large (small) cities refer to commuting zones with more (less) than 750
thousand people in 1990.
1

1

Figure 1.1: City-Size Wage Premium
Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79). Large cities
(pop. > 750k, thick blue). Small cities (pop. < 750k, thin red). Shaded areas: 95%
bootstrap confidence interval.

of a large number of workers and firms inside a narrow geographic unit, like a city,
reduces the transportation and information frictions that are associated with the
process of job search. If firm-worker matches are heterogeneous, sampling jobs at a
faster rate generates more selectivity in the quality of accepted jobs, hence higher
wages.
The second mechanism I analyze is the advantage of large cities in promoting the
exchange of ideas between workers. Geographic proximity promotes the transmission
of those forms of knowledge that require direct interactions between people. In the
model, this intuition takes the form of a human capital accumulation process that
varies with the worker’s location. I allow workers in large cities to experience more
frequent interactions with each other, and, to the extent that large cities host a greater
fraction of high-skilled workers in equilibrium, to learn from better peers. Stochastic
aging, from young to old, ends the period of life during which workers learn.
2

Third, the city-size wage premium may be driven by sorting on observed education—which determines learning ability—and on unobserved human capital. Sorting
occurs through endogenous migration decisions upon receiving a job offer from another
city. Differences in the propensity to migrate are generated by heterogeneity, across
workers, in the benefit from forming better matches and being exposed to a better
process of knowledge diffusion. The productivity benefits of living in a large city
are traded off against higher house prices, which operate as a congestion force that
constraints the equilibrium relative city size.
To measure the importance of these three channels, I use information on workers’
wage profiles and labor market flows in small and large cities. The parameters of
the knowledge diffusion technology are identified by the difference in wage growth
within large and small cities, for given worker’s education and ranking in the wage
distribution at the time of labor market entry. I impose a restriction on the match
quality distribution such that arbitrary returns to scale in the search process can
be consistent with the observed lack of variation in unemployment and job-to-job
transition rates across cities. Under such restriction, increasing returns to scale lead to
the formation of proportionally better matches at all stages of labor market experience.
Hence, the presence of lower search frictions in larger cities is identified by the average
level of the city-size wage premium. Sorting is determined by the optimal mobility
choice of workers, given the identified difference in knowledge diffusion and search
speed in large and small cities.
The model is estimated using a panel of workers from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth started in 1979 (NLSY79). Workers in the sample are observed for
the first 20 consecutive years since labor market entry. Confirming the hypothesis of
increasing returns to scale in the labor market, I find that the contact rate between
workers and firms in large cities is 73% higher than in small cities. Similarly, exchanges
of ideas through interactions among workers are 20% more frequent in large cities. I
refer to increasing returns in the search process and in the frequency of interactions
as agglomeration forces. In addition, I find that higher rates of knowledge diffusion in
large cities leverage an equilibrium human capital distribution of peers that first order
stochastically dominates the distribution in small cities. I show that the diffusion of
ideas is particularly beneficial to college graduates and, conditional on education, to
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workers with lower initial levels of human capital.
The model is validated according to its ability to reproduce the micro evidence on
the wage of movers with respect to stayers in the pre-migration city, and incumbents
in the destination one. The wage of movers are not esplictly used in the estimation
of the model, which only targets aggregate differences between wages in large and
small cities. Since 78% of workers never move from a small to a large city, nor vice
versa, non-movers provide the vast majority of the information that identifies the
model parameters.2 I find that the model quantitatively replicates the steeper wage
path of workers who move to large cities, compared to stayers. Newcomers into large
cities earn significantly less than incumbents, although the difference partially shrinks
with experience. With respect to the opposite migration flow, I show that movers to
small cities are negatively selected in terms of pre-migration wages, and that their
income prospects further decline after moving, compared with stayers in large cities.
Furthermore, the post-migration wage of movers is not significantly different from the
wage of incumbents in small cities.
Controlling for the quality of the current match—proxied by job tenure—affects the
comparison between movers, stayers, and incumbents, but it does so in a remarkably
similar fashion in the model as in the data. The contribution of heterogeneity in job
tenure in accounting for the wage dynamics, and selection into migration, highlights
the importance of modeling a frictional labor market with match-specific job quality.
In addition, I provide external validation for the estimated elasticity of the firm-worker
meeting rate with respect to city size, which is equal to 20% in the model. Empirically,
I interpret the firm-worker meeting rate as the average number of applications per
vacancy per unit of time. The model estimate lies well inside the range of direct
elasticities obtained from the search behavior of firms, that I documented in previous
work (52%), and novel evidence on the heterogeneity in the number of job applications
across cities, obtained from workers in the NLSY79 (12%).
To answer the first research question, I decompose the life-cycle city-size wage
premium into the contribution of increasing returns to search, knowledge diffusion,
2

I verify that the moments obtained from the set of non-movers are almost identical to their
counterparts computed on the entire sample, and are also remarkably similar to those generated by
non-movers in the model. Re-estimating the model on the sample of non-movers delivers very similar
parameter values. See the discussion in Section 1.3.
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and sorting. I show that, because of increasing returns to search, wages in large cities
are 11% higher than in small cities, but this channel has only a level effect on the
city-size wage premium. To the contrary, sorting and knowledge diffusion become
increasingly important for more experienced workers, and they generate a 12% and
15% wage premium after 20 years, respectively. More than three quarters of the
contribution of knowledge diffusion is due to heterogeneity in peer effects across cities,
while differences in the rate at which ideas are exchanged between workers play a much
smaller role. The decomposition highlights a sharp qualitative difference between
the life-cycle contribution of lower search frictions and higher learning rates to the
city-size wage premium. In fact, while in principle it is reasonable to expect lower
search frictions to also have a growth effect, through faster search on the job, I show
that this conjecture would be inconsistent with the empirical evidence on labor market
flows.
In the second part of the paper, I explore the aggregate implications of the estimated
heterogeneity in productivity between small and large cities.
I study the equilibrium response of the economy to an exogenous increase in the
housing supply elasticity of large cities—for example, due to the relaxation of land-use
regulation. The existence of vast and persistent wage differentials across cities has
raised the question of whether place-based policies might improve aggregate outcomes
by triggering the relocation of workers toward more productive places. Specifically,
the existence of local land-use regulation that constraints the amount of available
housing in some of the most productive large US cities has spurred a recent academic
and policy debate about the potential gains associated with the relaxion of such
constraints. Although the geography in this paper is admittedly more stylized than
in the traditional urban literature, I bring two new features to the debate on this
topic: endogenous agglomeration forces and dynamic benefits from experience in large
cities. I highlight the importance of these margins by contrasting the equilibrium
response to a change in policy, with an alternative scenario in which productivity was
an exogenous characteristic of cities. I show that such alternative scenario overstates
the percentage growth in total labor income by more than a factor of 2.5. As large
cities grow in size, due to an expansion in housing supply, the presence of increasing
returns to scale in the search process and in the rate of knowledge diffusion leads
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to higher productivity in those cities. However, this gain is more than offset by a
reduction in the extent of sorting of high-skilled workers, which, in turn, is responsible
for the deterioration in the quality of peers. In equilibrium, large cities experience a
decline in productivity (and wages). At the same time, small cities are also negatively
affected by this policy. As they shrink, they suffer from both the outmigration of their
high-ability workers, and the reversal of agglomeration forces.
Last, motivated by the existence of agglomeration and knowledge spillover externalities, I compute and characterize the constrained-efficient allocation of workers
across cities and jobs. In the optimal allocation, large cities shrink in size, but have a
much higher concentration of college graduates than in the equilibrium. The solution
to the planner’s problem can be implemented using a set of flow transfers, indexed
by workers’ characteristics (and location), and financed through lump-sum taxes.
Under the optimal policy, college graduates receive a bigger transfer if they locate
in large rather than small cities, while the opposite is true for high school graduates.
The externalities in this paper are endogenous and dynamic in nature: workers who
learn from others generate a stronger externality themselves. This force favors the
agglomeration of workers with high human capital and high learning ability—i.e.
college graduates—into large cities. High school graduates have a negative impact on
peer effects, but they do not particularly gain from interacting with other workers.
Hence, the planner would subsidize their relocation to small cities.

Related Literature
The first research question in this paper is closely related to the literature that
studies the origins of spatial wage differentials.3 Glaeser and Maré (2001) document
the existence of a urban-rural wage premium in the US, which has both a level and a
growth component. The empirical literature that followed has highlighted the presence
of spatial sorting (Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2008), in the context of France)
and faster wage growth associated to longer tenure in large cities (De La Roca and
Puga (2016), using a sample of Spanish workers).4
3

In their seminal handbook chapter, Duranton and Puga (2004) list matching and learning as two
of the three main potential sources of agglomeration economies, input sharing being the third one.
4
Eckert, Hejlesen, and Walsh (2019) address the endogeneity of workers’ initial location decision by
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There have been examples of structural models that attempt to formalize and
discipline the various mechanisms that could account for the observed spatial wage
heterogeneity.5 Davis and Dingel (2019) assume that workers can divide their time
between working and interacting with others. Large cities emerge as the location in
which high-ability workers cluster in order to share their knowledge. Combes et al.
(2012) estimate that agglomeration economies, in contrast to selection due to stronger
competition, are responsible for the higher productivity of large cities, but they do not
take a stand on the sources of such agglomeration forces.6 While these papers address
the cross-sectional heterogeneity between cities, their static nature makes them silent
with respect to the life-cycle profile of the wage premium.
To the best of my knowledge, this paper introduces the first equilibrium model
with dynamic knowledge diffusion in cities that can be empirically estimated. The
mechanism I adopt is related to the theoretical contribution by Glaeser (1999). Glaeser
(1999) builds a two-period model, where homogeneous young workers learn from the
(skilled) old. By allowing for heterogeneity in human capital and learning ability in a
quantitative life-cycle model, this paper can speak to the evidence on selection into
migration, and on the short and medium run return to a change in location.7
Exploring the matching channel, Schmutz and Sidibé (2019) abstract from worker
heterogeneity and human capital, and build a model of the French economy with
frictional labor markets and migration. They find that faster job-to-job transitions
are a major source of wage growth within large cities. Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012)
use NLSY79 data to estimate a search and matching model equipped with exogenous
considering a sample of refugees that were randomly assigned to Danish cities. They find that, while
entry-level wages do not differ across space, accumulating experience in Copenhaghen significantly
increases the probability of working in high-skill occupations and high-wage firms.
5
Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2010) review the issues involved in the identification of the
city-size wage premium using reduced-form specifications, in particular with regard to the difficulties
implied by mobility over the life cycle. Estimating the foundations of the city-size wage premium is
empirically challenging when there exists a systematic life-cycle component in both the frequency of
labor market episodes—like job-to-job transitions and human capital accumulation—irrespectively of
the worker’s location, and in the decision to move in or out of large cities. In this regard, a life cycle
model is key in order to recover the fundamental parameters that govern the pattern of wages and
migration episodes observed in the data.
6
See also Behrens, Duranton, and Robert-Nicoud (2014), who jointly model sorting, selection,
and agglomeration in order to account for variations in productivity between and within cities.
7
In a second version of his model, Glaeser (1999) allows for multiple skill types, but, in order to
maintain tractability, he assumes away migration across cities.
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returns from experience in cities of different size. They find that search frictions are
not significantly different between small and large cities, while working in large cities
is associated with a steeper wage profile.8 The theoretical contribution in Martellini
and Menzio (2018) helps understand why the results in Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012)
differ from mine. Martellini and Menzio (2018) provide restrictions on the shape of
the match quality distribution, under which increasing returns to scale in the search
process are consistent with the observed lack of variation in labor market flows with
respect to city size. While the model in this paper satisfies those restrictions, this is
not the case for Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012). I also provide external evidence that
supports the existence of lower search frictions in larger labor markets, based on the
heterogeneity in search behavior of workers and firms along the city-size distribution.
In addition, I replace the exogenous difference in the return from experience across
cities with an equilibrium learning model that can be used for policy analysis.
A related literature takes the existence of spatial wage differentials as given, and
focuses on its aggregate implications. Hsieh and Moretti (2019) and Herkenhoff,
Ohanian, and Prescott (2018) study the effect of relaxing land-use regulation in
some large US cities, or some states, on total output, through to the relocation of
workers toward more productive locations. Importantly, they abstract from worker
heterogeneity and human capital accumulation. In those papers, the key determinant of
spatial productivity differentials is given by locations’ exogenous TFP levels. Compared
to this literature, I show that endogenizing the sources of spatial wage differentials—and
their equilibrium response to a change in policy—might significantly reduce the
resulting income gains.
An additional benefit of building an equilibrium model with endogeneous productivity differences between locations is that it allows me to characterize the efficient
allocation in the economy, given the presence of agglomeration forces and knowledge
spillovers. Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2019) compute the efficient allocation in a
static setting with multiple locations, and positive production externalities within
and between two sets of workers—college and high school graduates. They find
8

Using German data, Dauth et al. (2019) provide evidence that larger cities are characterized by
higher assortative matching between workers and firms. Importantly, their findings are robust to
controlling for heterogeneity in the firm and worker composition of cities. See also Gould (2007) for
a dynamic model in which a worker’s life-cycle wage profile is a function of his location.
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that the optimal educational sorting is weaker than in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Schwartzman (2019) build a model that shares many
features with Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2019), but they recover negative cross-type
externalities. The optimal allocation in their paper features an increase in sorting of
high-skilled workers into large cities. The dynamic setting in this paper shares key
features with both those models. Quantitatively, I find that the congestion created
by high school graduates in large cities—as in Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Schwartzman (2019)—plays a dominant role in determining the optimal allocation, compared
with the benefits from relocating college graduates into (human capital-poor) small
cities—in the spirit of Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2019).
Methodologically, this paper nests into the literature that studies productivity gains
through knowledge diffusion. This literature has built on the theoretical contributions
by, among others, Luttmer (2007), Lucas (2009), Lucas and Moll (2014), Perla and
Tonetti (2014), who developed models in which the engine of growth is the imitation
of other workers’, or firms’, productivity. Recent empirical work has attempted to
quantify the importance of this channel in various economic environments. Herkenhoff
et al. (2018) and Jarosch, Oberfield, and Rossi-Hansberg (2019) measure the amount
of learning from coworkers inside a firm; Buera and Oberfield (2019) consider a world
in which the stock of knowledge of a country depends on the productivity of its
international trade partners; Fogli and Guerrieri (2019) study how neighborhood
quality affects the process of children’s skill formation. Differently from the existing
work, I explore the life-cycle contribution of knowledge diffusion in accounting for
the remarkable difference in wage profiles across cities. Compared to the common
assumption of vertical imitation, i.e. workers only learn from those who are more
skilled than they are, I adopt a flexible knowledge diffusion technology that also allows
for horizontal imitation, i.e. workers learn from everyone. I then use heterogeneity
in wage growth for workers in different positions of the entry wage distribution to
discipline the contribution of these two types of knowledge diffusion, and I find that
they are both quantitatively significant. This paper also shares some key features
with Lucas (2004). His model aims at accounting for the long-run transition from
a rural to an urban economy, where the latter is characterized by a human capital
intensive technology and by learning from others. In contrast, I focus on a stationary
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equilibrium in which small and large cities coexist and host heterogenous workers in
terms of productivity and life-cycle stages. At the cost of losing tractability, I provide
a quantification of the ‘external effect’ of other workers on the process of human
capital accumulation proposed by Lucas, in a way that is empirically consistent with
the labor market experience of workers in US cities.9
Last, this paper is also closely related to the literature on the determinants
of wage growth over the life cycle, both within and between jobs. In a seminal
paper, Topel and Ward (1992) show that a large fraction of the wage growth of
young workers is associated with transitions to different employers. A more recent
tradition of papers has used models with search and matching frictions to study the
reallocation of workers toward better jobs, a process known as ‘climbing the job ladder’
(Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)). Bagger et al. (2014),
Menzio, Telyukova, and Visschers (2016) augment a search model with human capital
accumulation through learning by doing, and measure the contribution of both job
transitions and learning to life-cycle wage growth. The present paper contributes to
this literature by exploring how search efficiency and human capital accumulation
are affected by a worker’s location. In this paper, the intensity of search frictions is
allowed to depend on city size through the presence of non-constant returns to scale in
the matching function. To the traditional skill acquisition through learning by doing,
I add a process of knowledge diffusion, which is affected by the size and composition
of the city where the worker is located.

1.2

The Model

I consider an economy made of two types of locations, small and large cities. Cities
are inhabited by a continuum of workers with different age, education, and human
capital, and by a continuum of identical firms. Inside each city, or local labor market,
workers can be either employed or unemployed. Local labor markets are characterized
9

The main specification in Lucas (2004) is such that everyone in the city only learns from the
most skilled worker. Hence, he conjectures that a social planner would want only the ‘leader’ to invest
time in learning, in order to maximize the extent of knowledge spillovers. However, he concludes
that "if one is to gain the ability to use the theory to discover ways to improve on the equilibrium, a
better description of the social character of the learning process will be needed".

10

by search frictions and heterogeneity in firm-worker match quality. Workers search
both on and off the job. When they contact a firm, they observe the quality of
the potential match and decide whether to form a new employment relationship.
Workers also search across cities, but must pay a moving cost if they decide to migrate.
Workers accumulate human capital through learning by doing and through interactions
with other workers, thanks to knowledge diffusion (or imitation). While learning
by doing is unaffected by the worker’s location, I assume that interactions require
geographic proximity, so that workers exclusively learn from those who are located
in their same city. Both migration decisions over the life cycle and human capital
accumulation determine the equilibrium size and composition of cities. In turn, these
city characteristics feed back into workers’ decision problems. City size is allowed to
affect the amount of search frictions and the frequency of interaction between workers,
through increasing returns to scale in the labor market and in the process of knowledge
diffusion, respectively. The human capital composition of a city determines the quality
of peers. Workers must consume a scarse non-tradeable local good whose equilibrium
price is also affected by city size and composition. Local, or house, prices operate as a
congestion force in workers’ location choice.
In the remainder of this section, I first present a rigorous description of the economic
environment, then I define a stationary equilibrium for this economy.

Environment
Time is continuous and goes from 0 to ∞.
Geography.
The economy is made of N small cities and 1 large city. Cities, or locations, are
denoted by i ∈ {small, large}. Small and large cities are heterogenous with respect
to the meeting rate in the labor market, the rate of interaction between workers, the
equilibrium distribution of peers, and house prices. These features are rationalized
by the existence of increasing returns to scale in the search and knowledge diffusion
processes, sorting on unobservable human capital, and consumption of a scarse nontradable good. In equilibrium, these differences are the endogenous outcomes that
result from a fundamental heterogeneity between cities with respect to their housing
11

supply function, migration opportunities to other cities, and vacancy creation cost, all
of which I explain in detail below.
Workers
Demographics. The economy is populated by a measure M of workers. Workers
are indexed by the tuple (h, a, e). Human capital h is a discrete variable that belongs
to the set H = {h1 , h2 , ..., hL } and evolves endogenously over the life cycle. Age is
denoted by a ∈ {y, o}, where y stands for young, and o for old. e denotes the worker’s
education type, which is permanent throughout his life and is equal to either hs (high
school) or col (college). Workers inelastically supply one indivisible unit of labor
and maximize the present value of net flow income discounted at rate r. Net flow
income is equal to bi h − q e pi if the worker is unemployed, or ωzh − q e pi , if the worker
is employed at a job of match quality z and receives a piece rate ω. bi is the gross
flow payoff per unit of human capital from being unemployed in city i, and q e pi is
the flow cost from living in city i, discussed below. Workers are born young and
turn into old at Poisson rate ψ y .10 When old, they leave the economy (or retire) at
rate ψ o , and are replaced by a new young worker in their same city. Newborns draw
their education and initial human capital level from a distribution with cdf G0,i (h, e)
and probability mass function g0,i (h, e). I assume that the probability that a worker
enters the economy with given education depends on the educational attainment of
the worker he is replacing. Conditional on e, the initial human capital distribution
is independent of the worker’s location. This implies that G0,i (h, e) = Gh0 (h|e)Ge0,i ,
where Ge0,i = Ge0 (COLi (o)) and COLi (o) is the equilibrium fraction of old college
graduates in city i.11
Human capital accumulation. Workers accumulate human capital through
two channels.
10

For the remaining of this paper, the word ‘rate’ stands for ‘Poisson rate’, unless otherwise
specified.
11
Workers in the NLSY79 sample were administrated a test of cognitive ability, known as the
Armed Force Qualifying Test (AFQT). The assumption I make on the workers’ initial distribution
is motivated by the observation that, conditional on education, the average AFQT score is almost
identical in small and large cities, as already documented by De La Roca, Ottaviano, and Puga
(2019) and Baum-Snow and Pavan (2012). In the quantitative section, I also show that the model
replicates the life-cycle distribution of college graduates across cities, including at labor market entry.
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First, they experience the so-called ‘learning by doing’, which captures the additional skills a worker gains by performing a given set of tasks while employed. This
form of learning represents those aspects of the human capital accumulation process
that are unaffected by the worker’s location. Due to learning by doing, the human
capital of an employed worker with education e improves from h` to h`+1 at rate
η e exp(−ηh` ).
This formulation generates a decline in learning probability with respect to the worker’s
current human capital, while it allows the level of the learning rate to vary by education.
Second, I model how interactions between workers spur the exchange of ideas.
This form of learning—that I define knowledge diffusion, or imitation—is potentially
influenced by the economic environment in which the worker is located. For example,
the rate at which ideas flow between workers may depend on city size, as highly
populated cities may be characterized by more frequent social interactions. I define
the dependence of the meeting rate between workers on city size, i.e. the existence of
increasing returns to scale in the frequency of interactions, as the ‘flow of ideas’ channel.
In addition, the amount of learning that occurs through imitation is likely to depend
on the human capital of the individuals a worker interacts with. Therefore, if imitation
requires geographic proximity (as suggested, among others, by Jaffe, Trajtenberg, and
Henderson (1993), Akcigit et al. (2018)), so that workers only learn from those who
are located in their same city, the composition of a city is also a crucial determinant
of the gains from knowledge diffusion. I define the contribution of the human capital
composition of a city to learning as peer effects, or ‘peers’. In practice, the actual shape
of the imitation process is theoretically ambiguous, and it is ultimately an empirical
question. I model a flexible imitation technology by assuming that a worker in city
i experiences an increase in human capital from h` to h`+1 at rate σ i κ(Gi (h`˜), h` , e),
where σ i ≡ σ(Mi ), for some function σ. The dependence of the learning rate on city
size, Mi , and on the equilibrium distribution of human capital in city i, Gi (h`˜), is
meant to capture the flow of ideas channel and peer effects, respectively. Concretely,
the function κ takes the form,
κ(Gi (h`˜), h` , e) = EGi (h`˜) [η ev max{h`˜ − h` , 0} + η eh h`˜].
13

The first term on the right-hand side captures the form of learning that exclusively
occurs when interacting with more-skilled workers (vertical imitation). This is the
type of knowledge diffusion that has been most frequently assumed in the theoretical
literature (Lucas (2009), Lucas and Moll (2014), Perla and Tonetti (2014)). The
second term represents the fact that workers might learn from everyone else, since
even less-skilled workers have some knowledge to transfer (horizontal imitation). The
technology of knowledge diffusion can be interpreted as follows. A worker of type
h` meets another worker of type h`˜ ∼ Gi (h`˜), and he becomes of type h`+1 with
probability η eh h`˜, if `˜ ≤ `, or with probability η eh h`˜ + η ev (h`˜ − h` ), if `˜ > `.12
Although the focus of this paper is on how human capital accumulation is affected by
the worker’s location, accounting for learning by doing plays the role of controlling for
selection of workers into different locations according to their educational level. Absent
this channel, the role of imitation in large cities is overstated if college graduates are
more likely to both live in large cities, and experience faster wage growth irrespectively
of their location.
Firms
Each city is also populated by a positive measure of firms. Firms operate a constant
returns to scale technology that transforms one unit of labor into zh units of output.
The variable z denotes the quality of the match, which is the component of productivity
that is specific to the firm-worker pair, while h is the human capital of the worker.
Firms maximize the present value of their profits, (1 − ω)zh, discounted at rate r.
Local Labor Market.
The labor market is characterized by search frictions. Workers can be either employed
or unemployed.13 An unemployed worker who lives in city i contacts a firm, also
located in city i, at rate λ0,i ≡ λ0 (Mi ). The dependence of λ0 on city size is what I
12

Since the support of the human capital distribution is bounded from above, workers of type hL
experience neither learning by doing, nor knowledge diffusion. In practice, H is chosen so that only a
negligible measure of workers ever achieves the human capital value hL over the life cycle.
13
I do not model flows into and out of the labor force. In the empirical section, I pool unemployed
workers and those out of the labor force into a single category that I simply refer to as ‘unemployment’.
As stated in the quantitative section, I estimate the model on a representative sample of young males,
for whom fluctuations in labor force participation are less likely to be a concern.
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define the ‘matching’ channel. This channel captures the idea that, because of lower
information and transportation frictions, workers in larger cities have access to a
broader set of potential employers. Employed workers in city i contact firms in their
same city at rate λ1,i ≡ λ1 (Mi ) = ρλ0,i , where the parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1) captures the
relative search efficiency on the job. Upon meeting, the firm-worker pair draws a
match quality ẑ ∼ F (ẑ), where ẑ ∈ [z, z̄], z > 0 and z̄ ≤ ∞.14 If the pair decides to
form a match, it starts producing, and the worker receives a fraction β of the gains
from trade. If they do not, they keep searching. Jobs are exogenously destroyed at
rate δ e .
In the first part of the paper, I take the function λ as exogenous. In Section 1.4, I
endogenize the meeting rates using a zero-profit condition in the market for vacancies.
Location Choice
Workers in city i are also contacted by firms located in a different city, which I refer
to as city −i. The meeting rate between an unemployed worker in city i = small
and a firm in city −i = large is denoted by λ∗0,−i ≡ λ∗0 (M−i ) = ρ∗ λ0,−i . The meeting
rate between an unemployed worker in city i = large and a firm in each one of
the N cities −i = small is denoted by N1 λ∗0,−i ≡ N1 λ∗0 (M−i ) = N1 ρ∗ λ0,−i , so that the
overall cross-city meeting rate for workers in the large city is equal to ρ∗ λ0,small . The
parameter ρ∗ captures the extent of search frictions across cities.
While it imposes a restriction on migration opportunities, this parsimonious
specification corresponds to the intuition that if a larger city generates more job offers
for its current residents, it does so for workers in a different city as well, although
possibly at a proportionally lower rate. In the quantitative section, I show that not
only the model matches the average hazard rate of migrating, but it is also able to
tightly match the life-cycle behavior of migration flows in both directions.
Upon meeting, the firm-worker pair observes the quality of the match ẑ ∼ F (ẑ).
Differently from meetings that occur inside a given city, the worker also draws a
migration cost c ∼ D(c), which is iid distributed across migration episodes. Given the
realization of (ẑ, c), one of the following events occurs: i) the worker migrates and the
14

In the quantitative section, I empirically motivate the assumed lack of heterogeneity in ρ and F
across cities.
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match is formed, ii) the worker migrates but the firm-worker pair decides not to form
the match, in which case the worker becomes unemployed in city −i, iii) the worker
does not migrate, and remains in his current city and employment state.
In the rest of this paper, I focus on an equilibrium in which small cities are all
identical to each other, and it is then convenient to assume away any migration flow
between them. Under the classification I adopt in the quantitative section, the number
of small cities in the US economy is much larger than the number of large cities.
Therefore, setting N > 1 is necessary in order to aggregate observations at the city
level into macroeconomic statistics.
Housing Market
Each city i is characterized by a supply function for housing,
pi = p0,i Qi γ i

p0,i > 0, γ i ∈ R,

where γ i is the (inverse) elasticity of housing supply. This specification is analogous to
Hsieh and Moretti (2019). I also assume that the housing stock is owned by absentee
landlords, so that housing income does not accrue to the workers in the economy.
A worker of education e, located in city i, consumes q e units of housing, hence he
pays a flow price q e pi . The parameter q e captures how the amount, or quality, of
housing services varies by education. While I refer to pi as house price, or local
price, for simplicity, pi is meant to represent both non-tradeable consumption and the
components of tradeable goods whose price is affected by local house prices.
Contracts
To conclude the description of the environment, I assume that the contracts offered
by firms to workers are sufficiently flexible that the outcome of the matching process
is bilaterally efficient, in the sense that the joint value of a match—i.e. the sum of the
presented discounted value of the firms’s profit and the worker’s utility—is maximized.
As a consequence, the allocation of workers across jobs and cities does not depend on
the history of wages. Many contractual environments satisfy this convenient property
(see Menzio and Shi (2011) for some examples). In this paper, I follow the approach
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in Bagger et al. (2014). Specifically, a worker is paid a fraction ω of his productivity,
a so-called ‘piece rate’, which implies that his wage is equal to ωzh. The wage setting
mechanism is described in details in Appendix 1.A, but it can be summarized as
follows.
When a worker is hired, either from unemployment or through a job-to-job transition, the equilibrium piece rate is the unique value of ω that solves the Nash bargaining
problem, where the worker’s bargaining power is equal to β. The firm’s threat point is
always equal to 0, since firms do not make any profit unless they hire a worker. The
worker’s threat point is the present discounted value of being unemployed, if he is
hired from unemployment, or the joint value of the previous match, if he was already
employed. Over the course of the employment relationship, the worker might receive
three types of outside offers. First, as already mentioned, if an outside offer triggers
a separation, the piece rate is pinned down by Nash bargaining with the new firm.
Second, if the worker’s present discounted value of utility implied by his current piece
rate is higher than the maximum value the new potential employer can offer, neither
the worker’s employer nor his piece rate changes. A new potential employer would
always offer, at most, the joint value of the new potential match. Third, even if a
job-to-job transition does not occur—because the joint value of the current match
is higher than the joint value of the new potential match—the piece rate is revised
upward if the worker receives an outside offer that would deliver more value to the
worker than what he is currently being promised by his employer.
Notice that a worker who migrates to a different city incurs a one-time cost c.
Hence, in every unemployment-to-employment, or job-to-job, transition that requires
a change of location, the realized value of c needs to be subtracted from the joint
value in the new employment relationship. Similarly, an outside offer to a worker in
city i from a firm in city −i triggers a wage raise only if accepting the offer would
provide more value to the worker than what he is currently being promised, even after
subtracting the migration cost the worker would have to pay.15
15

To keep the model simple, I rule out the possibility of quitting a job while remaining inside the
same city. This assumption is quantitatively innocuous, as I find that only 0.03% of workers are
employed in a match they would not have formed to begin with. Absent this assumption, quitting
would be observed in equilibrium after a worker becomes old or he accumulates human capital,
whenever i) the reservation match quality is increasing in age or in human capital, for at least certain
values of h, and ii) the worker’s match quality is sufficiently close to its reservation value. Besides,
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Definition of a Stationary Equilibrium
In this section, I define a stationary equilibrium for this economy. The term stationary
stands for the fact that the set of equilibrium objects is constant over time. As
mentioned above, I restrict attention to equilibria in which the N small cities are
all identical to each other in terms of size and composition. In order to define
an equilibrium, I introduce the following notation. Let U (h` , a, e, i) be the present
discounted value of income of an unemployed worker of human capital h` , age a,
education level e, who lives in city i. Let V (h` , a, e, i, z) be the sum of the present
discounted value of utility to the worker and profit to the firm if the worker has type
(h` , a, e), the firm-worker pair is located in city i, and the employment relationship
has match quality z. I refer to V (h` , a, e, i, z) as the joint value of a match.
The value of unemployment U (h` , a, e, i) satisfies the following Hamilton-JacobiBellman Equation (HJBE),
rU (h` , a, e, i) = bi h` − q e pi +
σ i κ(Gi , h` , e)[U (h`+1 ) − U ]I{a = y} + ψ a [U (o)I{a = y} − U ]+
λ0,i EF [max{β(V (ẑ) − U ), 0}]+
λ∗0,−i EF,D [max{β(V (−i, ẑ) − U (−i)) + U (−i) − U − c,
β(V (−i, ẑ) − U − c), U (−i) − U − c, 0}].
(1.1)
For ease of notation, I omit the dependence of the value and policy functions on
the right-hand side of the HJBEs in this section from those elements of the worker’s
individual state that are the same as in the value on the left-hand side. The LHS of
Equation (1.1) is the annuitized value of unemployment. The first line on the RHS is
the flow payoff of unemployment, net of the house price. The second line shows the
gains from knowledge diffusion and the transition to old age (retirement) if the worker
is young (old). The third line shows the option value of searching in the worker’s
current city, which is equal to the rate at which an unemployed worker meets a firm,
if quitting is allowed, unemployment represents a credible outside option, which might trigger an
increase in the piece rate. This possibility would complicate the analysis without adding any relevant
insight. What makes this restriction quantitatively negligible is the fact that the reservation match
quality is almost constant in age and in the level of human capital, and that workers leave marginal
matches at a sufficiently high rate.
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multiplied by the fraction of surplus that accrues to the worker, if the match is formed.
Since it is easy to show that the joint value of a match is strictly increasing in its
quality, the decision to create a match gives rise to a cutoff match quality R(h` , a, e, i),
which is implicitly defined by
V (h` , a, e, i, R(h` , a, e, i)) = U (h` , a, e, i).

(1.2)

The last two lines of Equation (1.1) describe the event in which the worker contacts a
firm in city −i. According to the realization of (ẑ ∼ F , c ∼ D), the gain from a crosscity meeting is equal to the maximum between four terms: i) moving as employed to
city −i, having unemployment in city −i as outside option in the bargaining protocol
(high ẑ, low c), ii) moving as employed to city −i, having unemployment in city i as
outside option (high ẑ, high c), iii) moving as unemployed to city −i (low ẑ, low c),
iv) not moving (low ẑ, high c). The max operator in the fourth line pins down the
migration cost threshold, x(h` , a, e, i, z, z ∗ ), that a worker of type (h` , a, e) in city i,
and with match quality z, is willing to pay to move to city −i in a job of quality z ∗ .
To avoid introducing additional notation, I adopt the convention that a value of z
and/or z ∗ equal to 0 stands for a worker who is unemployed in city i and/or moves as
unemployed to city −i. The cutoff migration costs are given by
x(h` , a, e, i, 0, 0) = U (h` , a, e, −i) − U (h` , a, e, i),

(1.3)

x(h` , a, e, i, 0, z ∗ ) = V (h` , a, e, −i, z ∗ ) − U (h` , a, e, i).

(1.4)

The HJBE (1.5) describes the joint value of a firm-worker pair,
rV (h` , a, e, i, z) = zh` − q e pi +
[σ i κ(·) + η e exp(−ηh` )][V (h`+1 ) − V ]I{a=y} + ψ a [V (o)I{a=y} − V ]+
δ e (U − V ) + λ1,i EF [max{β(V (ẑ) − V ), 0}]+
λ∗1,−i EF,D [max{β(V (−i, ẑ) − U (−i)) + U (−i) − V − c,
β(V (−i, ẑ) − V − c), U (−i) − V − c, 0}].
(1.5)
As most events are common to employed and unemployed workers, I only highlight the
differences between the terms in Equation (1.5) and their counterparts in Equation
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(1.1). In the first line on the RHS, the flow payoff is given by the output produced by
the firm-worker pair, net of the house price. The human capital accumulation process
in the second line is analogous to the process for unemployed workers, except for the
presence of learning by doing. The third line shows the change in value that follows
an exogenous job destruction, and the expected gain from searching on the job in city
i. Since V is strictly increasing in z, such gain is positive only if the worker draws
a match quality ẑ > z. The last two lines are identical to those in Equation (1.1),
except for the fact that V replaces U as the current value. Therefore, the migration
cost thresholds in Equations (1.3) and (1.4) are replaced by, respectively,
x(h` , a, e, i, z, 0) = U (h` , a, e, −i) − V (h` , a, e, i, z),

(1.6)

x(h` , a, e, i, z, z ∗ ) = V (h` , a, e, −i, z ∗ ) − V (h` , a, e, i, z).

(1.7)

Labor market and location decisions, learning, and aging induce a distribution
of workers over the state space. In equilibrium, this distribution feeds back into
the agents’ decisions. First, city size determines the frequency of meetings between
workers and firms (the matching channel), and the rate of knowledge diffusion (the
flow of ideas channel). Second, the human capital distributions of cities determine the
magnitude of peer effects. Third, the size and educational composition of cities affect
house prices, hence workers’ location choice.
The Kolmogorov Forward Equation, KFE, (1.8) describes the law of motion of the
measure of unemployed workers, φ(h` , a, e, i, 0),
0 = σ i [κ(Gi , h`−1 , e)φ(h`−1 ) − κ(Gi , h` , e)φ(h` )]I{a = y}+
ψ y φ(y)I{a = o} − ψ a φ + ψ o g0,i (h` , e)Mi (o)I{a = y}−
Z z̄
φ(ẑ)dẑ+
λ0,i φ[1 − F (R)] + δ
z
(1.8)


Z z̄
1
F (R) λ∗0,i D(x(−i, 0, 0))φ(−i, 0) + λ∗1,i
D(x(−i, ẑ, 0))φ(−i, ẑ)dẑ −
Ni
z


Z z̄
∗
λ0,−i φ F (R(−i))D(x(0, 0)) +
D(x(0, ẑ))dF (ẑ) .
R(−i)

The LHS is the derivative of the distribution with respect to time, which is equal to 0
in a steady state. The first line on the RHS states that learning through imitation
induces an outflow of young workers of human capital h` and an inflow of young
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workers of human capital h`−1 . The second line shows the inflow and outflow of workers
due to aging, and the entry of young workers into the labor market. Newborns are
distributed according to g0,i (h` , e). They replace old workers in city i—whose measure
is denoted by Mi (o)—at rate ψ o . The third line is related to local labor market flows.
It shows the flow of workers out of unemployment because of an accepted job offer, and
the inflow into unemployment of workers whose jobs are destroyed. The fourth line
represents the inflow of workers from city −i, who are either unemployed or employed
at some match quality ẑ, before moving to city i as unemployed. Such workers draw a
sufficiently low migration cost that induces them to migrate, but also draw a match
quality below the reservation value in city i. The term 1/Ni accounts for the fact that,
while all the mobility from small cities happens toward the single large city in the
economy, workers in large cities are equally likely to receive an offer from any one of
the N small cities. Hence,
(
1 if i = large
Ni =
N if i = small.
The fifth line describes the migration flow in the opposite direction. It shows the flow
of workers into city −i, either as unemployed or as employed at match quality ẑ.
Equation (1.9) is the KFE for the measure of employed workers at match quality
z, φ(h` , a, e, i, z),
0 = {[σ i κ(·) + η e exp(−ηh`−1 )]φ(h`−1 ) − [σ i κ(·) + η e exp(−ηh` )]φ(h` )}I{a = y}+
ψ y φ(y)I{a = o} − ψ a φ+
Z

z

λ0,i φ(0)f (z)I{z ≥ R} + λ1,i
φ(ẑ)dẑf (z) − λ1,i φ(1 − F (z)) − δ e φ+
z


Z z̄
1
∗
∗
f (z)I{z ≥ R} λ0,i D(x(−i, 0, z))φ(−i, 0) + λ1,i
D(x(−i, ẑ, z))φ(−i, ẑ)dẑ −
Ni
z


Z z̄
∗
λ1,−i φ F (R(−i))D(x(z, 0)) +
D(x(z, ẑ))dF (ẑ) .
R(−i)

(1.9)
Equation (1.9) is analogous to Equation (1.8), except for few differences. First,
employed workers accumulate human capital through learning by doing, and not just
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through knowledge diffusion. Second, the measure of employed workers at match
quality z increases because of both hiring from unemployment, and on-the-job search
by workers with match quality ẑ < z (third line, first two terms). It also decreases
because of transitions to jobs with quality above z, and to unemployment (third line,
last two terms). The fourth line shows the inflow of workers from city −i into jobs
of match quality z in city i. The first term represents workers who are hired from
unemployment, the second term represents those who are already employed in city −i
at match quality ẑ. The fifth line shows the outflow of workers toward city −i, either
as unemployed, or as employed at some match quality ẑ.
From the steady-state distribution φ, it is possible to compute the measure of
workers of age a in city i,
Mi (a) =

L Z
X X
e=hs,col `=1

z̄


φ(h` , a, e, i, z)dz + φ(h` , a, e, i, 0), ,

(1.10)

z

and total population in city i,
Mi = Mi (y) + Mi (o).

(1.11)

Similarly, the share of college graduates of age a in city i, and the overall share of
college graduates in city i are given by, respectively,
i
PL hR z̄
φ
(h
,
a,
col,
i,
z)dz
+
φ(h
,
a,
col,
i,
0)
`
i `
`=1
z
COLi (a) =
,
(1.12)
Mi (a)
and

COLi (y)Mi (y) + COLi (o)Mi (o)
.
Mi
The human capital distribution in city i is
i
P
P
P` hR z̄
φ(h`˜, a, e, i, z)dz + φ(h`˜, a, e, i, 0)
˜
a=y,o
e=hs,col
`=1
z
Gi (h` ) =
.
Mi
COLi =

(1.13)

(1.14)

Last, the equilibrium price in the housing market is given by
γ

pi = p0,i Qi i = [(q col COLi + q hs (1 − COLi ))Mi ]γ i .
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(1.15)

Equations (1.10)-(1.14) show how the law of motion for the measure φ in Equations
(1.8) and (1.9) can be re-written in a compact form using the function Γ̃, defined as
0 = Γ̃(φ, R, x, λ, λ∗ ).

(1.16)

Equation (1.16) states that the evolution of φ is a function of its current value and of
the policy functions R and x. I also highlight the dependence of Γ̃ on the meeting
rates λ and λ∗ . This turns out to be convenient when I define the planner’s problem
in Section 1.6, in which the reduced-form meeting rates are replaced by a function of
the endogenous labor market tightness.
The content of the above equations can be summarized in the following definition.
Definition. A stationary equilibrium is a tuple {V, U, R, x, φ, p} of value and policy
functions, equilibrium distributions, and house prices such that i) U solves the HJBE
(1.1) ii) V solves the HJBE (1.5), iii) R satisfies the optimality condition (1.2), iv) x
satisfies the optimality conditions (1.3), (1.4), (1.6) and (1.7), v) φ solves the system
of KFEs (1.8)-(1.9), where Mi (a), COLi (a) and Gi (h` ) are given by (1.10), (1.12) and
(1.14), respectively, vi) p satisfies (1.15), where COLi is given by (1.13), and Mi by
(1.11).

1.3

Quantitative Analysis

The model is not amenable to a closed-form solution, due to the interaction between
labor market dynamics, human capital accumulation and location choice. Therefore, I
solve it numerically, by adapting the finite difference method introduced by Achdou
et al. (2017) to a spatial economy with search frictions and knowledge diffusion. After
describing the data (Section 1.3), and specifying the parametric assumptions employed
in the estimation (Section 1.3), I discuss the identification of the model parameters
(Section 1.3). The model is estimated via the method of simulated moments.16 The
results of the estimation are presented in Section 1.3. In Section 1.3, I validate the
16
Newborns in the model are all unemployed, while they are employed in the data. To bring the
model closer to the data, I follow a similar approach to Lise and Postel-Vinay (2019). I simulate a
pre-sampling period of 6 months in which I shut down all events that can happen to a worker, except
meeting a firm in the local labor market. I then drop the pre-sampling period, and consider the
worker’s state at the end of it as the initial condition.
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model by verifying its ability to replicate, without targeting, the wage difference
between movers and stayers in the years before and after migrating. Last, I address
the first research question of this paper by decomposing the wage premium into the
contribution of sorting, matching, flow of ideas, and peer effects (Section 1.3).

Data
The main source of data for this paper is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1979 (NLSY79). The NLSY79 is a survey of young men and women that were between
14 and 21 years old on December 31, 1978. The survey comprises a ‘cross-sectional’
subsample that is representative of the US population, and other supplemental samples
that represent minorities, econonomically disadvantaged, and population serving in
the US military. Interviews took place annually from 1979 until 1994, and biennially
thereafter. For each respondent, the NLSY79 contains information on highest educational attainment, weekly employment status, job transitions, wages, and location. In
order to have a homogeneous sample and avoid dealing with issues related to labor
force participation, I only use information on men from the cross-sectional subsample.
Further sample restrictions involve dropping individuals that entered the labor force
before January 1, 1978—i.e. the first date for which labor market information is
available—or completed 20 years of experience after 2012. I also drop individuals with
a significant amount of missing information on education, job history or location.17
The survey contains information on the respondents’ county of residence, which I
uniquely assign to a commuting zone (CZ), following the methodology developed by
David Dorn.18 Because of the small number of observations associated to each CZ, I
then group all the CZs in the sample into two size categories, according to their total
population in 1990. Each group contains CZs with population less, or more, than 750
thousand individuals. I refer to these groups as small and large cities, respectively.
The threshold is chosen in order to guarantee both substantial heterogeneity between
groups and similar group size in the NLSY79. The final sample contains information
on the labor market experience of 1532 men, for 20 consecutive years since the first
month they are observed as employed after completing formal education. In order to
17
18

Additional details about sample selection are provided in Appendix 1.A.
https://www.ddorn.net/data/Dorn_Thesis_Appendix.pdf
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assess the representativeness of the sample under consideration, I compute the value of
some key summary statistics in the NLSY79, and their counterparts in larger publicly
available datasets, the Current Population Study (CPS) and the US Decennial Census.
The share of men with at least a 4-year college degree in the NLSY79, 25.21%, is
close to the analogous statistics for the US economy in the same time period, 26.8%,
obtained from the CPS. The fraction of population living in large cities in the NLSY79
is 61.9%, against a value of 62.5% in the 1990 US Census. Last, average hourly
earnings, measured in 2014 dollars, are equal to $24.7, and they are somewhat higher
than the value of $21.6 obtained from the March Supplement of the CPS.

Parametric Assumptions
The estimation of the model requires imposing parametric assumptions on the relationship between city size and meeting rates, and on the distributions of match quality,
migration cost, and newborns’ human capital.
Local Labor Market. The meeting rate between unemployed workers and firms,
both located in city i, is given by the constant elasticity function
λ0,i ≡ λ0 (Mi ) = χMi χM ,

χ > 0, χM ∈ R.

The parameter χM represents the degree of returns to scale in the search process.
Match Quality Distribution. Upon meeting, a firm-worker pair samples a
match quality
z ∼ P areto(z, α)
z > 0, α > 1,
with cdf F (z), where z is the lower bound of the support of the distribution and α is
the tail coefficient. The choice of a Pareto distribution is motivated in Section 1.3.
Human Capital Accumulation. The rate at which ideas flow inside city i is
equal to
σ(Mi ) ≡ τ Mi τ M ,
τ > 0, τ M ∈ R.
Analogously to χM , τ M captures the degree of returns to scale in the process of
knowledge diffusion.
Migration Cost. Upon migrating, workers pay a cost c ∼ Logistic(µc , σ c ), with
cdf D(c). The parameters µc and σ c represent the mean and standard deviation of
25

the distribution, respectively. Similarly to the Normal, the Logistic distribution is
symmetric about the mean and can be described by two parameters that have a direct
mapping into the characteristics of the distribution itself. In a model with endogenous
migration decisions, the property of having a closed-form conditional expectation
makes the Logistic distribution computationally convenient.
Initial Human Capital Distribution. Let ĥ|e ∼ LogN (µe , σ e ) be a random
variable with pdf ĝ0h (ĥ|e). Let π e be the fraction of workers in the economy with
0
education e, and π e,e be the probability that a worker with education e is replaced
by one with education e0 . Newborns’ human capital and education are distributed
according to
e
g0,i (h` , e) = g0h (h` |e)g0,i
,
where
ĝ h (h` |e)
g0h (h` |e) = PL 0 h
,
ĝ0 (h`ˆ|e)
ˆ
`=1

(1.17)

col
g0,i
= [π col,col COLi (o) + π hs,col (1 − COLi (o))]π̂.

(1.18)

Equation (1.17) states that the conditional distribution of initial human capital is
assumed to be approximately log-normal (as in Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2006))
on a finite set of points, with parameters µe and σ e that are allowed to vary by
education.19 According to Equation (1.18), for each old worker that exits the economy
in city i, the education of the newborn in the same city is governed by the transition
0
probability π e,e . The normalizing factor π̂ guarantees that the total fraction of college
graduates in the economy is equal to π col .20

Identification
The model is calibrated at monthly frequency. The choice of a fine partition of
workers’ experience allows to better replicate the behavior of some high-frequency
Rh
The value of hL is such that 0 L ĝ0h (x|e)dx ≈ 1, ∀e.
20
The normalizing factor is given by
P
π col i Ni Mi (o)
π̂ = P
.
col,col COL (o) + π hs,col (1 − COL (o))]
i
i
i Ni Mi (o)[π
19
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events, like unemployment-to-employement and job-to-job transitions. Even though
all the parameter are either externally calibrated or jointly estimated from simulated
data, I provide an intuitive identification argument that clarifies how specific empirical
facts are informative about certain model parameters. Overall, there are 25 internally
estimated parameters, using 29 targeted moments.
Human Capital Accumulation and Aging. The rate of human capital accumulation through knowledge diffusion is given by σ(Mi )κ(Gi (h`˜), h` , e), where
σ(Mi ) = τ Miτ M . Since κ is a constant returns to scale function of the parameters η eh
and η ev , I normalize τ = 1. Hence, the set of parameters related to human capital accol
hs
col
hs
col
cumulation is given by {τ M , η hs
h , η h , η v , η v , η , η , η}. In order to estimate these
8 parameters, I define 8 groups of workers. First, I split the sample by educational
categories (hs and col). Then, within each category, workers are divided into those
with wages in the top and bottom half of the wage distribution in the first year of
employment. This operation delivers four groups. Last, at any point of the life cycle,
each of the four groups is partitioned into workers located in large and small cities.21
The average growth rate of wages for workers in each group provides a moment
that is used in the estimation. Learning by doing is described by the parameters
η hs , η col , and η. Intuitively, η hs and η col determine the average wage growth by
educational category, and η reproduces the curvature of wage profiles, irrespectively of
col
hs
a worker’s location. The knowledge diffusion technology is described by η hs
v , ηv , ηh ,
hs
col
and η col
h . Vertical imitation, η v and η v , is identified from the faster growth rate of
wages—potentially heterogeneous across cities—for workers that are in the bottom
half compared to the top half of the initial wage distribution. Horizontal imitation,
col
η hs
h and η h , is pinned down by differences across cities in wage growth for workers
that start in the top half of the wage distribution. The parameter τ M leverages η ev
and η eh in determining the overall higher wage growth in large cities. Notice that
the mapping between the learning parameters and wage growth is affected by the
equilibrium human capital distribution in large and small cities. The better the quality
of peers in a city, the faster wage growth inside that city, even under a hypothetical
scenario in which τ M = 0.
Since young (old) workers age (retire) at rate ψ y (ψ o ), imposing ψ1 + ψ1 = 40 × 12
y

21

o

If I first split the sample by education, then by city size, and last by position in the within-city
initial wage distribution, I recover virtually identical growth rates of wages for each of the 8 groups.
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guarantees that workers retire after 40 years of work, on average. Only young workers
o
are assumed to accumulate human capital. The share of life spent as young, ψ ψ+ψ
, is
o
y
then pinned down by the ratio between the average wage in the second 10 years vs.
the first 10 years of labor market experience. Intuitively, for given total wage growth,
o
such ratio is higher the more time workers spend as young, i.e. the higher ψ ψ+ψ
.
o
y
e
Local Labor Market. The job destruction rate, δ , is taken directly from the
data. It is equal to the average conditional probability of becoming unemployed
in a given month, across the entire sample period. I now turn to the identification
of meeting rates in the local labor market. Because of the small sample size, the
remarkable variation in city size observed in the data is absorbed into two categories.
Therefore, the model is only able to identify the average meeting rate, conditional
on living in a large or a small city. Nevertheless, the choice of a parametric form
allows changes in city size to affect meeting rates in counterfactual experiments. I
pin down the elasticity of the number of meetings with respect to city size, χM , by
targeting the average wage premium between large and small cities. The intuition is
that a higher meeting rate makes firm-worker pairs more selective with respect to the
type of matches they are willing to form, which implies that the reservation match
quality is higher in larger cities. Notice that the human capital composition need not
be—and, in fact, it is not—the same across cities. Hence, higher match quality is only
responsible for the portion of the average wage premium that is not accounted for by
equilibrium sorting.
One could expect lower search frictions in larger cities to also generate higher
transition rates out of unemployment, or across jobs. However, in the data, the
unemployment rate and the average number of jobs held over the life cycle are
virtually identical across cities of different size. This empirical regularity imposes
a restriction on the shape of the match quality distribution. In an economy with
homogenous workers and a single location, Martellini and Menzio (2018) prove that, if
and only if z ∼ P areto(z, α), the presence of lower search frictions in a larger market,
i.e. χM > 0, is consistent with the observed similarity in labor market flows in cities
of different size. Quantitatively, I find that the intuition in Martellini and Menzio
(2018) carries through to the much richer environment of this paper. An alternative
hypothesis that could also account for the observed labor market flows within large
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and small cities is the existence of constant returns to scale in the search process,
χM = 0, combined with an arbitrary match quality distribution. As I show below,
under constant returns to scale, the model would underpredict the average wage
premium in the economy, and it would need to resort to other mechanisms outside
the ones proposed in this paper. More importantly, constant returns to scale would
be inconsistent with direct estimates of χM that I document in Section 1.3, and that I
obtain from measuring the heterogeneity in the job search behavior of workers and
firms along the city-size distribution. Reassuringly, the estimated value of χM that
allows the model to replicate the average wage premium in the economy is well in line
with such direct measures.
Since χ determines the level of the firm-worker meeting rate, this parameter is
identified by the average unemployment rate in the economy. Conditional on the
values of χ and χM , the relative efficiency of search on the job, ρ, is identified by the
average number of jobs that a worker holds during his first 20 years of work experience.
Match Quality Distribution and Bargaining Power. It is well known that
if z ∼ P areto(z, α), z cannot be separately identified from χ.22 Hence, I normalize
z = 1. The slope of the distribution, α, and workers’ bargaining power, β, are jointly
identified by the average wage growth in a job-to-job transition and from returns to
tenure at a firm. As a measure of returns to tenure, I use the wage difference between
workers that spent more—compared to less—than a fifth of their work experience at
a given firm (very similar results are found using other cutoffs). The argument goes
that both a thick tail of the distribution, i.e. a low value of α, and a high value of
β are consistent with high wage growth in a job-to-job transition. This is because a
thick tail is associated with high dispersion in match quality, hence high productivity
gains from changing jobs. At the same time, if workers have high bargaining power,
they immediately reap the benefit of a higher match quality, and see their wage
increase on impact. However, for given wage growth in a job-to-job transition, low
values of α and high β have opposite predictions in terms of returns to tenure. If
there is high heterogeneity in matches, and workers have low bargaining power (low
α, low β), returns to tenure are high, since outside offers are likely to trigger an
upward revision of the piece rate. Under this parametric configuration, workers receive
22
The rate at which
χ
χMi M F (R(h, a, e, i)) =

an unemployed worker of type (h, a, e) accepts a job in city i is equal to
χ
z
χMi M Rα (h,a,e,i)
. Clearly, labor market flows can only identify χz.
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the productivity gains from the creation of a better match over the course of the
employment relationship. In the opposite case (high α, high β), returns to tenure are
depressed, since the actual dispersion in match quality is low, and workers receive
most of the benefits from a job-to-job transition upon joining the new firm.
Location Choice. Workers in city i contact firms in city −i at a rate that
is ρ∗ times as large as workers that live in city −i. Migrating entails a cost c ∼
Logistic(µc , σ c ). The values of ρ∗ , µc and σ c are jointly identified by relative city size,
the hazard rate of moving from a small to a large city, and the share of workers in
large cities with a college degree.23 Since idiosyncratic migration motives—captured
by σ c —are symmetric across cities, high values of σ c tend to equalize the equilibrium
relative city size, but also increase the probability that the realized migration cost is
sufficiently low for a worker to choose to migrate. Both decreasing µc and increasing
ρ∗ positively affects the migration hazard rate. However, since migration entails a
lump-sum cost, and college graduates earn higher income, on average, lower values of
µc would disproportionally facilitate the access of high school graduates to large cities.
Initial Human Capital Distribution. I normalize the mean of initial loghuman capital for high school graduates to µhs = 0. Given µhs , µcol is determined by
the initial mean wage gap between college and high school graduates in the economy.
The standard deviations of the initial human capital distributions, σ hs and σ col , are
pinned down by the inter-quartile range of initial wages (for high school and college
graduates, respectively). The value of π col is equal to the fraction of college graduates
0
in the data. Using information on parental education for workers in the sample, π e,e
is given by the probability that a worker has education e0 , conditional on his father’s
educational attainment e.
Housing Cost. The house price function in city i is described by a level, p0,i , and
an elasticity parameter, γ i . Workers with education e consume q e units of housing.
The values of γ i are taken from Saiz (2010).24 I normalize q hs = 1, and choose values
23

For given relative city size and hazard rate of moving from a small to a large city, the hazard
rate of moving in the opposite direction is pinned down by the law of motion for city size, combined
with the assumption of stationarity.
24
The online appendix in Saiz (2010) reports the elasticity of housing supply for 269 MSAs in
2000. I assign to γ large (γ small ) the population-weighted inverse elasticity for the 65 (204) MSAs
with population above (below) 750 thousand. Splitting the sample in Saiz (2010) according to the
size of the commuting zones that mostly overlap with those MSAs—when such CZs can be clearly
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of p0,i and q col so that each educational group has the average expenditure share on
non-tradeable goods computed by Moretti (2013).
Remaining Parameters. The monthly discount rate, r, is set to 1.25%, which
corresponds to an annual value of 15%, as in Herkenhoff et al. (2018). This value
is higher than what is usually adopted in traditional macroeconomic models. In
contrast to standard concave utility functions, a linear utility has an infinite elasticity
of substitution. Hence, it accomodates wide fluctuations in flow payoffs, which might
lead workers to temporarily accept negative wages, in exchange for significant wage
growth. Therefore, the value of r in this environment is meant to capture not only
the rate of time preference, but also (at least in part) the inverse of the workers’
intertemporal elasticity of substition.
The parameters bi are chosen to match a flow value from unemployment equal
to 60% of the average wage in city i. This target lies between the traditional value
of 40% in Shimer (2005) and the more recent estimate of 70% in Hall and Milgrom
(2008).
Last, the (relative) number of small cities, N , is equal to 9.5, which is the ratio
between the number of small and large cities in the 1990 US Census.

Estimation Results
Parameter Values
In this section, I discuss how the key estimated parameters shed light on the proposed
mechanisms behind the city-size wage premium and workers’ location choice. The full
list of parameters is reported in Table 1.1.
The degree of returns to scale in the technology of knowledge diffusion, τ M ,
is equal to 0.067. This value implies that, at the equilibrium relative city size,
Mlarge /Msmall = 15.7, workers in large cities experience 15.7τ M = 1.20 times more
interactions with each other than in small cities. The relative importance of vertical
and horizontal imitation is embodied in the parameters η ev and η eh . The estimation
implies that the human capital of a college graduate at the 75th percentile of the
human capital distribution in large cities grows at 2.76% per year, compared to 1.8%
identified, as it is the case for virtually all large cities—provides very similar results.
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Internally Estimated

Description

Value

σ hs

inital hc hs, std

0.28

µcol , σ col
χ
χM
ρ
ρ∗
µq

inital hc col, mean and std
meeting rate
returns to scale matching
relative search eff. on the job
relative search eff. across cities
migration cost (mean)

0.3, 0.47
0.06
0.20
0.4
0.08
2 × median wage

σq
α
β
τM

migration cost (std)
shape match quality distrib
workers’ bargaining power
returns to scale knowledge

1.6 × median wage
3.6
0.2
0.067

horizontal imitation

0, 0.0013

vertical imitation

0.0026, 0.007

η ,η ,η
ψ o /(ψ y + ψ o )

learning by doing
share of young

0.005, 0.008, 0.85
46%

p0,large , p0,small

house price (intercept)

4.6e-5, 0.007

pcol
0
blarge , bsmall

housing demand (col vs hs)
flow payoff unempl.

1.68
(1.27,1.13) × z

Externally Calibrated

Description

Value

µhs

inital hc hs, mean

0

δ hs , δ col
r

job destruction
discount rate

0.0135, 0.005
0.0125

π col

college share

0.2521

π hs,col , π col,col

intergen. transition rate to college

0.175, 0.62

γ large , γ small

(inverse) house supply elasticity

1.47−1 , 2.46−1

N
1/ψ y + 1/ψ o

number of small cities
average life span

9.5
40 × 12 months

col
η hs
h , ηh

η hs
v ,
hs

η col
v
col

Table 1.1. Parameter Values.
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for a worker in the same position of the human capital distribution of a small city. The
same comparison at the 25th percentile is 6% vs 4.56%. Clearly, college graduates learn
more in large than in small cities, and particularly so the less skilled they are. Notice
that this is a conservative representation of the heterogeneity in learning opportunity
across cities, since for any quantile of the distribution, the associated human capital
value is higher in large cities.25
Figure 1.2 provides a graphical intuition of the contribution of horizontal and
vertical imitation to the wage profiles of college graduates, given differences across
cities in the equilibrium distribution of human capital, Gi , and in the meeting rate
between workers, σ i . In the first row of the Figure, the top (bottom) lines of each
graph represent the life-cycle profiles of workers whose wage was in the top (bottom)
half of the wage distribution of college graduates in the first year of work. The solid
lines represent the wage paths obtained from the model using the baseline parameter
values. The baseline profiles are remarkably similar to their empirical counterparts
(see the comparison in Appendix 1.A). The dashed lines are obtained by simulating the
model under the following restrictions: η col
v = 0 and σ large = σ small . It is easy to see
that the resulting profiles are flatter than the baseline, and particularly so for workers
located in large cities, and with initially lower wages. Intuitively, initially less-skilled
workers would lose the most from the absence of vertical learning. Allowing η col
v to
take its estimated value largely fills the gap with respect to the baseline wage profiles,
but the model would still slightly underpredict the overall wage growth in large cities
(dashed-dotted lines in the top left panel). Once the estimated σ large replaces σ small in
the simulation of wages in large cities, the model is able to fully replicate the empirical
wage profiles. Interestingly, even under the restriction σ large = σ small , the simulated
paths go a long way toward accounting for the higher wage growth in large cities.
This result is due to the presence of better peers. The equilibrium human capital
distribution in large cities first order stochastically dominates the distribution in small
cities (bottom panels of Figure 1.2).
A similar wage pattern characterizes the labor market experience of high school
hs
col
col
graduates, though both η hs
v and η h take lower values than η v and η h , respectively.
In fact, I find that η hs
h = 0, which implies that initially high-skilled high school
For example, the human capital of a worker at the 25th percentile of the small city distribution
would increase at 9.6% per year if he was in a large city.
25
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graduates have virtually no room for further learning from others. College graduates
also accumulate more human capital than high school graduates irrespectively of
their location, due to a superior learning-by-doing technology (η col > η hs ). Recall
that learning is a prerogative of young workers. According to the estimated value of
ψ o /(ψ y + ψ o ) = 0.46, workers learn during their first 0.46 ∗ 40 = 18.4 years of working
life, on average.

Figure 1.2: Identification of the Knowledge Diffusion Technology
Top panels: wage profiles of college graduates in large (left) and small (right) cities.
Bottom panels: equilibrium human capital distributions. The legends in the top panels
characterize the top 3 lines in each graph. The same mapping between line styles and
parameter configurations applies to the three light-colored lines in the bottom of the
same graphs.

Turning to the characteristics of the search and matching technology, I find an
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elasticity of the contact rate between workers and firms with respect to city size, χM ,
equal to 0.2, which implies increasing returns to scale (χM = 0 corresponds to constant
returns). The estimated value of χM suggests that the frequency of meetings between
workers and firms, both located in a large city, is 15.7χM = 1.73 times higher than
the meeting rate inside a small city. At the same time, the estimated tail coefficient
of the Pareto distribution of match quality is α = 3.6, meaning that a match at the
75th percentile of the distribution is 35.7% more productive than a match at the 25th
percentile. As explained in the identification section, lower search frictions leverage
the dispersion in match quality, and allow for the formation of more productive jobs.
However, not all the productivity advantages of creating better matches are passed to
the workers through higher wages, since workers capture an estimated β = 20% of the
gains from trade.
The degree of returns to scale in the search technology is estimated by targeting
the average wage premium between small and large cities, at the equilibrium level
of sorting on human capital. Therefore, it is of particular interest to compare the
estimated value of χM with direct evidence on the heterogeneity in search frictions
across cities. Interpreting a firm-worker contact in the model as an application to an
open vacancy in the data, I compare the estimated value of χM with two empirical
measures of the same statistic. First, Martellini and Menzio (2018) report an estimate
of the elasticity of the number of applications per vacancy received by firms with
respect to the population of the commuting zone where the firm is located. The
estimated elasticity, provided to us by Ioana Marinescu, is equal to 0.52. On the
other side of the labor market, the 1982 wave of the NLSY79 collected information
on the most recent job search experience of all the workers who were employed at
the moment they were surveyed. Using information on the number of employers
the workers had contacted, and the number of weeks they had been looking for a
job, I compute the elasticity of the number of applications per week of search with
respect to the population of the commuting zone where they were living. To the best
of my knowledge, this estimate is new in the literature. I find an elasticity of 0.12.
Interestingly, the value of χM obtained from the model, i.e. 0.2, lies inside the range
of direct estimates derived from the worker, 0.12, and the firm side, 0.52.
With regard to the location choice, the estimated value of ρ∗ implies that workers
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contact firms in a different city at a rate that is only 8% the rate of workers who already
live in that local labor market. At the same time, the average migration cost, µc , is
equal to about 2 months of median income in the economy. In their seminal paper on
interstate migration, Kennan and Walker (2011) estimate a much larger average cost,
equal to more than 300 thousand dollars. Beyond comparing two different types of
location choice, an additional difference between their paper and mine is that I replace
a frictionless labor market with one characterized by search frictions. As pointed out
by Schmutz and Sidibé (2019), the presence of search frictions greatly reduces the size
of the migration cost that is necessary in order to replicate the observed mobility rate.
Besides, the model in this paper replicates, without targeting, the average wage gain
experienced by workers upon changing location, about 9%.26 If the observed level of
mobility was due to higher values of µc , the model would generate a counterfactually
high value of this statistic.27
Model Fit
Table 1.2 reports the model-generated moments next to their empirical counterparts.
While the number of targeted moments is greater than the number of parameters, the
model fits the data very well along all dimensions. In all the Figures of this section, the
thick blue (thin red) lines describe variables related to large (small) cities, while the
corresponding dotted lines show the analogous observations in the data, surrounded
by the 95% bootstrap confidence interval.28
Through the lens of the model, the characteristics of the knowledge diffusion
process generate variations in wage growth across locations, educational category
and relative position in the initial wage distribution. In line with the existence of
26

I compute the percentage wage change in the three months after migration, compared to the
three months before. The average value in the model is 9%, which is remarkably close to the empirical
9.1%. However, in the data, moving from a small to a large city is associated with a virtually identical
wage gain as moving in the opposite direction. In the model, wage gains are equal to 16% and 6%,
respectively. An asymmetric mobility cost, or a systematic preference for living in large cities, would
help close this gap.
27
The reason why the estimates in Kennan and Walker (2011) are also consistent with the observed
wage gain at migration is that, contrary to this paper, they allow for heterogeneity in location-specific
preferences across people. Once the utility gain from living in a preferred location is accounted for,
they show that the migration cost paid by movers is actually slightly negative.
28
The label ‘Years worked’ on the x-axis of the graphs is short for total labor market experience,
which includes the unemployment spells between two jobs.
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Moment (large/small)

Data

Model

unemp. rate (%)
n. of jobs
mean wage gap (%)
EE wage growth (%)
return to tenure (%)
UI replacement rate (%)

5.8/5.9
6.9/7.2
29.3
10.7/11.8
23.7
60

6.0/6.1
7.0/7.2
29.3
10.9/11.2
23.0
61.3/60.4

Cities
city size
college share (%)
hazard rate (small→big, %)
hazard rate (big→small, %)
exp share non-trad. (col, %)
exp share non-trad. (hs, %)

15.7
29/19
0.31
0.18
58
58

15.6
29/19
0.32
0.18
56/55
58.4/57.2

Wage growth (%)
bottom-col-large
bottom-col-small
top-col-large
top-col-small
bottom-hs-large
bottom-hs-small
top-hs-large
top-hs-small
wage 11-20 vs. 1-10 yr. of exp.

6.3
4.7
4.0
3.1
4.3
3.6
2.6
1.3
30.6

6.3
4.4
3.8
2.9
4.3
3.0
2.7
1.7
29.3

38.7

39.2

pctile, hs

1.63

1.64

75th /25th pctile, col

1.88

1.89

Labor Market

Initial Wage
col wage premium (%)
th

th

75 /25

Table 1.2. Targeted moments in the data and in the model.
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vertical imitation, workers with lower initial wages (i.e. in the bottom half of each
education-city category) experience faster wage growth. This is particularly true for
college graduates in large cities, whose wage grows at an average 6.3% per year, over
20 years, compared with 4.7% in small cities. The benefit of large cities also applies to
college graduates with high initial wages, who experience a 4% wage growth per year,
against 3% in small cities. Even though high school graduates are characterized by a
much flatter experience gradient, they display a similar pattern in terms of variations
in wage growth across cities and initial position in the wage distribution.
On the search and matching side, the average wage growth in a job-to-job transition,
which is key to identify the tail of the match quality distribution, is closely matched at
about 11%, and it is also very similar across cities. In addition, the model successfully
replicates the experience profile of the frequency of job-to-job transitions (or EE rate),
although the profile from the model is slightly flatter than the data at high levels of
labor market experience (Figure 1.3).

Figure 1.3: Job-to-Job Transition Rate
Job-to-job transition rate within large (thick blue line) and small (red thin line) cities,
in the model (solid line) and in the data (dotted line).

At early career stages, workers frequently change jobs, as they keep looking for a
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better match. After some years in which they ‘climb the job ladder’, the probability
of further improving on their current matches declines, and so does the frequency of
job-to-job transitions. Both in the model and in the data, the EE rate is remarkably
similar across cities of different size, and, as a consequence, so is the number of jobs
held after 20 years in the labor market (about 7). This finding is entirely consistent
with the existence of significantly lower search frictions in large cities. On the one
hand, employed workers in larger cities contact firms more frequently, contributing
to a higher observed number of transitions. On the other hand, the endogenous
distribution of employed workers over match qualities is also better in large cities.
This reduces the conditional probability of drawing a match quality that further
improves on the existing one, contributing to lowering the EE rate. If and only if the
sampling match quality distribution is Pareto, these two opposing forces cancel each
other out, delivering a pattern of job-to-job transitions that is line with the data. A
similar intuition can explain why the unemployment rate is virtually identical across
cities (≈ 6%): the equilibrium increase in the reservation match quality in large cities
prevents the higher meeting rate between firms and workers from turning into a higher
frequency of unemployment-to-employment transitions.
Turning to the location choice, the average hazard rates of moving from a small to
a large city, and vice versa, are equal to 0.31% and 0.18% per month, respectively.
The life-cycle profile of migration patterns is depicted in Figure 1.4. The model is
consistent with the fact that the hazard rate of migrating from small into large cities
is considerably larger than the hazard rate in the opposite direction. Furthermore,
the model replicates—without targeting—the steady decline in migration rates over
the life cycle. Large cities offer two main advantages: a higher rate of human capital
accumulation and lower search frictions in the labor market. As a consequence, they
attract more workers compared with small cities. The age profile of migration is also
consistent with the assumption that learning only happens at a ‘young’ age, and that
older workers, who are more often employed at better matches, are less likely to start
a new job, including in a different city.
The model generates an equilibrium relative city size that is almost identical to
the one observed in the data. The endogenously larger (smaller) city in the model
represents the average US commuting zone with a population of more (less) than 750
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Figure 1.4: Migration Hazard Rate
Hazard rate of moving out of a large (thick blue line) and a small (thin red line) city,
in the model (solid line) and in the data (dotted line).

thousand people in the 1990 Census. These two sets of cities had average population
of 2.2 milion and 140 thousand people, respectively. Figure 1.5 shows that the modelgenerated data resembles the mildly hump-shaped life-cycle behavior of the share
of workers located in large cities in the NLSY79 sample, although the confidence
interval cannot rule out that such share is constant. In addition, the model replicates
the educational composition of cities. Figure 1.6 shows the life-cycle profile of the
fraction of workers in large cities that have at least a 4-year college degree. The
average college share in large cities is tightly matched at 29%, compared with 19%
in small cities. These plots are intuitive. Workers move to large cities in order
to accumulate human capital and to find better jobs. As they age, some of them
move back to small cities, which are on average 27% less expensive. Since college
graduates have higher levels of human capital—which is complement to match quality
in the production function—they benefit relatively more from lower search frictions
in large cities. College graduates are also more likely to learn from others through
knowledge diffusion. This explains why not only the size but also the educational
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Figure 1.5: Population Share in Large Cities
Fraction of population located in large cities, in the model (solid line) and in the data
(dotted line).

composition of large cities generated from the model is broadly consistent with its
empirical counterpart.

Model Validation: Patterns of Migration
In the previous section, I showed that the model is able to give an accurate representation of the labor market experience of workers in small and large cities. The
estimation highlights the existence of increasing returns to scale in the labor search
process and, to a lesser extent, in the rate of knowledge diffusion. Furthermore, I show
that larger cities provide better learning opportunities due to peer effects.
While the model targets the frequency of migration, and the education composition
of cities, none of the wage information used in the estimation is specific to migrants.
Since 78% of workers in the NLSY79 sample never move from a small to a large city,
nor vice versa, the identification of the heterogeneity in the productivity gains from
living in large cities is mostly driven by the labor market experience of non-movers.
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Figure 1.6: College Share in Large Cities
Fraction of population in large cities with a college degree, in the model (solid line)
and in the data (dotted line).

To make this point more transparent, I re-compute the targeted moments on the
subsample of workers that never move, both in the data and in the model. The
empirical moments obtained from the set of non-movers are almost identical to their
counterparts computed on the entire sample, and are also remarkably similar to those
generated by non-movers in the model (see Appendix 1.A).29 At the same time, small
and large cities are not isolated from each other, and some workers do in fact change
location over the life cycle. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether the migration
incentives generated by the matching and knowledge diffusion channels are consistent
with the observed labor market experience of movers. In this section, I validate the
model by testing its ability to replicate the relative wage of movers with respect to
both stayers in the pre-migration city, and incumbents in the destination one.
To do so, I apply the methodology introduced in the context of job displacements
29

I also re-estimate the model on the subsample of non-movers, and I obtain almost the same
parameter values as in the baseline estimation. However, in order to perform policy analysis, and
compute the optimal allocation, it is desirable to use a configuration of parameters that is the most
consistent with the aggregate behavior of the US economy.
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by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) to migration episodes. Jacobson, LaLonde,
and Sullivan (1993) perform an event study in which they compare the wage of a
worker in the years right before an unemployment spell, to the wage in the years that
follow. In a very similar fashion, I adopt the following specification:30
X
log(wit ) = βXit +
δ k ditk + it .
(1.19)
k=−10,..,−1,1,..,10

The outcome variable is the inflation-adjusted logged hourly wage of worker i in year
t. The controls include a quadratic term in experience, an indicator variable that is
equal to 1 if worker i has at least a 4-year college degree, and year dummies. The key
coefficients of interest are given by the vector of δ k associated to the dummy variables
ditk , which are equal to 1 if worker i in time t is in his k th year after migrating to
a city of different size. Negative values of k stand for years before migration takes
place.31 I run four different versions of Regression 1.19, that are distinguished by the
type of city a worker migrates from, and by the selected control group, i.e. the set
of observations where ditk = 0. In Figure 1.7, I plot the coefficients generated from
the NLSY79 sample (green circles) and those obtained using model-generated data
(orange diamonds).
The top-left panel shows the wage of workers around the time when they move
from a small into a large city, compared to the wage of those who remain in small
cities. It is easy to observe that migrants do not particularly differ from stayers until
the moving year. After that, the wage of migrants starts to diverge, and it reaches a
28% premium after 10 years or more. The top-right panel repeats the same exercise
with respect to the opposite migration flow. Leaving a large city is associated with
lower pre-migration wages, and a much larger, but substantially flat, wage discount in
the years after moving into a small city. Except for slightly overestimating the extent
of sorting out of small cities, the predictions from the model are remarkably close to
the empirical evidence over the entire time window around the migration episodes.
Recall that the estimation targets the aggregate wage difference between small and
large cities. Since the model is able to replicate the relationship between the wages of
movers and stayers, it should not be surprising that the model also matches the wage
30

See also Glaeser and Maré (2001) for an analogous empirical specification applied to migration
into and out of urban areas.
31
The value of δ 10 (δ −10 ) stands for 10 or more years after (before) the migration episode.
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Figure 1.7: Wage of Movers and Non-Movers
Wage of movers vs. stayers (top panels) and vs. incumbents (bottom panels). Left:
from small city. Right: from big city. Data: green circles. Model: orange diamonds.

heterogeneity between movers and incumbents. Such comparison is represented in the
bottom panels of Figure 1.7. While they live in small cities, migrants earn less then
those who are already living in large cities before their arrival, and continue to do so
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even after migration takes place (bottom-left panel). This evidence is in line with the
idea that most of the benefit from living in a large city does not accrue on impact.
Consistently with the dynamic nature of the return to experience in large cities, the
gap with respect to the incumbents slowly shrinks in the 10 years after the migration
episode. Last, in the bottom-right panel, I show that migrants to small cities earn
somewhat less than the incumbents, even if they were earning significantly more while
working in large cities. This finding supports the existence of a productivity benefit
from being in large cities that workers lose upon migrating out.
Through the lens of the model, the variation in Figure 1.7 originates from differences
across workers in terms of human capital and match quality, while the migration
decision is also affected by idiosyncratic preferences. These components are not
separately observed. The model predicts that higher match quality is associated with
longer job tenure, as better matches tend to last longer. At the same time, recent
migrants have lower job tenure, and, both in the model and in the data, jobs with
longer tenure pay significantly higher wages—after controlling for worker observable
characteristics.
Motivated by this evidence, I attempt to measure the contribution of heterogeneity
in match quality to wage differentials between movers, stayers, and incumbents. I
augment Regression 1.19 with a quadratic term in the tenure at the current job,
and re-draw the new values of the coefficients δ k . The updated plots—in Appendix
1.A—highlight how the results differ with respect to the baseline specification, but
they do so in a remarkably similar fashion in the model as in the data. To gain
intuition, here I show and describe one of the four updated plots (Figure 1.8). I
construct this plot by repeating the regression represented on the top-right panel
of Figure 1.7—workers who move to small cities vs. stayers in large cities—and I
compare the results that are obtained from excluding or including controls for job
tenure. The left panel of Figure 1.8 shows the coefficients estimated on NLSY79
data. While the relative wage loss after leaving a large city is essentially flat in the
baseline regression (dark green stars), it is much steeper when tenure is controlled
for (light green triangles). An almost identical pattern emerges from the model (right
panel, orange shades). Since recent movers to small cities have been at their current
job for a shorter period of time, controlling for job tenure reduces the size of their
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Figure 1.8: Job Tenure and Migration
Wage of movers to small cities vs stayers in large cities. Dark stars: baseline. Light
triangles: control for tenure. Left: data. Right: model.

wage discount with respect to stayers in large cities, but only in the years right after
migration (from -26% to -17% in the first year). After removing the tenure effect, a
stronger diverging wage pattern emerges, since movers to small cities are no longer
exposed to the superior knowledge diffusion of large cities.

Inside the Agglomeration Black Box: Decomposition
The validation exercise in the previous section confirmed the model ability to replicate the wage experience of migrants with respect to stayers and incumbents. The
unobservable worker characteristics in the model—human capital, match quality, and
moving cost—are quantitatively consistent with the motives that drive location choices
in the data. I am now in the position to measure the contribution of each of the
proposed sources of the city-size wage premium and its life-cycle behavior.
Throughout the decomposition, I fix the set of aggregate variables at their baseline
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equilibrium values, treating them as parameters in the worker’s problem. I also
impose that workers cannot migrate at any moment of their life. In order to perform
the decomposition, I consider four scenarios, which I model as follows. Let Θ̃i =
{λ̃0,i , λ̃1,i , σ̃ i , G̃i }, for i = {small, large}, be the set of aggregate characteristics of city
i in the baseline economy, and let Θsi = {λs0,i , λs1,i , σ si , Gsi } be the set of aggregate
variables that characterize city i in scenario s.32 Because of the assumption of no
migration across cities, the joint value of an employment relationship and the value of
unemployment in city i only depend on the worker’s idiosyncratic state (and match
quality, if employed) and on Θsi , but do not depend on Θs−i . In other words, large
and small cities are treated as separate economies. Across all scenarios s, I set
Θssmall = Θ̃small , and only vary the characteristics of large cities, Θsbig . The thought
experiment is comparing the life-cycle wage premium in a world in which only one of
the aggregate characteristics of large cities differs from its counterpart in small cities.
In the first scenario, I isolate the contribution of sorting. I solve the decision problem
of workers and firms, and simulate life-cycle paths of wages, under the parametrization
S
ΘN
big = Θ̃big . I label this scenario no sorting, NS, as the only departures from the
baseline economy are imposing the same initial distribution of workers across cities—in
terms of both human capital and education—and removing all migration flows between
them. The left panel of Figure 1.9 shows the city-size wage premium in the data (black
dotted line), the baseline economy (thick black line) and in the no sorting scenario
(thin blue line). The vertical distance between the baseline and the no sorting scenario
captures the contribution of sorting over the life cycle.
The remaining city-size wage premium—i.e. the wage premium net of the role
of sorting—is represented by the blue thin line reported on both panels of Figure
1.9, and it is due to heterogeneity in the equilibrium aggregate characteristics of
small and large cities. In order to quantify the contribution of each treatment, I
compute the wage premium under three additional scenarios, illustrated in the right
panel of Figure 1.9. The red dotted line corresponds to an economy in which only
the matching channel is operative, ΘM
large = {λ̃0,large , λ̃1,large , σ̃ small , G̃small }. The pink
dashed line repeats the same exercise with respect to the flow of ideas, ΘFlarge =
32

I omit house prices from the aggregate characteristics of cities. If migration is ruled out, house
prices are equivalent to a lump-sum tax paid by every worker in the economy—although potentially
different across cities—but they have exactly no impact on wages.
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Figure 1.9: Decomposition of the City-Size Wage Premium
Percentage wage premium. Left panel: data (black dotted line), baseline model (black
thick line), ‘no sorting’ scenario (blue thin line). Right panel: ‘no sorting’ (blue thin
line), ‘matching’ (red dotted line), ‘flow of ideas’ (pink dashed line), ‘peer effect’ (green
dashed-dotted line) scenario.

{λ̃0,small , λ̃1,small , σ̃ large , G̃small }. Last, the green dashed-dotted line shows an economy
in which the only heterogeneity between small and large cities is due to differences in
peer effects, ΘPlarge = {λ̃0,small , λ̃1,small , σ̃ small , G̃large }.33
Starting from the left panel of Figure 1.9, we observe how the contribution of sorting
slowly rises with experience, and it reaches 12% after 20 years.34 I further isolate the
33

In the flow of ideas and peer effect scenarios, I also set the value of b in large cities equal to its
value in small cities. Recall that the flow value from unemployment in city i is bi h. In the model,
wages are determined by the human capital of the worker and the match quality of the jobs. Given
that the value of bi aims at replicating a flow value of unemployment that is a constant fraction of
wages, it is natural to set the values of b equal across cities, in a scenario in which the only systematic
difference between workers in small and large cities is in terms of human capital.
34
At labor market entry, the wage premium is slightly higher in the no sorting scenario than in
the baseline economy. I verify that this is not due to the presence of negative initial sorting in the
economy, but to a slightly higher average piece rate in large compared to small cities. When workers
are allowed to migrate, as in the baseline economy, firms pay workers part of the future surplus
they might obtain from a job-to-job transition across cities. Such influence of future offers on wages
is muted in the no sorting scenario. Since, in the baseline economy, very young workers are more
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contribution of sorting on observable education, up to 7%, from sorting on unobservable
human capital, up to 5%. To perform this additional decomposition, not shown in the
graphs, I re-simulate the no sorting scenario, weighting the observations in each city
and at each experience level according to the actual experience-specific educational
composition of cities in the baseline economy.35 The modest role of sorting on
unobservable human capital in accounting for the city-size wage premium is consistent
with the findings by, among others, Eeckhout, Pinheiro, and Schmidheiny (2014) and
De La Roca and Puga (2016). While in the static environment by Eeckhout, Pinheiro,
and Schmidheiny (2014) lack of sorting is due to production complementarities between
workers at the top and the bottom of the skill distribution, in this paper it is the
result of two opposing forces. On the one hand, high-skilled workers benefit more
from locating in large cities, because of complementarity between human capital and
match quality. On the other hand, low-skilled workers have more room for learning in
large cities, thanks to vertical imitation in the process of knowledge diffusion.
The right panel of Figure 1.9 shows the contribution of each of the three proposed
treatments. Consistently with the identification strategy presented above, matching
has a level effect on the wage premium of about 11%, but it plays no role in the
growth of the premium over the life cycle. If the distribution of match qualities is
Pareto, increasing returns to scale in the search process generate better matches at
any level of experience. At the same time, a Pareto distribution is the only one that
is consistent with the fact that increasing returns to scale do not trigger differences
in unemployment and job-to-job transition rates across cities of different size. To
the contrary, the flow of ideas and peer effects are negligible for newborns, as human
capital accumulation occurs over time, but they are responsible for the entire growth
of the wage premium that is not accounted for by sorting—up to 15%. Heterogeneity
in the equilibrium composition of peers makes up three quarters of the higher rate of
learning in large cities, leaving a much smaller role to increasing returns to scale in
likely to move to large cities than in the opposite direction, workers that are born in small cities
suffer relatively more from the absence of cross-city offers, in terms of the piece rate they are able
to bargain. This is why the wage premium in the no sorting scenario is slightly bigger than in the
baseline economy, at labor market entry.
35
The difference between the resulting wage profile and the no sorting in Figure 1.9 isolates the
contribution of sorting on education. The residual difference with respect to the baseline profile
captures the wage premium due to sorting on human capital.
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Sorting
Matching
Flow of Ideas
Peers
Total

5 years

10 years

20 years

4
11
1.5
5.5
22

8
11
2
9
30

12
11
3
12
38

Table 1.3. Decomposition of the city-size wage premium (%).

the flow of ideas. Table 1.3 summarizes these findings by breaking down the wage
premium at 5, 10 and 20 years of work experience.
It is worth commenting on two features of the decomposition presented in this
section. First, the aggregate variables in the economy are not allowed to respond,
in equilibrium, to changes in workers’ decisions. That is, they are treated as fixed
parameters. The decomposition described above is meant to highlight the role of city
characteristics—at their current equilibrium value—in determining the city-size wage
premium, and not the role of increasing returns and knowledge diffusion in shaping
the characteristics of cities. Second, besides isolating the role of sorting, the absence of
migration flows is also required in order to correctly measure the contribution of any
specific treatment (matching, flow of ideas, and peer effects). Consider, for example,
the matching scenario. If workers were allowed to migrate, the resulting wage premium
would necessarily represent a combination of both the actual object of interest—i.e.
a higher average match quality in large cities—and the sorting behavior induced by
matching itself.

1.4

Endogenous Market Tightness

So far, I focused on a stationary equilibrium for the economy, which is an allocation
in which city size and composition are constant over time. Hence, I dispensed with
modeling vacancy creation, and I adopted a reduced-form specification for the rate
at which a worker contacts a firm in the local labor market and across cities, λ and
λ∗ , respectively. In solving for the constrained-efficient allocation and performing a
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counterfactual policy experiment, it is natural to allow firms to adapt their behavior
to changes in the profitability of creating vacancies in different cities. In order to
accomodate this margin, I explicitly introduce a perfectly competitive market for
vacancies, in the tradition of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
I assume that the number of meetings between a firm and an unemployed worker,
χ
both located in city i, is given by the product between Mi M and a constant returns
to scale meeting function m,
χM

mi = Mi

χM 1−ζ ζ
si vi ,

m(si , vi ) = Mi

where vi is the number of vacancies, and si is the actual measure of workers seeking
jobs in city i.36 In line with the assumption of proportional search efficiency across
employment states and cities, the number of meetings per unit of time between a firm
and an employed worker, both located in city i, is equal to ρmi . The meeting rate
between an unemployed (employed) worker in city −i and a firm in city i is equal to
ρ∗ mi (ρρ∗ mi ). It follows that
si = [ui + ρ(1 − ui )]Mi + ρ∗ [(u−i + ρ(1 − u−i ))]M−i ,

(1.20)

where ui is the unemployment rate in city i.
Since search is random and m has constant returns to scale, an unemployed worker
in city i contacts a firm, also in city i, at rate
mi
χ
= Mi M θζ ,
si
where θ = vi /si is assumed to be the same across cities.37 From the reduced-form
χ
specification introduced in Section 1.3, such contact rate is also equal to λ0,i = Mi M χ.
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) document a wide range of empirical estimates of ζ,
and suggest a value of approximately 0.5. However, while in this paper it does not
guarantee efficiency, applying the Hosios (1990) condition simplifies the nature of the
36

I use the term ‘meeting’—instead of the standard ‘matching’—function to highlight the fact
that not all meetings in this model turn into matches.
37
The assumption of equal market tightness across cities can be relaxed using either direct measures
of vacancies at the city level, combined with local unemployment data, or variations in the average
duration of vacancies across cities. While data on both measures is scant, this kind of empirical
evidence is certainly worth exploring in the study of search and matching frictions in local labor
markets.
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optimal policy I introduce in Section 1.6.38 Hence, I set ζ = 1 − β = 0.8. Given ζ, I
1
recover the value of θ = χ ζ . Last, the vacancy creation cost, ki , is pinned down by
the zero profit condition
χ
ki = Mi M θζ−1 (1 − β)S(i),
(1.21)
where S(i) is the expected job surplus from contacting a worker from any city, or in
any employment status, and (1 − β) is the share that accrues to the firm.
I define the gross surplus from a match, S(h` , a, e, i0 , z 0 , i, z) ≡ V (h` , a, e, i, z) −
V (h` , a, e, i0 , z 0 ), where it is understood that V (h` , a, e, i, 0) stands for U (h` , a, e, i),
and that i0 might take the value of either i or −i. The specification ‘gross’ is due to
the presence of a migration cost that the worker has to pay whenever he moves from
city −i. The expected surplus S(i) is described in detail in Appendix 1.A, but it is
possible to gain intuition by using the following stylized representation,
S(i) = Eφ(i,0),F [S(i, 0, i, ẑ)] + Eφ(i,z),F [S(i, z, i, ẑ)]+
Eφ(−i,0),F,D [S(−i, 0, i, ẑ) − c] + Eφ(−i,z),F,D [S(−i, z, i, ẑ) − c].39

(1.22)

The terms on the first line of Equation (1.22) correspond to the expected surplus
from meeting an unemployed, or employed worker, in city i. The expectation is taken
with respect to the probability of meeting each type of worker, and to the sampling
distribution of match quality, F . The second line is analogous to the first, but it is
related to hiring a worker who lives in city −i before accepting a job in city i. If
forming a new match involves migration, the expectation also takes into account the
random component of the migration cost, c ∼ D(c).
Applying Equation (1.21) to both large and small cities, I find klarge /ksmall = 1.6.
Because of increasing returns to scale in the search process, and a better human capital
composition, firms in large cities are willing to pay a 60% higher vacancy creation cost.
A higher value of k reduces firms’ incentives to create vacancies in a given city, in a
similar fashion as higher house prices represent a congestion force in workers’ location
choice.
38

In an economy with on-the-job search and multiple, connected, labor markets, the Hosios
condition would not guarantee efficiency even in the absence of the other externalities that are
peculiar to this paper (agglomeration and knowledge diffusion). Replacing random with directed
search is a natural solution in order to remove the inefficiency that originates from the search process.
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1.5

Large Cities and Housing Regulation

Understanding the sources of the remarkable difference in wages across cities is a
long standing endeavour in the literature, and an interesting question in and of itself.
Yet, the nature of the city-size wage premium has also important implications for the
aggregate and distributional consequences of those place-based policies that trigger the
relocation of workers across cities. I illustrate this point by computing the equilibrium
of the economy after the implementation of a policy that has been at the center of the
academic and political debate: relaxing housing regulation in some large US cities.
In Section 1.5, I describe the policy experiment and show how this paper is related
to the existing literature on this topic. In Section 1.5, I propose an identity that
allows to decompose the change in total income, after the policy implementation,
into pre-policy observables and predicted equilibrium responses. The decomposition
highlights how the outcome of the policy is crucially affected by the endogenous
behavior of productivity in small and large cities, which is in turn determined by the
sources of the city-size wage premium. Section 1.5 presents the results.

Housing Regulation: Background
In the estimation of the model, the (inverse) elasticity of housing supply is constructed
using the estimates from Saiz (2010). I find that, on average, it is equal to 1/1.47 in
large cities, but only 1/2.46 in small cities. A growing literature has documented that
part of the higher inverse elasticity in some large US cities—i.e. the fact that house
prices grow more rapidly as the city expands—is not due to physical constraints, but
it is the outcome of tighter regulation.40
Hsieh and Moretti (2019), HM henceforth, explore the aggregate implications of
tighter regulation in the most productive (large) US MSAs. They find that if house
price dispersion in 2009 had been as low as in 1964, the increase in productivity of
some large cities would have triggered a much higher increase in employment, and a
40

Saiz (2010) estimates the contribution of regulation to the housing supply elasticity of 269 US
cities. Glaeser and Gyourko (2018) compute the magnitude of house prices in excess of construction
costs in US MSAs and find that it is negatively correlated with the number of building permits issued
in the same MSA. See also the discussion in Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005), and Gyourko, Saiz,
and Summers (2008).
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less staggering rise in wages, in those cities. In equilibrium, the growth rate of US
GDP would have been twice as large as its actual value during the last 50 years. The
intuition is that an increase in house prices, due to regulation, prevents a productive
city from further expanding, hence from generating higher GDP growth. Herkenhoff,
Ohanian, and Prescott (2018), HOP henceforth, develop a neoclassical growth model
with multiple regions. They find that GDP would be 12% higher in a steady state in
which current land-use regulation in all US states moved halfway toward that of the
least restrictive state, i.e. Texas. According to their estimates, California and New
York are among the most restrictive states. Notably, they are also the states where
some of the largest cities in the country are located.
Both HM and HOP model spatial heterogeneity in productivity as an exogenous
difference in TFP between locations.41 Besides, they study economies populated by
homogeneous workers, endowed with a constant amount of efficiency units. In contrast,
this paper introduces two new margins to this literature. First, exogenous heterogeneity
in productivity is replaced by agglomeration forces in the form of increasing returns to
scale in the labor market and in the process of knowledge diffusion. Second, in line with
the increase in the city-size wage premium over the life cycle, part of the productivity
differential between large and small cities is dynamic in nature, and stems from
differences in the rate of human capital accumulation. I also allow for heterogeneity in
human capital between workers, so that spatial sorting might contribute to measured
differences in productivity between cities. Crucially, all these aspects—agglomeration,
knowledge diffusion, sorting—are endogenous to the size and composition of cities, and
might alter the assessment of the aggregate consequences of changes in local policies.
In fact, consider two opposite theories of spatial wage differentials. On one extreme,
productivity is an intrinsic characteristic of cities, and regulation just limits access to
productive locations. This is the main view of HM and HOP. On the opposite extreme,
heterogeneity in productivity between cities is exclusively explained by workers’ sorting
on ability. According to such view, regulation may arise from the preference of highskilled individuals in certain (large) cities for excluding other workers from accessing
those cities. Parkhomenko (2018) shares some features with this second hypothesis.
He builds a model with sorting on ability and endogenous regulation—motivated by
41

HOP consider an extension of their model in which TFP is an exogenous increasing function of
local output, but they do not take a stand on the foundations of such agglomeration force.
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the desire to prevent newcomers from creating congestion in the use of local amenities.
However, he also assumes exogenous productivity differences between cities. He shows
that equalizing housing regulation across cities reduces the extent of sorting in large
cities, but the ensuing output gains are exclusively generated by the relocation of
workers toward exogenously more productive locations.42
While this paper exhibits an exogenous housing supply elasticity, hence exogenous
regulation, it presents a theory of the city-size wage premium that embeds some key
components of both the opposite views introduced above. Spatial wage differentials
are partially due to sorting, and partially to endogenous differences in productivity
between cities. Thus, although I adopt a much more stylized geography than the
traditional urban literature,43 the new margins considered in this paper complement
the current debate on the consequences of housing, and, more generally, place-based
policies.

Interpreting the Policy Outcome
I introduce an identity that highlights the role of the estimated heterogeneity between
small and large cities in shaping the equilibrium response to a policy change. Throughout the analysis, I compare the steady state of the economy, before and after the
implementation of the policy. As the estimation of this paper is based on information
on the wage of workers in their first 20 years of work experience, I evaluate the policy
outcome in terms of total labor income of this set of workers.44
I denote by j 0 (j 1 ) the value of any variable j before (after) the policy implemen1
0
0
1
tation, and by j̄ the mean of j. Let ∆M = Mbig
− Mbig
= N (Msmall
− Msmall
) be the
equilibrium change in the measure of workers located in large cities. The difference
between total labor income, denoted by W age, after and before the change in policy
42
The model in Parkhomenko (2018) includes constant elasticity production externalities that
depend on the size but not the composition of a city, in the spirit of Kline and Moretti (2014). This
type of externality has no aggregate implications since moving a worker from one location to another
reduces the output of the former by the same amount as it increases the output of the latter. See the
discussion in Section 1.6.
43
HM and Parkhomenko (2018) model an economy with more than 200 MSAs. HOP consider 7
groups of states. Those more realistic environments can capture the heterogeneity in productivity
and house prices also within the set of large cities—or between states—in the US.
44
Extending the policy analysis to total labor income in the economy—assuming a working life of
exactly 40 years for all workers—delivers very similar results.
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is equal to
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
W age1 − W age0 =[Mbig
w̄big
+ N Msmall
w̄small
] − [Mbig
w̄big
+ N Msmall
w̄small
]
0
1
0
1
=[(Mbig
+ ∆M )w̄big
+ (N Msmall
− ∆M )w̄small
]−
0
0
0
0
[Mbig
w̄big
+ N Msmall
w̄small
]
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
=∆M (w̄big
− w̄small
) + Mbig
(w̄big
− w̄big
) + N Msmall
(w̄small
− w̄small
).

(1.23)
It is easy to verify that, if average wages in small and large cities are policy invariant,
1
0
1
0
i.e. w̄big
= w̄big
and w̄small
= w̄small
, the last line of Identity (1.23) simplifies to
0
0
W age1 − W age0 = ∆M (w̄big
− w̄small
).

(1.24)

It follows that the change in total labor income is given by the average city-size wage
premium that is currently observed in the data, multiplied by the additional measure
of workers located in large cities after the policy implementation. I define the term on
the RHS of Identity (1.24) the direct effect (D).
In the general case, in which such invariance is not satisfied, the last line of Identity
(1.23) can be further re-arranged as,
W age1 − W age0 =
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
0
∆M (w̄big
− w̄small
) + Mbig
(w̄big
− w̄big
) + N Msmall
(w̄small
− w̄small
)+
0
0
0
0
∆M (w̄big
− w̄big
) − ∆M (w̄small
− w̄small
)
{z
}
|
{z
}
|
=0

=0

=

0
∆M (w̄big

−

0
w̄small
)

+

1
1
Mbig
(w̄big

0
1
1
0
− w̄big
) + N Msmall
(w̄small
− w̄small
)

0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
− w̄small
)
= ∆M (w̄big
− w̄small
) + Mbig
(w̄big
− w̄big
) + (N Msmall
−Mbig
+ M 1 )(w̄1
{z big} small
|
=0

=

0
∆M (w̄big

|

−
{z

(D)

0
1
1
w̄small
) + Mbig
[(w̄big

}

|

−

1
w̄small
)

{z

(P)

−

0
(w̄big

−

0
1
w̄small
)] + M (w̄small

}

|

− w̄0 ) .
{z small}

(S)

(1.25)
In order to interpret the terms in Identity (1.25), consider the wage of a worker as
being the sum of two components: the wage he would earn in a small city, and, for
workers located in a large city, an additional city-size wage premium. Hence, the
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change in total labor income can be decomposed into the sum of the direct effect
1
0
(D), and two new terms. First, M (w̄small
− w̄small
) is the change in the average
wage of small cities, multiplied by the entire population in the economy, (S). Second,
1
1
1
0
0
Mbig
[(w̄big
− w̄small
) − (w̄big
− w̄small
)] is the change in the city-size wage premium,
multiplied by the size of large cities after the policy, (P).

Results
I describe the steady-state equilibrium response of the economy to a 1% and a 2%
increase in the elasticity of housing supply in large cities, while I leave the same
parameter in small cities unchanged. Specifically, I replace γ large = 1/1.474 with
γ large = {1/1.489, 1/1.504}. Intuitively, under looser housing regulation, large cities
gain in population, as they become 10.4% and 20.7% larger, respectively. The increase
in size is accompanied by a change in their educational and human capital composition.
The share of workers in large cities who hold a college degree goes from 29%, in the
baseline economy, to 28% and 27.1%, as γ large shrinks. Interestingly, the equilibrium
human capital distributions deteriorate in both large and small cities. In Figure 1.10,
I show the deviation of those distributions from the distributions in the baseline
economy. The green line with circles (purple with triangles) is associated with a 1%
(2%) change in policy. In both the left and the right panel—large and small cities,
respectively—a less restrictive housing policy causes a leftward shift of the human
capital distribution. This finding can be explained by the fact that workers who locate
in large cities under lower housing restrictions are more skilled than those who remain
in small cities, but less than those who locate in large cities in the baseline economy.
Next, I explore the aggregate implications of the change in city size and composition,
as measured by variations in total labor income.
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Figure 1.10: Housing Regulation and Human Capital
Difference between the human capital distribution under ∆γ big = −0.01% (green line
with circles) and ∆γ big = −0.02% (purple line with triangles), with respect to its value
in the baseline economy. Left panel: large city. Right panel: small city.

The outcome of the housing policy can be analyzed by using Identity (1.26),
W age1 − W age0
=
W age0
{z
}
|
Total
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
[(w̄big
− w̄small
) − (w̄big
− w̄small
)] M (w̄small
∆M (w̄big
− w̄small
) Mbig
)
− w̄small
+
+
,
0
0
0
W age
W age
W age
{z
} |
{z
} |
{z
}
|
(D)
(P)
(S)
(1.26)
which includes the same terms as Identity (1.25), divided by W age0 in order to
obtain percentage deviations from the baseline. Figure 1.11 shows the overall effect
(black bars) and its components (grey bars). The direct effect is equal to +1.8%
(+3.55%), while the total effect is +0.65% (+1.25%), when γ large is lowered by 1% (2%).
Intuitively, the direct effect (D) is necessarily positive: since large cities currently pay
higher wages, increasing their size contributes to raising total labor income. However,
because of endogenous changes in the productivity of cities, the other two terms create
a wedge between the direct and the total effect of the policy. As previously mentioned,
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Figure 1.11: Housing Regulation and Aggregate Income Gains
Percentage change in total labor income (black bar), and in its components (grey
bars). Left panel: ∆γ big = −1%. Right panel: ∆γ big = −2%.

the composition of small cities deteriorates compared to the baseline economy, and so
do peer effects in those cities. In addition, increasing returns to scale in the search
process and in the flow of ideas have an adverse effect on the average match quality,
and on the frequency of interactions, in a city that shrinks in size. All these forces
contribute to the negative sign of the term denoted by (S). Because of weaker sorting
and worse peers, wages in large cities decline as well. The contribution of agglomeration
forces—matching and flow of ideas—is positive in a city that expands. Hence, the
average wage in large cities declines relatively less than in small ones, driving up the
city-size wage premium (P). All in all, even accounting for the equilibrium response
of agglomeration forces, peer effects, and sorting, relaxing housing restrictions in
large cities generates non-negligible income gains. Yet, assuming that productivity
dispersion across locations was invariant to the policy would overstate the percentage
increase in income by more than a factor of 2.5.
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1.6

Optimal Allocation

In the previous section, I focused on the income gains generated by a change in
housing regulation, but avoided taking a stand on its welfare implications. A proper
welfare analysis of this type of policy would require the inclusion of housing wealth
and political economy considerations that go beyond the scope of this paper. However,
even abstracting from housing policy—i.e. taking housing supply elasticities as fixed
parameters—one might wonder whether a social planner could still improve on the
equilibrium allocation. In fact, the equilibrium of this economy may not be optimal
because of the existence of three potential sources of inefficiencies.
First, increasing returns to scale in the search process and in the technology of
knowledge diffusion create a feedback effect—that workers do not internalize—between
location decisions and the meeting rates, λ, λ∗ and σ. This process gives rise to an
agglomeration externality. Since λ, λ∗ and σ are constant elasticity functions, the
increase in the number of meetings in a city is associated with a proportional reduction
in another city. Kline and Moretti (2014) show that if the externality in productivity
has constant elasticity, the gains from allocating an additional worker to one location
are exactly offset by losses in another location. Such neutrality does not need to hold
in the present environment, since constant elasticity with respect to city size is a
property of the meeting rates, but not necessarily of productivity. Besides, Fajgelbaum
and Gaubert (2019) show that the result in Kline and Moretti (2014) does not hold in
an economy characterized by either compensating differentials across locations—as in
the presence of non-tradeable goods—or sorting of heterogenous agents.
Second, workers do not internalize the benefit they have on each other through the
process of knowledge diffusion. The knowledge spillover externality in this paper has
the same nature as the externality in Lucas and Moll (2014). In their paper, agents
learn from everyone in the economy, and choose how to allocate their time between
producing and learning. The inefficiency takes the form of workers’ underinvestment in
their own human capital. In contrast, in the spatial economy I consider, the externality
originates from workers’ location choice, so that even those who cannot learn anymore,
i.e. ‘old’ workers, might behave suboptimally.
Third, because of the assumption of random search in the labor market, workers
who live in a certain location, and choose which jobs to take, do not internalize the cost
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paid by firms to post the vacancies they might come into contact with (vacancy creation
externality). Specifically, workers do not take into account the fact that such cost varies
by location and, in efficiency units, employment status. Recall that an unemployed
worker in city i, where a vacancy costs ki , meets a firm in city −i, where a vacancy
costs k−i , at a rate that is only ρ∗ times as large as in the local labor market. Similarly,
the relative search efficiency of employed—compared to unemployed—workers is equal
to ρ. To provide a concrete example, since klarge > ksmall and ρ∗ < 1, the search
technology implies that, everything else equal, the planner allocates workers to larger
cities with a lower probability than in the equilibrium.
Motivated by the existence of these externalities, in this section I consider the
problem of a social planner who aims at maximizing the present discounted value
of total output in the economy, net of housing and migrations costs. In the present
environment, under the assumption that the planner can redistribute resources using
lump-sum taxes and transfers, this maximization delivers the constrained-efficient
allocation of workers to cities and jobs.45 The planner is subject to the same mobility
and labor market frictions as the agents in the economy. In particular, the planner
chooses the reservation match quality in a firm-worker meeting, the cutoff cost in
workers’ migration decisions, and the number of vacancies to post in each city. I
also assume that the planner is a price taker in the housing market. Price taking
can be rationalized by the standard assumption in the urban literature that the
aggregate housing supply function—introduced in Section 1.2—is the result of profit
maximization by a continuum of perfectly competitive absentee landlords.
In the remainder of this section, I first set up the planner’s problem and transform it
into an equivalent but tractable one: finding the marginal social value of an unemployed
worker, and of an employment relationship of given quality. I then characterize the
optimal steady-state allocation, show how it departs from the equilibrium, and compare
it to the optimal spatial allocation found in the existing literature.
45

Constrained-efficient allocations might still differ from each other with respect to the distribution
of consumption.
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The Marginal Social Value of a Worker
I solve the problem of a social planner that maximizes the present discounted value
of total net output. Let ũ(h` , a, e, i, z, t) be the net flow payoff of a worker in city i,
employed at match quality z (or unemployed, if z = 0), with human capital h` , age a,
and education e at time t:
Z z̄ Z max{x(ẑ),x(0)}
∗
e
cdD(c)dF (ẑ).
ũ(h` , a, e, i, z, t) = (bi I{z=0} +z)h` −q pi (t)−λI{z>0} ,−i (t)
z

−∞

(1.27)
The first term on the RHS of Equation (1.27) is the flow value from production, or
unemployment. The second term is the cost of housing. The third term is the actual
cost of moving from city i to city −i, which is given by the rate at which a worker
receives an offer from city −i, λ∗I{z>0},−i (t), multiplied by the expected migration cost,
conditional on migrating. Notice that the expectation is taken with respect to both the
quality of the new potential match, ẑ, and the realization of the migration cost, c. The
max operator in the integral is due to the worker’s choice between moving as employed
or unemployed to city −i.46 In light of the microfoundation of the firm-worker meeting
rates introduced above, λ∗I{z>0},−i (t) = (I{z = 0} + ρI{z > 0})ρ∗ θ−i (t)ζ M−i (t)χM . The
total flow payoff, u, generated by a worker of type (h` , a, e, i, z) is equal to the sum
of the net flow payoff in Equation (1.27), and the vacancy posting cost associated to
hiring such worker. The cost of posting vi (t) vacancies in city i at time t is equal to
ki vi (t) = ki θi (t)si (t). The definition of the effective measure of workers seeking a job
in city i at time t, si (t), is given by the time-varying equivalent of Equation (1.20).
Taking into account the relative search efficiency on and off the job, within and across
cities, I obtain
u(h` , a, e, i, z, t) = ũ(h` , a, e, i, z, t) − (ki θi (t) + ρ∗ k−i θ−i (t))(I{z = 0} + ρI{z 6= 0}).
(1.28)
The planner solves the following problem,
Z ∞
W (φ(·, t)) = p
max
e−rτ Eφ(·,τ ) [u(·, τ )]dτ
p
p
R (·,τ ),x (·,τ ),θ (·,τ )

t

(1.29)

∂φ(·, τ )
= Γ(φ(·, τ ), Rp (·, τ ), xp (·, τ ), θp (·, τ )),
s.t.
∂t
46

The usual omission of the state variables (h` , a, e) has been applied.
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where the expectation is taken with respect to the cross-sectional distribution of workers
at each τ ≥ t. The policy functions in the planner’s problem are characterized by the
superscript ‘p0 in order to distinguish them from their equilibrium counterparts. Notice
that the measure of workers and house prices in each city can be derived from φ(·, t)
using Equations (1.10) and (1.15). Hence, the state variable in Problem (1.29) can be
parsimonously described by the distribution φ. The constraint in the maximization
∗
problem is given by the law of motion of φ, Γ(φ, Rp , xp , θp ) ≡ Γ̃(φ, Rp , xp , λ̃(θp ), λ̃ (θp )),
∗
where Γ̃ is defined by Equation (1.16), and λ̃(θ) and λ̃ (θ) can be obtained using the
microfoundation of market tightness introduced in Section 1.4.47
In order to solve for the optimal allocation, I follow the approach proposed by
Lucas and Moll (2014) and transform the infinite-dimensional planner’s problem into a
standard system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman and Kolmogorov Forward Equations. The
details of the derivation and the formal characterization of the HJB and KF Equations
can be found in Appendix 1.A. The KFEs are the same as Equations (1.8) and (1.9),
which define the law of motion of φ in the decentralized equilibrium. The HJBEs
describe the marginal social value of each type of agent in the economy. They differ
from Equations (1.1) and (1.5) due to the presence of additional terms that capture
the externalities in the economy. In what follows, I show a stylized representation of
the HJBE that characterizes the marginal social value of an unemployed worker, and
highlight how it differs from the corresponding HJBE in the laissez-faire equilibrium.
Let U p (h` , a, e, i, t) and V p (h` , a, e, i, z, t) be the marginal social value of an unemployed worker, and of a firm-worker match, respectively, of type (h` , a, e, i, z) at time
47

χM

For example, λ0,i = χMi

1

χM

= θiζ Mi

1

χM

. Hence, λ̃0,i (θi ) = θiζ Mi
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∗

1

χM

. Also λ̃0,i (θi ) = ρ∗ θiζ Mi

.

t. U p satisfies the following HJBE,
rU p (h` , a, e, i, t) = max
RHSU (U p (h` , a, e, i, t), β = 1)+
p p p
R ,x ,θ

∂λ∗0,i
∂λ0,i
∂σ i
Eφ(i) [∆z U p ] +
Eφ(−i) [∆z U p ] +
Eφ(i) [∆h` U p ]+
∂Mi
∂Mi
∂Mi
∂Eφ(i),Gi [∆h` U p (y)]
− (ki θpi + ρ∗ k−i θp−i )+
∂φ(h` , a, e, i, t)


e
∂g0,i
(ẽ)
∂U p (h` , a, e, i, t)
p
U I{a = o} +
.p
ψ o Egh (h̃|ẽ)
o,i
∂φ(h` , a, e, i, t)
∂t
(1.30)
σi

The LHS of Equation (1.30) is the annuitized marginal social value of an unemployed
worker. The first line on the RHS is given by the RHS of Equation (1.1), and it is
equal to the annuitized private value of an unemployed worker, if the worker captures
the entire gains from trade from the formation of a match (β = 1). The second
line describes the agglomeration externality. An additional worker in city i increases
the rate at which firms and workers meet in the labor market, within and across
cities, and the frequency at which workers interact with each other. The marginal
changes in meeting rates multiply the average expected gains accruing to all the
other workers that experience any of those events. The first term on the third line
represents the knowledge spillover externality toward other (young) workers located
in city i. This externality operates through the dependence of the rate of human
capital accumulation, conditional on interacting with other workers, on the equilibrium
human capital distribution in city i, Gi (see Equation 1.14).48 The second term in the
third line, −(ki θpi + ρ∗ k−i θp−i ), corresponds to the vacancy creation externality. It is
equal to the marginal cost of creating vacancies that might come into contact with
an unemployed worker in city i. The first term in the last line represents the effect
of the location of an old worker on the location—and education—of the newborn he
is replaced by when he receives the retirement shock ψ o .49 The last term is the time
derivative of U p .
To avoid repeating conceptually similar terms, I only show terms with ∆z U p and ∆h` U p , on
the second and third lines of Equation (1.30), but it is understood that an unemployed worker exerts
the same type of agglomeration and knowledge spillover externalities on employed workers as well.
49
This component of the marginal social value derives from the OLG structure of the economy,
48
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The HJBE that characterizes the marginal social joint value of a match is identical
to Equation (1.30), once RHSU (U p , β = 1) is replaced by RHSV (V p , β = 1)—that
is the RHS of Equation (1.5)—and (ki θpi + ρ∗ k−i θp−i ) is pre-multiplied by ρ, since
employed workers are only ρ times as likely to contact a firm as the unemployed.
The solution to the planner’s problem is given by the set of policy functions
p
(R , xp , θp ) that satisfy
V p (h` , a, e, i, Rp (h` , a, e, i, t), t) = U p (h` , a, e, i, t)

(1.31)

xp (h` , a, e, i, z, z ∗ , t) = V p (h` , a, e, −i, z ∗ , t) − V p (h` , a, e, i, z, t)

(1.32)

ki = ζθpi (t)ζ−1 S p (i, t).

(1.33)

Equations (1.32) and (1.31) are identical to the corresponding optimality conditions
in the decentralized equilibrium. Equation (1.33) is analogous to Equation (1.21),
except for the fact that the values U and V , and the surplus S, inside S are replaced
by their optimal analogues, and the average meeting rate with a worker is replaced by
the marginal one. However, the average and marginal rates are equal to each other,
given the assumption ζ = 1 − β. Clearly, the values of the optimal policy functions
need not be the same as the equilibrium ones, since the marginal social and private
vaues might differ from each other. Determining how the optimal allocation departs
from the equilibrium one is what I turn to next.

Optimal Allocation and Policy
I solve the planner’s problem and compute the optimal steady-state allocation for
the economy. The denotation of a steady state implies that this is the time-invariant
allocation the planner would choose ∀τ > t if the state of the economy was equal to the
steady-state optimal distribution at a certain time t. Under the implicit assumption
that the optimal allocation would converge to the same steady state for any value of
the initial distribution, it is informative to compare the characteristics of the optimal
allocation to the steady-state equilibrium of the economy.50
and not from the interaction between economic agents. This is why I do not list and discuss it
among the externalities at the beginning of this section. Quantitatively, I find that it does not play a
significant role in shaping the discrepancy between the optimal and equilibrium allocations.
50
A milder requirement is that the optimal steady-state allocation would be part of the solution
to a planner’s problem in which the state variable φ(·, t) was equal to the equilibrium steady-state
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Figure 1.12: Knowledge Diffusion Externality
Left y-axis: human capital distribution of high school (gree line with circles) and
college graduates (purple line with diamonds). Right y-axis: difference between
knowledge spillover externalities in large and small cities as a percentage of average
income in the economy (black solid line). The dotted line corresponds to the value of
human capital at which the black solid line is equal to 0 (i.e. same externality in large
and small cities).

In the optimal allocation, large cities are 11.4% smaller than in the equilibrium,
while small cities expand by 18.5%. The lower dispersion in city size is accompanied
by a change in the optimal composition of large cities, which occurs along three
main dimensions. First, the optimal fraction of college graduates is equal to 39%,
compared with 29% in the equilibrium (R1). Second, educational sorting is particularly
pronounced among old workers. In the equilibrium, the college share in large cities is
almost constant with respect to age, while in the optimal allocation it is equal to 35%
among young workers, and 45% among the old (R2). Third, 56% of workers in large
cities are young, compared with an equilibrium value of 51% (R3).
In order to understand the first result, R1, Figure 1.12 shows the human capital
distribution. Verifying this conjecture is certainly an important exercise to perform.
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distribution of high school and college graduates in the economy, under the optimal
allocation (left y-axis). On the same graph, I plot the difference between the knowledge
spillover externality generated by a worker in a large and in a small city, as a function
of his human capital (right y-axis).51 I define this difference the net knowledge
spillovers in large cities. Knowledge spillovers is the externality that varies the most
with a worker’s education—through the effect of learning ability on his equilibrium
human capital.52 Within each city, this externality is given by the combination of
two ingredients. On the one hand, a worker transmits knowledge to the young. Such
effect is positive and increasing in the worker’s human capital. On the other hand,
that same worker reduces the rate at which the young interact with—hence learn
from—every other worker in the city. This congestion component is always negative
and independent of the worker’s type. Therefore, the higher a worker’s human capital,
the higher the knowledge spillover externality he generates, in every city. However,
the rate at which ideas are diffused, and the return to human capital through the
formation of better labor market matches, are increasing in city size. It follows that
high-skilled workers are disproportionally more beneficial to others when they are
located in large cities. The dotted line corresponds to the human capital level at
which workers generate the same knowledge spillover externality in both cities. It
is easy to see that the human capital distribution of college graduates first order
stochastically dominates the distribution of high school graduates, which implies that
college graduates are more likely to be on the right side of the dotted line. That is,
they are more likely to provide net positive knowledge spillovers in large cities.53
In light of the argument behind R1, R2 can be explained by the life-cycle increase
in human capital inequality between education groups. Since college graduates learn
at a higher rate than high school graduates, the educational gap in the ability to
generate knowledge spillovers grows with experience. Last, notice that the optimal
51

See the first term on the third line of Equation (1.30). A formal definition of the knowledge
spillover externality can be found in Appendix 1.A.
52
The other externality that varies by education is given by the dependence of newborns’ education
(hence initial human capital) on the education of the old workers they replace. Quantitatively, such
intergenerational channel has a much smaller effect on the optimal allocation, compared with the
effect of the knowledge spillover externality.
53
In turn, the presence of more college graduates, who have high learning ability, provides an
additional explanation for the disproportionally larger spillovers generated by high-skilled workers in
large cities.
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large city is much richer in human capital, compared with the equilibrium one. This
creates stronger incentives for young workers to move to large cities, which explains
R3.
To gain additional insights into the heterogeneous externality each worker generates,
I compute a simple type-specific optimal policy that can be readily obtained by
comparing the private to the social marginal value of a worker. Specifically, I find
the unique flow transfer (up to a lump-sum tax levied on all workers) that equates
the solutions to the HJBEs (1.1) and (1.30), and I perform the same exercise for
employed workers. As illustrated by Equations (1.31)-(1.33), the equality between
the equilibrium and the optimal value functions guarantees that the decentralized
and the optimal policy functions take the same values, and so does the steady-state
allocation. While the absolute level of the transfers is not particularly informative,
it is instructive to observe how they vary across cities, for different types of workers.
In particular, I compute the population-weighted average subsidy by worker’s age,
education, and location. I then compute the difference in such average transfers by
age and education, between large and small cities, and express them as a percentage
of the average per capita output in the economy.
Under the optimal policy, the transfer received by college graduates that locate in
large cities is higher than in small cities by an amount equal to 12.5% of average per
capita output. To the opposite, the planner would subsidize high school graduates that
choose to locate in small cities, as they would receive an additional 4.1% of average
output compared to those who live in large cities. Conditional on education, the size
of the average transfer is unaffected by the age of the worker.54
The policy prescriptions in this paper are closest to Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and
Schwartzman (2019), and they somewhat differ from those in Fajgelbaum and Gaubert
(2019).55 Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2019) consider a multiple location, heterogeneous
agent, static economy, characterized by externalities in both production and amenities.
54

An age-independent transfer is able to generate large cities that are younger than in the
equilibrium. To see why, notice that part of the social benefits from learning are in fact internalized
by young workers—since they maximize the presented discounted value of their income. Hence, they
do not need to be subsidized in order to have stronger incentives for locating in large cities, once
those cities are richer in human capital, compared with the equilibrium.
55
While they have different implications in terms of composition, both these papers—as well
as mine—point toward less dispersion in the optimal distribution of city size, compared with the
equilibrium.
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They find that a social planner would in fact reallocate workers, and, in particular,
college graduates, toward smaller cities. This is because small cities host fewer college
graduates, and such scarsity makes them particularly valuable in those locations. RossiHansberg, Sarte, and Schwartzman (2019) build a model in the spirit of Fajgelbaum
and Gaubert (2019), augmented with multiple industries and input-output linkages.
They divide workers according to whether they do—or do not—perform cognitive nonroutine tasks (CNR vs. non-CNR). They estimate negative cross-type externalities,
and find that it is optimal to reallocate non-CNR workers outside of large cities.
Similarly to the non-CNR workers in Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Schwartzman (2019),
high school graduates in my model have lower average levels of human capital, and
reduce the intensity of interactions between college graduates.
The externalities in the present paper are only indirectly related to production—through increasing returns to scale in the search process—but they primarily
involve the process of human capital accumulation. Since peer effects are endogenous
and dynamic, a worker who learns more exerts a more positive externality on other
workers. College graduates have higher learning ability and human capital, hence
they benefit more from—and also contribute more to—knowledge spillovers in large
cities. Notice that, because of vertical learning, in this paper, as in Fajgelbaum and
Gaubert (2019), college graduates would be very beneficial to workers who live in a
(human capital-poor) small city. Yet, this benefit is quantitatively dominated by the
externality generated by college graduates on each other, consistent with the findings
in Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Schwartzman (2019).

1.7

Conclusions

The US, as many other economies, displays a significant and persistent positive
correlation between city size and productivity, usually proxied by wages, and in
particular for more experienced workers. In this paper, I contribute to the literature
that studies the origins of the city-size wage premium. I build a life-cycle equilibrium
model that jointly allows for heterogeneity in sorting behavior, increasing returns
to scale in the labor search process, and spatial differences in the frequency and
quality of knowledge diffusion between workers. I find that lower search frictions in
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the labor market facilitate the formation of better matches, which in turn generate a
positive level effect on wages in large cities. The contribution of knowledge diffusion
to the city-size wage premium emerges over the life cycle, mainly because of a better
composition of peers, and to a lesser extent because of more frequent interactions
between workers. By determining workers’ migration decisions, better match quality
and learning opportunities generate positive sorting of workers into large cities. In
turn, sorting contributes to the equilibrium heterogeneity in the quality of peers across
cities. Quantitatively, I find that matching generates a constant wage premium of
11%, while the role played by sorting and knowledge diffusion grows over the life cycle,
up to 12% and 15%, respectively.
Throughout the paper, I stress how the mapping from heterogeneity in city
characteristics into observed wage profiles is the result of the interaction between
multiple channels that are dynamic in nature, and cannot be readily recovered from
the data. Furthermore, a worker’s location decision in the model is affected by a
number of unobservable variables, like his level of human capital, quality of current and
perspective matches, and idiosyncratic moving cost. Since the estimation targets only
the aggregate differences in labor market outcomes between small and large cities, I use
micro evidence on wages of movers and stayers to validate the proposed mechanisms
behind the city-size wage premium. I show that the model generates incentives to
move to—and from—large cities that are consistent with the empirical evidence on
selection into, and the return to, migration. Controlling for job tenure affects the
comparison between movers and stayers, but it does so in a virtually identical fashion
in the model as in the data. This finding highlights the importance of accounting
for labor market frictions, and match heterogeneity, in measuring the city-size wage
premium, and understanding workers’ location choice.
I conclude by pointing out the traditional disconnect between the studies that
investigate the nature of spatial wage differentials, and those that explore their
aggregate implications. As I microfound and measure the sources of the city-size
wage premium in an equilibrium environment, I address and combine both of these
literatures.
First, I contribute to the debate on the aggregate consequences of enacting placebased policies that trigger the relocation of workers toward more productive locations.
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In the context of an increase in housing supply—e.g. through a change in land-use
regulation—I show that accounting for endogenous productivity differences between
cities is crucial in order to asses the equilibrium response of the economy. A hypothetical scenario, characterized by exogenous productivity differences between locations,
would overstate the labor income gains associated to an expansion of large cities by
more than a factor of 2.5.
Second, I compute and characterize the extent to which the optimal spatial
allocation of workers differs from the equilibrium one. I highlight how heterogeneity
between workers in private and social benefits from knowledge spillovers would induce
a social planner to increase the concentration of high-skilled, college educated, workers
into large cities. This result requires a note of caution, in light of the implicit
assumption that the gains from improving on the equilibrium allocation can be
redistributed without distorsions. It is certainly worth exploring how a more realistic
set of policies would address the trade-off between the aggregate benefits from spatial
sorting and the potential increase in inequality between places (and people).
Nesting the dynamic aspects of this paper into a conventional urban system, with a
larger number of cities, is certainly an intriguing but challenging task. From a modeling
perspective, the fact that the human capital distribution of cities is an equilibrium
object poses non-trivial computational challenges. On the empirical side, estimating
a dynamic model with a realistic system of cities would require a large longitudinal
sample of workers, with an extensive cross-sectional dimension. Nonetheless, I believe
that the margins introduced in the admittedly stylized geography of this paper are
likely to apply to richer environments.
Relatedly, even though larger cities pay higher wages, size captures only a portion
of the observed dispersion in local productivity. Differences in sectoral composition, for
example, have been associated with the diverging fate of cities, like the manufacturing
area of Detroit, and the innovative tech hub of San Francisco. In a non-stationary
environment, in which places are differentially affected by aggregate trends, the same
agglomeration forces behind the expansion of a city might reverse, and accelerate
its decline. In such a context, the nature of human capital accumulation, and its
transferability across cities and occupations, would have significant distributional
implications for workers with different types and levels of experience. Extending
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the framework in this paper to account for the recent evolution in the geography of
productivity across US cities represents a fruitful venue for future research.
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1.A

Appendix

Wage contracts
Let W (h` , a, e, i, z, ω) be the present discounted value of a worker of human capital h` ,
age a, education e, who lives in city i, is employed at match quality z, and is being
paid a piece rate ω. It is instructive to highlight the discrepancy between W and the
joint value of the match at which the worker is employed, V . Hence, the HJBE that
characterizes the value function W can be written as
rW (·) = rV (h` , a, e, i, z) − (1 − ω)zh` +
[σ i κ(·) + η e exp(−ηh` )][(W (h`+1 ) − W ) − (V (h`+1 ) − V )]I{a=y} +

(1.34)

ψ h [(W (o) − V (o))I{a=y} − (W − V )] + δ e (V − W ) + W(i) + W ∗ (i).
The LHS is the annuitized value of W . The first line on the RHS has two terms. The
first term is the annuitized joint value from the worker’s current match. The second
term represents the fact that the worker only receives a fraction ω of the flow product
zh` . The second line shows the change in value due to human capital accumulation,
net of the change in the joint value of the match that is already included in the term
rV (h` , a, e, i, z). An analogous intuition applies to the aging process described by
the first term on the third line. The joint value of a match accounts for the event
of job destruction, but workers only lose the portion of the match value that they
were receiving. Since firms lose (V − W ) when the job is destroyed, δ e (V − W ) is
added back to the worker’s value. The last two terms represent the additional value
the worker obtains when receiving outside offers and/or moving.
The value W(i) is given by


Z z
W(i) = λ1,i (V − W )(1 − F (z)) +
(V (ẑ) − W )dF (ẑ) .
z f (ω)

If a worker transitions to a new job inside the same city, i.e. to a job with match
quality ẑ > z, he receives the value of the old match that was accruing to the previous
employer before the workers’ job-to-job transition. This is because the previous
employer is always willing to deliver at most the joint value of the match in order
to retain the worker, while competing with the poaching firm. The second term
shows the gain in value from receiving an outside offer, inside the same city, which
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triggers a wage renegotiation, but not a job-to-job transition. This event occurs when
the worker and the new potential employer draw a match quality ẑ < z, but such
that V (h` , a, e, i, ẑ) is higher than the current present discounted value to the worker,
W (h` , a, e, i, z, ω). The minimum match quality that triggers a wage increase is given
by the function z f (h` , a, e, i, z, ω), which is implicitly defined by
V (h` , a, e, i, z f (h` , a, e, i, z, ω)) = W (h` , a, e, i, z, ω).
A worker who draws a match quality z f < ẑ < z receives the joint value of the new
potential match, V (ẑ). This assumption is different from Bagger et al. (2014), who
use the bargaining protocol in Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006). In Bagger
et al. (2014), the worker would also receive a fraction β of the difference between the
joint value of his current and the new potential match.
The last term in Equation (1.34) shows the gain from meeting firms in city −i,
and it is equal to
W ∗ (i) = λ∗1,−i {D(x(z, 0))[U (−i) − W ]+
(D(x(ω)) − D(x))[U (−i) − W − E(c|x < c < x(ω))]}F (R(−i))+
Z z̄
∗
λ1,−i
(D(x(z, ẑ)) − D(x(z, 0)))(V (−i, ẑ) − W ) + D(x(z, 0))(V − W )+
R−i

(D(x(ω)) − D(x(z)))[(V (−i, ẑ) − W ) − E(c|x < c < x(ω))]dF (ẑ).
(1.35)
The first two lines on the RHS of Equation (1.35) represent the additional value the
worker receives if moving as unemployed to city −i (first line), and the gain from staying
at his current firm, but credibly threatening to quit as unemployed to city −i (second
line). Conditional on drawing ẑ < R(h` , a, e, −i), a worker moves as unemployed if
he draws a migration cost below x(h` , a, e, i, z, 0), defined by Equation (1.6). The
threat of moving as unemployed is credible—hence it triggers an increase in wage—if
the migration cost is above x(h` , a, e, i, z, 0), but below the cutoff x(h` , a, e, i, z, 0, ω),
given by
x(h` , a, e, i, z, 0, ω) = U (h` , a, e, −i) − W (h` , a, e, i, z, ω).
The last two lines of Equation (1.35) apply the same logic to the case in which the
match quality ẑ with the new potential employer is high enough to trigger either a
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job-to-job transition, or an upward revision of the piece rate. In this case, the cutoff
cost that induces the worker to credibly ask for a wage renegotiation is equal to
x(h` , a, e, i, z, ẑ, ω) = V (h` , a, e, −i, ẑ) − W (h` , a, e, i, z, ω).

Data
The representative cross-sectional sample of the NLSY79 includes 3003 men. I exclude
workers that never entered the labor force, were not employed for more than 5
consecutive years, or were already in the labor force when they started being surveyed.
Workers enter the labor force the first quarter in which they spend 390 hours either
employed or unemployed, where the number of hours spent as unemployed is equal to
the number of weeks of unemployment multiplied by 20. Once they enter the labor
force, workers enter the estimation sample the first time they are employed. In order
to keep a balanced panel, but also avoid issues of non-random sample selection, I keep
only workers that by 2012 had completed 20 full years since entering the estimation
sample.
I build a monthly panel by sampling the interview week, whenever available, and
the third week of the month, otherwise. For each monthly observation, I observe labor
market status, working hours, hourly wage, and whether the worker experienced a
change of employer. I keep only wage observations that are associated to jobs at which
workers spend at least 10 hours per week. I consider workers as still employed at their
last job if they are observed not to be working for a certain period of time, but then
return to their last employer. In fact, it would be hard to justify the existence of
search frictions and unknown match quality with the most recent past employer.
Location information, in the form of county of residence, is available at interview
dates, and between interviews during the time periods 1978-1982 and after 2000.
When location is not observed, I adopt the following assignment procedure. I assume
that workers stay at their current location for the entire spell of a job, and I assign
each job to the modal location in case I observe more than one location for the same
job. I assign each county to a commuting zone (CZ) using the cross-walk provided
by David Dorn.56 I assign an observation to the CZ observed in the previous month
56

https://www.ddorn.net/data.htm
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if such CZ is the same as the CZ where the worker lives one or two months after
the missing observation. The remaining periods with missing location information
are split into two parts: the first half is assigned to the last observed CZ and the
second half to the first CZ observed after the period with missing information. The
underlying assumption is that the actual migration date is uniformly distributed over
the period in which location information is not available. Last, CZs are assigned to
the category "large city" ("small city") if they have population of more (less) than
750 thousand in 1990. This categorization guarantees both substantial heterogeneity
in size between large and small cities, and a comparable number of observations from
each type of city in the NLSY79.
The final sample has 240 monthly observations for each of the 386 (1146) workers
with a college (high school) degree.

Expected surplus and marginal social value of a worker
Expected surplus
Firms in city i receive a fraction (1 − β) of the expected surplus S(i) of creating a
match with a worker. The expectation is taken with respect to the type of worker the
firm meets, the match quality sampled by the firm-worker pair, and the migration
cost—if the worker moves from city −i. The formal representation of the expected
surplus introduced in Equation (1.22) is given by57
S(i) =
Z z̄
Z
Σ{
S(i, 0, i, ẑ)dF (ẑ)φ(i, 0) +

h,a,e

Z

Ri
z̄

z

z̄

Z

z̄

S(i, z̃, i, ẑ)dF (ẑ)φ(i, z̃)dz̃ρ+
z̃

{(D(x(−i, 0, i, ẑ)) − D(x(−i, 0, i, 0)))[S(−i, 0, i, ẑ)−
(1.36)

Ri
∗

E(c|x(0) < c < x(ẑ))] + D(x(−i, 0, i, 0))S(i, 0, i, ẑ)}dF (ẑ)φ(−i, 0)ρ +
Z z̄ Z z̄
{(D(x(−i, z̃, i, ẑ)) − D(x(−i, z̃, i, 0)))[S(−i, z̃, i, ẑ)−
z

Ri

E(c|x(0) < c < x(ẑ))] + D(x(−i, z̃, i, 0))S(i, 0, i, ẑ)}dF (ẑ)φ(−i, z̃)dz̃ρρ∗ }.
57

Once again, the state variables (h, a, e) are omitted from S and x.
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The first line on the RHS corresponds to the surplus from hiring an unemployed
(first term) or employed (second term) worker in the local labor market. Currently
employed workers at match quality z̃ would move to a new job inside city i if and only
if they draw a match quality ẑ > z̃. Notice how the parameter ρ in the second term
captures the relative search efficiency of employed workers. The second and third lines
show the expected surplus from hiring a currently unemployed worker from city −i.
Recall that if the worker draws a migration cost c < x(−i, z̃, i, ẑ), he migrates even
without accepting a job. In that case, his threat point in the Nash bargaining protocol
is being unemployed in city i. The last two lines follow the same logic, applied to
hiring a currently employed worker from city −i.
Derivation of the marginal social value of a workers
The derivation of the marginal social value of a worker closely follows the methodology introduced by Lucas and Moll (2014). In order to numerically compute the
optimal allocation, I discretize the match quality distribution on a finite set of points.
Recall that human capital, age, education, and location are discrete variables as well.
Therefore, here I present the discretized planner’s problem, and refer the reader to
Lucas and Moll (2014) for the treatment of a dynamic programming problem in which
the state variable is a continuous distribution. The economic intuition is the same
for both approaches, and so is the mathematical derivation—except for the use of
functional derivatives in the continuous-state problem.
Let j (or j 0 ) index the state of a worker, (h, a, e, i, z), under the usual assumption
that a value of z = 0 means that the worker is unemployed. Let φ(j) be the measure
of workers of type j. The planner’s problem (1.29) in Section 1.6 can be written in
recursive form as
rW (φ) =
where Γ(j 0 ) =
ξ, is given by

∂φ(j 0 )
.
∂t

max
p

Rp (·),x (·),θp (·)

X

u(j)φ(j) +

j

X ∂W
Γ(j 0 ),
0
∂φ(j )
j0

(1.37)

The first order condition with respect to a generic policy function

0=

X ∂u(j)
j

∂
φ(j) +
∂ξ
∂ξ
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!
X ∂W
0
Γ(j ) .
∂φ(j 0 )
j0

(1.38)

Differentiating Equation (1.37) with respect to φ(j), and using the envelope condition,
I obtain
!
X ∂W
∂
∂W (φ)
= u(j) +
Γ(j 0 )
r
0)
∂φ(j)
∂φ(j)
∂φ(j
j0
(1.39)
2
0
X
X
∂W (φ)
∂ W
∂W ∂Γ(j )
r
= u(j) +
Γ(j 0 ) +
,
0
∂φ(j)
∂φ(j )∂φ(j)
∂φ(j 0 ) ∂φ(j)
j0
j0
where I used the fact that
∂ 2W
∂ 2W
=
.
∂φ(j)∂φ(j 0 )
∂φ(j 0 )∂φ(j)
Define the marginal social value of a worker U p (j, φ) =
Equation (1.39) results in
rŨ p (j, φ) = u(j) +

X ∂ Ũ p (j, φ)
j0

∂φj 0

Γ(j 0 ) +

∂W (φ)
.
∂φ(j)

X

Plugging U p (j, φ) into

Ũ p (j 0 , φ)

j0

∂Γ(j 0 )
.
∂φ(j)

(1.40)

The next step consists in transforming the high dimensional problem of solving for
Ũ p (j, φ) into a tractable one, which has the same dimensionality as the individual
decision problem in the laissez-faire equilibrium. I define the marginal social value
along the optimal trajectory
U p (j, t) = Ũ p (j, φ(·, t)) =

∂W (φ(·, t))
.
∂φ(j, t)

(1.41)

The intuition is that, along the optimal trajectory, the information included in the
entire cross-sectional distribution can be conveyed by the time dimension. Using the
chain rule of differentiation, it follows that
∂U p (j, t) X ∂ Ũ p (j, φ)
=
Γ(j 0 ).
0
∂t
∂φ(j )
j0

(1.42)

Combining Equations (1.42) and (1.40), I obtain the HJBE that describes the marginal
social value of a worker of type j,
rU p (j, t) = u(j) +

X

U p (j 0 , t)

j0
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∂Γ(j 0 ) ∂U p (j, t)
+
.
∂φ(j)
∂t

(1.43)

P
0)
The term j 0 U p (j 0 , t) ∂Γ(j
captures how a change in the measure of workers of type
∂φ(j)
j is associated with a change in the marginal value of all workers of type j 0 , weighted
by the effect of φ(j) on Γ(j 0 ). Hence, this term includes the externalities that worker
j creates on every other worker in the economy.
Using the law of motion of the distribution φ (Equations 1.8 and 1.9), I obtain the
following HJBE,

rU p (h` , a, e, i, t) = RHSU (U p , β = 1)+
agglomeration (matching) + agglomeration (flow of ideas)+
knowledge spillovers + vacancy creation + OLG+
∂U p (h` , a, e, i, t)
,
∂t
(1.44)
where RHSU (U p , β = 1) is the RHS of Equation (1.1), i.e. the flow private value of an
unemployed worker that captures all the gains from trade in the labor market (β = 1).
The remaining terms on the RHS of Equation (1.44) are generated by the fact that
φ(j) enters Γ(j 0 ) not only directly, but also through its contribution to Mi (Equation
1.10), Gi (Equation 1.14), and COLi (Equation 1.12).
The knowledge spillover externality is the key determinant of the wedge between
the optimal and the equilibrium composition of cities. Formally, it is equal to
knowledge spillovers ≡
Z z̄
σi X p
p
κ (h` , h`˜, ẽ)
φ(h`˜, y, ẽ, z̃, i)[V p (h`+1
˜ , y, ẽ, i, z̃) − V (h`˜, y, ẽ, i, z̃)]dz̃+
Mi ˜
z
`6=L,ẽ

p
φ(h`˜, y, ẽ, 0, i)[U p (h`+1
˜ , y, ẽ, i) − U (h`˜, y, ẽ, i)]+
Z z̄
σi X
p
κ(Gi , h`˜, e)
φ(h`˜, y, ẽ, z̃, i)[V p (h`+1
−
˜ , y, ẽ, i, z̃) − V (h`˜, y, ẽ, i, z̃)]dz̃+
Mi ˜
z
`6=L,ẽ

p
φ(h`˜, y, ẽ, 0, i)[U p (h`+1
˜ , y, ẽ, i) − U (h`˜, y, ẽ, i)].

(1.45)
The sum of the terms in the first two lines of Equation (1.45) is always positive and
strictly increasing in h` . A young worker of type (h`˜, ẽ) learns from a worker of type
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h` at rate κp (h` , h`˜, ẽ). The function κp is the counterpart of κ, seen from the point of
view of the worker who transmits knowledge to others. According to the technology
of knowledge diffusion described in Section 1.2,
κp (h` , h`˜, ẽ) = η ẽh h` + η ẽv max(h` − h`˜, 0).
A worker h` has a positive externality on any other (young) worker in the same city,
and, in particular, on workers with human capital h`˜ < h` . The sum the tems in the
last two lines of Equation (1.45) is clearly negative, and it is equal across all workers
in city i. It represents the congestion in the learning process, due to the reduction in
the rate at which young workers in city i learn from every other worker in the same
city.58
The other terms of Equation (1.44) are given by,
agglomeration (flow of ideas) ≡
Z z̄
σi X
p
τM
φ(h`˜, y, ẽ, z̃, i)[V p (h`+1
κ(Gi , h`˜, e)
˜ , y, ẽ, i, z̃) − V (h`˜, y, ẽ, i, z̃)]dz̃+
Mi ˜
z
`6=L,ẽ

p
φ(h`˜, y, ẽ, 0, i)[U p (h`+1
˜ , y, ẽ, i) − U (h`˜, y, ẽ, i)],

search ≡ −(ki θi + ρ∗ k−i θ−i ),
X
h
U p (h`˜, y, ẽ, i)π e,ẽ π̂g0,i
(h`˜|ẽ),
OLG ≡ ψ o
˜
`,ẽ
58

Recall that the knowledge spillover externality originates from the dependence of Gi on φ(j).
Specifically, from Equation (1.14),
i
P
P
P` hR z̄
φ(h
,
a,
e,
i,
z)dz
+
φ(h
,
a,
e,
i,
0)
˜
˜
˜
a=y,o
e=hs,col
`
`
`=1
z
Gi (h` ) =
 .
L Z z̄
X X X
φ(h` , a, e, i, z)dz + φ(h` , a, e, i, 0),
a=y,o e=hs,col `=1

z

|

{z

=Mi

}

The first (last) two lines in Equation (1.45) correspond to the effect of an additional unit of φ(j) on
the numerator (denominator) of the definition of Gi (h` ).
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agglomeration (matching) ≡
Z
Z ẑ
λ0,i z̄ X
χM
φ(h`˜, y, ẽ, z̃, i)[V p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, i, ẑ) − V p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, i, z̃)]dz̃+
ρ
Mi z ˜
z
`6=L,ẽ,ã

φ(h`˜, ã, ẽ, 0, i)[V p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, ẑ, i) − U p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, i)]I{ẑ > R(h`˜, ã, ẽ, i)}dẑ+

Z z̄ X Z z̄
λ∗0,i

χM
ρ
φ(h`˜, y, ẽ, z̃, −i)D(x(z̃, ẑ))
Mi
z
Ri ˜
`6=L,ẽ,ã

[V (h`˜, ã, ẽ, i, ẑ) − V p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, −i, z̃) − E(c|c < x(z̃, ẑ))]dz̃+
p

φ(h`˜, ã, ẽ, 0, −i)D(x(0, ẑ))[V p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, ẑ, i) − U p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, −i) − E(c|c < x(0, ẑ))]dẑ+
Z z̄
D(x(z̃, 0))[U p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, i) − V p (h`˜, ã, ẽ, −i, z̃) − E(c|c < x(z̃, 0))]dz̃F (Ri )+
z


D(x(0, 0))[U (h`˜, ã, ẽ, i) − U (h`˜, ã, ẽ, −i) − E(c|c < x(0, 0))]F (Ri ) .
p

p
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Additional results
Identification: Empirical and model-generated wage profiles

Figure 1.13: Life-cycle Wage Profiles
Wage profile of workers in the sample according to their education (top vs. bottom
panels), city (left vs. right), and position in the wage distribution in the first year of
employment (top vs. bottom lines inside each subplot). Data: dotted line. Model:
solid line. The shaded area represents the 95% empirical bootstrap confidence interval.
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Validation: Moments generated from the sample of non-movers

Moment (large/small)

Data

Model

unemp. rate (%)
n. of jobs
mean wage gap (%)
EE wage growth (%)
return to tenure (%)
college share (%)

5.1/5.5
6.38/6.14
32.7
11/11.8
22.5
29.3/17.5

5.1/5.1
6.54/6.56
34.5
11.1/11.3
24.0
30.9/18.7

Wage growth (%)
bottom-col-large
bottom-col-small
top-col-large
top-col-small
bottom-hs-large
bottom-hs-small
top-hs-large
top-hs-small
wage 11-20 vs. 1-10 yr. of exp.

6.6
4.8
4.0
2.5
4.4
3.7
2.5
1.3
30.6

6.5
4.3
3.8
3.0
4.4
3.1
2.8
1.9
31.2

col wage premium (%)

41

41.2

75th /25th pctile, hs

1.65

1.66

1.86

1.91

Labor Market

Initial Wage

th

th

75 /25

pctile, col

Table 1.4. Targeted moments computed on the sample of non-movers

87

Validation: Control for tenure

Figure 1.14: Job Tenure and Migration
Wage of movers with respect to stayers (top row) and incumbents (bottom two rows).
Dark stars: baseline. Light triangles: control for tenure. Left: data. Right: model.
The fourth comparison, i.e. movers to small cities compared to stayers in large cities,
is reported in the main body of the paper (Section 1.3).
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Chapter 2
DECLINING SEARCH FRICTIONS,
UNEMPLOYMENT, AND
GROWTH
By Paolo Martellini† and Guido Menzio‡

2.1

Introduction

The leading theory of unemployment and vacancies is the search model of the labor
market, first sketched in Stigler (1961), Stigler (1962) and then fully developed in
Diamond (2016), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985). The theory argues that
unemployment and vacancies coexist because limited information prevents unemployed
workers and vacant jobs from immediately locating each other. To overcome limited
information, firms spend resources to advertise their vacancies, and workers spend
time to collect and process the ads released by firms. The efficiency with which
firms advertise their vacancies and workers collect and process job ads determines
the extent of search frictions, i.e. the speed at which workers come into contact with
vacancies, and, in turn, the level of unemployment, vacancies, and the mismatch
between employers and employees.
A natural exercise is confronting the search theory of the labor market with data
about unemployment and vacancies from times when the extent of frictions is likely
to be different: the last 90 years of US history. Over this period, the introduction and
†University of Pennsylvania.
‡New York University.
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diffusion of communication and information technologies, such as the radio, the land
phone, the internet and the smart phone, is likely to have widened the audience that
can be reached by a firm’s ad. Moreover, progress in public and private transportation
is likely to have widened the audience of workers willing to entertain a job opening
in a given location. Both phenomena have plausibly increased the speed at which
unemployed workers become aware of relevant vacancies.
Figure 1 shows the Beveridge curve—the scatter plot of unemployment and vacancy
rates—over the period between 1927 and 2018 in the US.59 We can see the counterclockwise movements of the Beveridge curve at the business cycle frequency, which
have been well documented and rationalized.60 What we find remarkable, though, is
the lack of any systematic secular movement of the curve. The Beveridge curve in
2018 is exactly where it was in the late 1940s. There are also no secular movements
along the curve. We can see in Figure 2 that unemployment and vacancy rates feature
large fluctuations at the business cycle frequency, which have recently been the subject
of much research.61 Unemployment and vacancy rates also feature lower frequency
fluctuations, presumably driven by changes in the demographic and occupational
structure of the economy. Unemployment and vacancy rates, however, do not have an
over-riding secular trend. The rate at which unemployed workers become employed
(UE rate) and the rate at which employed workers become unemployed (EU rate) also
display business-cycle and lower frequency fluctuations, but do not have an over-riding
secular trend, as we can see from Figure 3.62
59

Figures 1 and 2 are constructed using the time-series for unemployment and vacancies in
Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2013). All the details are in Appendix A. Here, it is worth warning our
readers that the vacancy rate is constructed from 4 different series: the MetLife help-wanted index
(newspaper ads, April 1929-August 1960), the Conference Board help-wanted index (newspaper ads,
January 1951-July 2006), Barnichon’s help-wanted index (mix of newspaper and online ads, January
1995-December 2012), the JOLTS job openings (survey of establishments, December 2000-December
2018). The 4 series are merged through rescaling. Specifically, a series is rescaled so that it takes
the same value as the previous one at a particular point in time (January 1960 for the second series,
January 1995 for the third series, January 2000 for the fourth series). Once rescaled, consecutive
series closely track each other during the entire period of overlap. This suggests that the meaning of
a 1% change remains the same across different series. The unified series is a vacancy index. The
index is divided by the labor force and then turned into a vacancy rate by using the observation in
Zagorski (1988) that the vacancy rate was 2.05% in 1965. Reassuringly, for the period of overlap, our
vacancy rate is very close to a vacancy rate computed directly from JOLTS.
60
See, e.g., Kaplan and Menzio (2016), Gavazza, Mongey, and Violante (2018), or Sniekers (2018).
61
See, e.g., Shimer (2005), Hall (2005), Hall (2017) or Menzio and Shi (2011).
62
The UE and EU rates are constructed as in Menzio and Shi (2011). The UE and EU rates
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Figure 2.1: Beveridge Curve US: 1927-2018

If search frictions in the labor market have diminished over the last 90 years, why
do we not see a secular inward shift of the Beveridge curve, a secular negative trend
in the unemployment rate, and a secular rise in the UE rate?63 One possibility is
that search frictions are not the cause of unemployment and vacancies. A second
possibility is that the decline in search frictions has not been large enough to create
secular trends. A third possibility is that declining search frictions have countervailing
effects on unemployment, vacancies and transition rates which happen to offset each
other. We explore this third possibility.
We consider a model of the labor market in the spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides
corrected for time-aggregation (as in Shimer (2005)) are similar. The trend of the EU rate is slightly
positive from 1949 to 1985, and slightly negative afterwards. The UE rate shows no trend between
1949 and 2000, and a decreasing trend afterwards (see, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger (2014)).
63
The industrial organization literature has made a similar observation with respect to price levels
and price dispersion. The introduction of on-line trade, in fact, does not seem to have lowered prices
or eliminated price dispersion (see, e.g., Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2005) or Ellison and Ellison,
2018).
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Figure 2.3: UE and EU Rates US: 1948-2018

Figure 2.2: Unemployment and Vacancy Rates US: 1927-2018

(1994) with progress in the production technology and declining search frictions.
Progress in the production technology is modelled as a growth rate gy in the component
of labor productivity that is common to all firm-worker matches. Declining search
frictions are modelled as a growth rate gA in the rate at which a worker meets a
vacancy. We assume that firm-worker matches are inspection goods, in the sense
that, when a worker and a vacancy meet, they observe the idiosyncratic component
of productivity of their match and, based on this information, decide whether or not
to start an employment relationship. We seek a Balanced Growth Path (BGP) for
this economy, i.e. an equilibrium along which unemployment, vacancies, UE and EU
rates are constant over time. We focus on a BGP because it is a description of an
economy in which unemployment, vacancies and transition rates have approximately
no trend. Moreover, the conditions for the existence of a BGP are a useful benchmark
to understand temporary and persistent deviations of the economy from stationarity.
The main result of the paper is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for
the existence of a BGP, together with a characterization of the BGP. A BGP exists
iff: (a) the quality of a firm-worker match is a sample from a Pareto distribution
with some tail coefficient α; (b) the worker’s benefit from unemployment and the
firm’s cost of maintaining a vacancy grow at the same rate as average productivity.
The assumption that matches are inspection goods could be considered the third
condition for existence, as there is no BGP if matches are experience goods. The
BGP has the following properties: (i) unemployment, vacancies, UE and EU rates
are constant; (ii) the distribution of employed workers across match qualities is the
sampling distribution truncated at a cutoff that grows at the rate gA /α; (iii) average
productivity grows at the rate gy + gA /α.
The intuition behind the main result is simple. The decline in search frictions
leads to an increase in the reservation quality—i.e. the lowest match quality for which
workers and firms are willing to start or continue an employment relationship—as it
makes it easier for workers and firms to locate alternative trading partners. Hence,
the decline in search frictions has two countervailing effects on the UE rate. On the
one hand, it increases the rate at which workers meet vacancies. On the other hand,
by increasing the reservation quality, it lowers the probability that a meeting between
a worker and a vacancy results in an employment relationship. Iff the sampling
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distribution of quality is Pareto and the unemployment benefit grows at the same
rate as average productivity, the two effects cancel out and the UE rate remains
constant. The cross-sectional distribution of employed workers across qualities is
the sampling distribution truncated at the reservation quality. Since the sampling
distribution is Pareto and the reservation quality grows at a constant rate, the EU
rate remains constant. As UE and EU rates are constant, so is unemployment. The
vacancy-to-unemployment ratio remains constant iff the cost of maintaining a vacancy
grows at the same rate as the benefit, which is equal to the growth rate of average
productivity.
The decline in search frictions contributes to the growth of average productivity
by increasing the reservation quality. The contribution is gA /α, where 1/α denotes
the thickness of the right tail of the distribution from which workers and firms sample
the quality of their match and, hence, it controls the return to faster search. The
finding that declining search frictions contribute to productivity growth by reducing
the mismatch between firms and workers formalizes one of the original insights of
search theory. In fact, Stigler (1962) observes that “The better informed the labor
market, the closer each worker’s product to its maximum at any given time” and that
“In a regime of ignorance, Enrico Fermi would have been a gardener, Von Neumann a
checkout clerk at a drugstore.”
The main result of the paper carries over to two natural generalizations of the
environment: search on the job and population growth. For both generalizations, the
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a BGP are exactly the same as
in the baseline. The properties of a BGP, though, are slightly different. With search
on the job, the distribution of employed workers across match qualities is not the
truncated sampling distribution, but a truncated Fréchet. With population growth,
the effective rate of decline of search frictions is not gA , but gA + βgN , where gN is
the growth rate of population and β is the coefficient that controls the return to scale
of the search process. Hence, with population growth, the contribution to declining
search frictions to productivity growth is not gA /α, but (gA + βgN )/α.
The second result of the paper is about identification. If the economy is moving
along a BGP, one cannot infer the rate gA + βgN at which search frictions decline
by looking at the time trends of unemployment, vacancy, UE and EU rates. Indeed,
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these variables are constant over time irrespectively of gA + βgN . Moreover, if the
conditions for a BGP are satisfied, one cannot infer the return to scale β in the search
process by looking at the difference in unemployment, vacancy, UE and EU rates
across markets with different size. Indeed, these variables are uncorrelated with market
size irrespectively of β.64 We show that one can measure gA + βgN as the growth
rate of the number of candidates that a firm considers for a vacancy before filling
it. Similarly, one can measure β from the elasticity of the number of candidates per
vacancy with respect to the size of the market where the vacancy is located. Lastly,
we show that one can measure the coefficient α of the sampling distribution as the
tail coefficient of the wage distribution for inherently identical workers. We then carry
out a rough implementation of our identification strategy. We find a 2.2% decline in
search frictions between 1980 and 2010, 5/6 of which due to improvements in search
technology, gA , and 1/6 to increasing returns to scale in search, βgN . We find that
the contribution of declining search frictions to productivity growth, (gA + βgN )/α,
is non-negligible.65 Similarly, the contribution of increasing returns to scale in the
search process to the wage gap between large and small cities is non-negligible.
The main goal of our paper is to find conditions for a BGP in a search-theoretic
model of the labor market in which frictions become smaller over time. Most of the
literature seeking conditions for a BGP is applied to the neoclassical growth model
(see, e.g., King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988) and more recently Grossman et al. (2017)).
This literature starts from some stylized facts and uses these facts to derive restrictions
on the fundamentals of the economy, such as the utility and the production functions.
These restrictions are useful not only as an explanation for the stylized facts, but also
as a benchmark to understand how to make sense of deviations from the BGP. This
is the spirit of our paper too. A smaller part of the literature seeks conditions for a
BGP in search-theoretic models (see, e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1994) or Pissarides
64

In the data, unemployment, vacancies, UE and EU rates are indeed uncorrelated with the size
of the local labor market (see, e.g., Petrongolo and Pissarides (2006) and Martellini (2019)).
65
The finding that declining search frictions contribute to productivity growth formalizes and
quantifies one of the original ideas of Stigler (1962). The finding is related to recent work by Hsieh et al.
(2019) who argue that the decline in the discrimination of women and minorities in the labor market
might account for somewhere between a quarter and half of the overall increase in US productivity
over the last 50 years. Both findings work through a common mechanism: declining distortions in the
labor market lower the mismatch between workers and jobs or occupations. In our paper, distortions
are caused by information frictions. In theirs, distortions are caused by discrimination.
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(2000)). However, this part of the literature has focused on environments in which the
production technology, rather than the search technology, improves over time.
The premise of our paper is the conjecture that improvements in information
technology and in transportation over the last 90 years have reduced search frictions.
While we do not have a direct measure of search frictions over time, there is some
evidence to support our conjecture. First, we find that applications per vacancy, a
proxy of the frequency of firm-worker meetings, increased substantially between 1980
and 2010 in the US. Second, Bhuller, Kostøl, and Vigtel (2019) exploit exogenous
temporal and spatial variation in the access to broadband internet across Norway to
measure the effect that this technology has had on local labor markets. They find that,
when broadband internet becomes available, firms report fewer problems in finding
workers, workers find employment more quickly, and the wage of newly hired workers
increases. In particular, the fraction of firms reporting problems with recruiting
falls by 13%, the average duration of vacancies falls by 7%, the UE rate increases
by 2% percentage points, and, most importantly, the wage of workers hired out of
unemployment increases by 3%. These findings are consistent with the predictions of
our model in response to a discrete jump in the efficiency of search.
We find that a necessary condition for a BGP is that the quality distribution from
which firms and workers sample is Pareto. In this sense, our paper relates to a recent
literature on endogenous growth that has found a central role for Pareto distributions
in the construction of BGPs. Perla and Tonetti (2014) study a model of imitation, in
which firms can either produce with their current technology or copy the technology
of another randomly selected firm. They show that, if the initial distribution of
technologies is Pareto, there is an equilibrium in which the economy endogenously
grows at a constant rate. The role of the Pareto distribution, though, is different
than in our model.66 Lucas and Moll (2014), Benhabib, Perla, and Tonetti (2017),
Buera and Oberfield (2020) are growth models similar to Perla and Tonetti (2014). In
a model of endogenous growth through innovation, Kortum (1997) seeks conditions
66

In Perla and Tonetti (2014), firms have different technologies and can either produce or copy
the technology of another firm, randomly-sampled from those that produce. By construction, in
Perla and Tonetti (2014), the rate at which copying firms become productive is exogenous, as every
new draw of technology is acceptable. In our model, the UE rate is endogenous and it is constant
only if the sampling distribution is Pareto.
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under which the innovation rate is constant even though the number of researchers is
growing. This question is analogous to ours, i.e. seeking conditions under which the
UE rate is constant even though the rate at which unemployed workers meet vacancies
is growing. He argues that the innovation rate is constant because the increase in the
number of researchers is offset by the decline in the probability that a researcher finds
an idea better than the best available one. This answer has the same flavor as ours,
i.e. the UE rate is constant because the increase in the meeting rate is offset by the
decline in the probability of finding an acceptable match. The economics behind the
two answers, though, is different.67

2.2

Baseline model

In this section, we consider a version of the canonical search-theoretic model of
the labor market by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in which firm-worker matches
are inspection goods, in the sense that, when they meet, a firm and a worker get to
observe the productivity of their match before deciding whether to start an employment
relationship. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a BGP,
a path along which unemployment, vacancies, UE and EU rates remain constant in
the face of improving production and search technologies.

Environment
The labor market is populated by a continuum of workers with measure 1 and by a
continuum of firms with positive measure. The objective of a worker is to maximize
the present value of labor income discounted at the rate r > 0, where income is a wage
wt if the worker is employed, and an unemployment benefit bt if he is unemployed.
The objective of a firm is to maximize the present value of profits discounted at the
67

In Kortum (1997), the innovation rate is the measure of researchers times the probability that
a researcher draws an idea better than the best available one. This is the probability that a draw
from the sampling distribution is higher than the best past draw. In our model, the UE rate is
the rate at which an unemployed worker meets a vacancy times the probability that the quality of
the firm-worker match is above the reservation cutoff. This is the probability that a draw from the
quality distribution exceeds the value of sampling again. The success cutoff in Kortum (1997) is
backward looking (the best draw in the past). The success cutoff in our model is forward looking
(the option of continuing search).
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rate r. A firm operates a technology that turns the flow of labor supplied by a worker
into a flow yt z of output, where yt is the component of productivity that is common
to all firm-worker pairs and z is the component that is idiosyncratic to a specific
firm-worker pair.
The labor market is subject to search frictions. Unemployed workers need to search
the market to locate vacant jobs. Firms need to search the market to locate workers
for their vacancies, which are maintained at the flow cost kt > 0. The outcome of the
search process is a flow At M (ut , vt ) of random bilateral meetings between unemployed
workers and vacant jobs, where ut and vt are the measures of unemployed workers
and vacant firms, M is a constant return to scale function, and At is the efficiency of
search.68 An unemployed worker meets a vacancy at the rate At p(θt ), where θt ≡ vt /ut
is the labor market tightness, and p(θ) ≡ M (1, θ) is a strictly increasing and concave
function such that p(0) = 0 and p(∞) = ∞. A vacancy meets an unemployed worker
at the rate At q(θt ), where q(θ) = p(θ)/θ is a strictly decreasing function such that
q(0) = ∞ and q(∞) = 0.
Upon meeting, a firm and a worker draw the component of productivity z that is
specific to their match from a c.d.f. F . After observing z, the firm and the worker
decide whether to match or not. If they do, the firm and the worker bargain over the
terms of an employment contract and start producing a flow yt z of output. Production
continues until the match is broken off. If they do not match, the worker remains
unemployed and the firm’s job remains vacant.
The terms of the employment contract are determined by the axiomatic Nash
bargaining solution, i.e. they maximize the product between the worker’s gains from
trade taken to the power γ and the firm’s gains from trade taken to the power 1 − γ.
The worker’s gains from trade are the difference between the value of the match to the
worker and his disagreement point, which we take to be the value of unemployment.
The firm’s gains from trade are the difference between the value of the match to the
firm and its disagreement point, which we take to be the value of a vacancy. The
contract specifies, directly or indirectly, a path for the worker’s wage and a break-up
date. We assume that the contract has enough contingencies to guarantee that the
68

We assume that search is random. The assumption is not crucial, as the conditions and properties
of a BGP would be exactly the same if search were directed as in Moen (1997), Menzio and Shi
(2010), Menzio and Shi (2011).

98

break-up date maximizes the joint value of the match.69 Given this assumption, the
Nash bargaining solution allocates a fraction γ of the total gains from trade to the
worker, and 1 − γ to the firm.
The environment is non-stationary. The aggregate component yt of productivity
grows at the rate gy ≥ 0, which captures the idea that progress in the production
technology allows firms to produce more output with the same inputs. The efficiency
At of search grows at the rate gA > 0, which captures the idea that progress in
information technology makes it easier for workers to locate vacancies and for firms to
locate workers.70 We also assume that the cost of a vacancy grows at the rate gk , and
the unemployment benefit at the rate gb .
The model is a version of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) in which matches
are inspection goods, in the sense that firms and workers observe z before deciding
whether to consummate their match. The assumption that firms and workers have
some information about z prior to consummating the match is crucial for the existence
of a BGP, as it creates a wedge between the rate at which unemployed workers meet
vacancies, which is assumed to grow due to improvements in the search technology,
and the rate at which unemployed workers become employed, which is required to
be constant along a BGP. If matches were experience goods, in the sense that firms
and workers knew nothing about z before consummating their match, a BGP could
not exist. In that case, the growth in the rate at which unemployed workers meet
vacancies would always cause growth in the UE rate. In the baseline model, we assume
that firms and workers perfectly observe z upon meeting. In Section 3.2, we consider
the case in which firms and workers only observe a signal about z.
69

There are many employment contracts with enough contingencies to guarantee that the joint
value of the match is maximized. For example, if the employment contract can specify a wage path
and a break-up date, the joint value of the match is maximized. The same is true if the employment
contract can specify a wage path but the worker and firm are free to leave the match at any time.
The same is true even if the employment contract can only specify a wage over the next interval of
time, after which the wage is re-bargained (as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
70
We model progress in the search technology as Hicks neutral. In the case of Hicks neutral
progress, the growth rate gp of the meeting rate between a worker and a firm is equal to gA . In the
case of input-augmenting search progress, the rate gp converges to some gp∗ , which depends on gA
and on the shape of M . In the limit as gp → gp∗ , our theorems hold with gp∗ replacing gA .
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Definition of a BGP
In order to define a BGP, we need to introduce some notation. Let Vt (z) denote
the joint value of a firm-worker match of quality z, where the joint value is defined
as the sum of the worker’s present value of income and the firm’s present value of
profits generated by the worker. Let Ut denote the value of unemployment to a worker.
Further, let θt denote the tightness of the labor market, ut the measure of unemployed
workers, and Gt (z) the c.d.f. of employed workers across match qualities.
The initial state of the economy is the distribution of workers across employment
states at date t = 0, i.e. u0 and G0 . A rational expectation equilibrium is a path for
Vt , Ut , θt , ut and Gt such that the agents’ decisions are optimal, markets clear, and
the evolution of ut and Gt is consistent with the agents’ decisions and the initial state
u0 , G0 . A BGP is an initial state and an associated rational expectation equilibrium
such that unemployment, tightness, UE and EU rates are constant over time, and the
distribution Gt grows at some constant rate (in the sense that every quantile of Gt
grows at the same, constant rate). Note that, as in the definition of a steady-state,
the initial conditions are not taken as given in the definition of a BGP.
We are now in the position to formally define a BGP. The joint value Vt (z) of a
firm-worker match of quality z is such that
Z t+d
Vt (z) = max
e−r(τ −t) yτ zdτ + e−rd Ut+d .
(2.1)
d≥0

t

At date τ , the sum of the worker’s income and the firm’s profit is equal to the flow
of output yτ z. After d units of time, the firm and the worker break up. After the
break-up, the worker’s present value of income is Ut+d and the firm’s present value of
profits generated by the worker is 0. Note that Vt is well-defined only if the discount
rate r exceeds the growth rate of the common component of productivity, i.e. r > gy .
The optimal break-up date d must satisfy
yt+d z + Ůt+d ≤ rUt+d , and d ≥ 0,

(2.2)

where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. The left-hand side
of (2.2) is the marginal benefit of delaying the break-up, which is given by the
flow of output of the match, yt+d z, plus the time-derivative of the worker’s value
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of unemployment, Ůt+d . The right-hand side is the marginal cost of delaying the
break-up, which is given by the sum of the annuitized values that the worker and
the firm can attain by breaking up, rUt+d . Condition (2.2) states that either d = 0
and the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit, or d > 0 and the marginal cost
equates the marginal benefit. Note that (2.2) is also sufficient because, in any BGP,
the right-hand side grows at a faster rate than the left-hand side.
The reservation quality Rt is defined as
yt Rt = rUt − Ůt .

(2.3)

From (2.2), it follows that an existing match between a firm and a worker is maintained
at date t iff its quality z is greater than Rt . Similarly, a meeting between a firm and a
worker leads to a match at date t iff its quality z is greater than Rt . That is, Rt is
the lowest quality for which existing matches are maintained and new matches are
consummated. Define the surplus St (z) of an existing or new match as Vt (z) − Ut .
Then, St (z) is positive if z is greater than the reservation quality Rt . Otherwise,
St (z) = 0.
The value of unemployment to a worker, Ut , is such that
Z
rUt = bt + At p(θ)γ
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ) + Ůt .

(2.4)

Rt

The left-hand side is the annuitized value of unemployment to a worker. The righthand side is the sum of three terms. The first term is the worker’s flow income from
unemployment. The second term is the worker’s option value of searching, which
is given by the rate at which the worker meets a vacancy times a fraction γ of the
expected surplus of a meeting between the worker and a vacancy. The last term is the
time-derivative of the worker’s value of unemployment. Note that Ut is well-defined
only if the discount rate exceeds the growth rate of bt , i.e. r > gb .
The tightness of the labor market, θ, is such that
Z
kt = At q(θ)(1 − γ)
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ).

(2.5)

Rt

The left-hand side is the cost to a firm of maintaining a vacancy. The right-hand side
is the benefit of maintaining a vacancy, which is given by the rate at which the vacancy
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meets a worker times a fraction 1 − γ of the expected surplus of a meeting between
the vacancy and a worker. In order for the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio θ to be
consistent with the firm’s optimal behavior, the cost of maintaining an additional
vacancy must equal the benefit.
In a BGP, the UE and EU rates, as well as u and v are required to be constant.
The requirement is fulfilled iff
At p(θ) [1 − F (Rt )] = hue ,

(2.6)

G0t (Rt )R̊t = heu ,

(2.7)

uhue = (1 − u)heu .

(2.8)

The UE rate at date t is the product between the rate at which an unemployed worker
meets a vacancy and the probability that the quality of their match is above Rt .
Condition (2.6) states that the UE rate is equal to some constant hue for all t ≥ 0. The
EU rate at date t is the product between the density of the distribution of employed
workers at Rt and the time-derivative of Rt . Condition (2.7) states that the EU rate
is equal to some constant heu for all t ≥ 0. The condition for the stationarity of
unemployment u is (2.8), which states that the flow of workers into unemployment
is equal to the flow of workers out of unemployment at all dates t ≥ 0. Given the
stationarity of u and the stationarity of θ implied by (2.5), it follows that vacancies v
are stationary as well.
In a BGP, the distribution Gt (z) of employed workers across match qualities is
required to grow at some constant rate. Formally, the constant growth condition for
Gt (z) is zt (x) = z0 (x) exp(gz t) for all x ∈ [0, 1] and all t ≥ 0, where zt (x) is the x-th
quantile of Gt and gz is some endogenous growth rate. The condition is satisfied iff
(1 − u)G0t (zt (x))zt (x)gz + uAt p(θ) [F (zt (x)) − F (Rt )] = (1 − u)G0t (Rt )R̊t .

(2.9)

The left-hand side is the flow of workers into matches with quality lower than an x-th
quantile growing at the rate gz . The first term on the left-hand side is the flow of
workers employed in a match of quality z that, in the next instant, fall below the
growing x-th quantile. The second term is the flow of unemployed workers who, in
the next instant, become employed in a match of quality z below the x-th quantile.
The right-hand side is the flow of workers out of matches with quality lower than the
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x-th quantile. This is the flow of workers who leave employment because the quality
of their match, in the next instant, falls below the growing reservation quality Rt .
Condition (2.9) thus guarantees that the measure of workers in matches with quality
lower than an x-th quantile growing at the rate gz remains constant over time.

Necessary conditions for a BGP
We now derive some conditions on the fundamentals of the economy that are necessary
for the existence of a BGP. First, we derive a necessary condition on the distribution
F from which firms and workers sample the quality of their match. The stationarity
condition (2.6) for the UE rate implies
gA =

F 0 (Rt )
Rt gz .
1 − F (Rt )

(2.10)

The left-hand side is the elasticity with respect to t of the rate at which an unemployed
worker meets a vacancy. This elasticity is the growth rate gA of the efficiency of the
search technology. The right-hand side is the negative of the elasticity with respect
to t of the probability that the match between an unemployed worker and a vacancy
has a quality above Rt . Since Rt is the 0-th quantile of the distribution Gt , Rt grows
at the rate gz and the elasticity is [F 0 (Rt )/(1 − F (Rt ))]Rt gz . The UE rate remains
constant over time only if the left and the right-hand sides of (2.10) are equal. That
is, the UE rate remains constant over time only if the increase in the rate at which an
unemployed worker meets a vacancy is exactly offset by the decline in the probability
that their match is good enough to be consummated.
Condition (2.10) is effectively a differential equation for the sampling distribution
F , as Rt grows over time from R0 to ∞. The unique solution to this differential
equation which satisfies the boundary condition F (∞) = 1 is
 z α
`
F (z) = 1 −
,
(2.11)
z
where α = gA /gz and z` is an arbitrary lower bound non-greater than R0 . Since
condition (2.10) is necessary, it follows that a BGP may exist only if the sampling
distribution F is the one given in (2.11), which is a Pareto distribution with some
tail coefficient α. It is important to notice that α = gA /gz is not a restriction on the
103

tail coefficient of the sampling distribution, as gz is an endogenous object. Instead,
α = gA /gz should be interpreted as stating that, in any BGP, the endogenous growth
rate gz must be equal to the ratio between the exogenous, arbitrary growth rate gA of
the efficiency of search and the exogenous, arbitrary tail coefficient α of the sampling
distribution.
Second, we derive a necessary condition on the growth rate gb of the worker’s
unemployment benefit and on the growth rate gk of the firm’s vacancy cost. The
optimality condition (2.3) for the reservation quality can be written as
R
yt Rt = bt + At p(θ)γ Rt St (z)dF (z)
(2.12)
γ
= bt +
θkt ,
1−γ
where the first line makes use of the Bellman equation (2.4) for the value of unemployment Ut to substitute out rUt − Ůt , and the second line makes use of the optimality
condition (2.5) for the market tightness θ to substitute out the expected surplus of a
match. The left-hand side of (2.12) is the output of a marginal match, and it grows
at the rate gy + gz . The first term on the right-hand side of (2.12) is the worker’s
unemployment benefit, and it grows at the rate gb . The second term is the worker’s
option value of searching which, in equilibrium, must be proportional to the firm’s
vacancy cost, and, hence, it grows at the rate gk . Since condition (2.12) must hold for
all t ≥ 0, a BGP may exist only if the left and the right hand sides of (2.12) grow at
the same rate. That is, a BGP may exist only if gb and gk grow at the rate gy + gz .
Lemma 1 (Necessary conditions for a BGP). Let gA > 0 and gy ≥ 0 be arbitrary
growth rates for the production and search technologies.
1. A BGP may exist only if: (a) the distribution F is Pareto with an arbitrary
coefficient α; (b) the growth rate of the vacancy cost, gk , and the growth rate
of the unemployment benefit, gb , are equal to gy + gz ; (c) the discount rate r is
greater than gy + gz .
2. In any BGP, the growth rate gz of the distribution Gt is equal to gA /α.
Let us make a few comments about the necessary conditions for the existence of
a BGP. The requirement that F is Pareto does not imply that there is a great deal
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of heterogeneity in the productivity of different firm-worker matches. Indeed, the
variance of the productivity of different matches can be made arbitrarily small if the
coefficient α is sufficiently large. The requirement that F is Pareto does imply that
there are some firm-worker matches that are arbitrarily productive. This might seem
implausible to some of our readers. Note, however, that the F distribution must be
Pareto if we want the economy to remain on a BGP indefinitely. If, in contrast, we
only want the economy to remain on a BGP up to some period T , F must be Pareto
over the interval [R0 , RT ] but, to the right of RT , F may take any shape as long as it
has the same expected value for z as a Pareto.
The requirement that gb and gk are equal to gy + gz would seem, at first blush,
to imply that the existence of a BGP is a knife-edge result that obtains only if the
exogenous growth rates of unemployment benefits and vacancy costs take a particular
value. If that were the case, our theory of a BGP would not be very satisfactory.
However, as we shall see in the next few pages, the growth rate of bt and kt that is
necessary for the existence of a BGP is exactly the growth rate of wages, productivity
and of output per capita. Hence, if the input to produce vacancies is labor and if
unemployment benefits are proportional to average wages or average productivity, kt
and bt endogenously grow at precisely the rate gy + gz . In Appendix B, we develop
such a version of the model.

Existence and uniqueness of a BGP
Let us assume that the sampling distribution F is Pareto with tail coefficient α, the
growth rate gk of the vacancy cost and the growth rate gb of the unemployment benefit
are equal to gy + gz , and the discount rate r is greater than gy + gz . We now show
that a BGP exists and is unique.
The first step is to solve for the expected surplus of a meeting between a firm and
a worker. To this aim, note that the surplus St (z) of a firm-worker match with quality
z > Rt is
Z
t+dt (z)

e−r(τ −t) (yτ z − yτ Rτ ) dτ ,

St (z) =

(2.13)

t

where dt (z) ≡ log(z/Rt )/gz is the optimal duration of the match. The expression above
states that the surplus of a match with quality z is equal to the present discounted
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value of the difference between the flow output yτ z of the match and the flow output
yτ Rτ of a marginal match between dates t and t + dt (z). The expression above is
obtained by taking the difference between the joint value of the match, which is given
by (2.1), and the worker’s value of unemployment, which, in light of (2.3), is given by
the present value of the flow output of a marginal match between dates t and t + dt (z)
plus the discounted value of unemployment at date t + dt (z).
Using the fact that yt grows at the rate gy and Rt grows at the rate gz , we solve
the integral on the right-hand side of (2.13) and find that


h
r−gy i
r−gy −gz i
z h
R
t
St (z) = yt
1 − (Rt /z) gz −
1 − (Rt /z) gz
. (2.14)
r − gy
r − gy − gz
The expected surplus of a meeting between a firm and a worker is the expectation
of the surplus St (z) with respect to the quality distribution of F . Using (2.14) and
the fact that F is a Pareto with tail coefficient α, we find that, if α > 1, the expected
surplus of a meeting between a firm and a worker is
Z
−(α−1)
St (ẑ)F 0 (ẑ)dẑ = Φyt Rt
,
(2.15)
Rt

where Φ is a positive constant that depends on parameters. In words, the expected
surplus of a meeting is proportional to the product between the aggregate component
of productivity and the reservation idiosyncratic component of productivity taken to
the power of −(α − 1). Hence, the expected surplus of a meeting grows over time at
the rate gy − (α − 1)gz . If α ≤ 1, the expected surplus of a meeting is not well-defined.
Thus, we proceed under the assumption α > 1.
The second step is solving for the reservation quality. Using (2.15) to substitute
out the expected surplus of a meeting between a firm and a worker, we can write the
optimality condition (2.12) for the reservation quality Rt as
−(α−1)

yt Rt = bt + At p(θ)γΦyt Rt

.

(2.16)

Let R0 be a solution of (2.16) for t = 0. Then Rt = R0 exp(gz t) is a solution of (2.16)
for all t > 0 iff gz = gA /α. To see why this is the case, note that the left-hand side
of (2.16) grows at the rate gy + gz . The first term on the right-hand side of (2.16)
grows at the rate gb , which is assumed to be equal to gy + gz . The second term on the
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right-hand side grows at the rate gA + gy − (α − 1)gz . The left and the right-hand
side of (2.16) grow at the same rate iff gz = gA /α.
The third step is solving for the tightness of the labor market. Using (2.15) to
substitute out the expected surplus of a meeting between a firm and a worker, we can
write the optimality condition (2.5) for the tightness θ as
−(α−1)

kt = At q(θ)(1 − γ)Φyt Rt

.

(2.17)

Let θ be a solution of (2.17) for t = 0. Then, θ is also a solution of (2.17) for all t > 0.
To see why this is the case, note that the left-hand side of (2.17) grows at the rate gk ,
which is assumed to be equal to gy + gz . The right-hand side of (2.17) grows at the
rate gA + gy − (α − 1)gz . The two growth rates are equal because gz = gA /α.
The fourth step is solving for the initial distribution of employed workers across
match qualities. Using the stationarity condition (2.8) for unemployment to substitute
the flow of workers out of employment with the flow of workers into employment in
(2.9) and using the fact that F is a Pareto distribution with coefficient α, we can
rewrite the balanced growth condition for the distribution Gt of employed workers as
 z α
`
(1 − u)G0t (zegz t )zegz t gz = uAt p(θ)
,
(2.18)
zegz t
where gz = gA /α. At t = 0, (2.18) is a differential equation for the initial distribution
G0 of employed workers across qualities that depends on the unemployment rate u.
The unique G0 and u that solve the differential equation and satisfy the boundary
conditions G0 (R0 ) = 0 and G0 (∞) = 1 are
 α
R0
gA
G0 (z) = 1 −
, u=
.
(2.19)
z
gA + A0 p(θ)(z` /R0 )α
The initial distribution G0 of employed workers is the sampling distribution F truncated
at the initial reservation quality R0 . Then, the distribution Gt grows at the constant
rate gz = gA /α. In fact, it is easy to verify that Gt (z exp(gz t)) = G0 (z) satisfies the
balanced growth condition (2.18) for all t > 0.
The last step is to verify the stationarity conditions for the UE, EU and unemployment rates. The UE and EU rates are
hue = At p(θ) (z` /Rt )α = A0 p(θ)(z` /R0 )α ,

(2.20)

heu = G0t (Rt )Rt gz = gA .

(2.21)
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The UE rate is stationary. To see why, note that the rate at which an unemployed
worker meets a vacancy grows at the rate gA , the probability that the quality of the
meeting exceeds the reservation Rt falls at the rate αgz , and the two rates are equal
to each other because gz = gA /α. The EU rate is also stationary. To see why, note
that Gt (z exp(gz t)) = G0 (z) implies G0t (z exp(gz t)) = G00 (z) exp(−gz t) and, hence,
G0t (Rt )Rt gz is equal to the constant G00 (R0 )R0 gz . In light of (2.19) and gz = gA /α, it
follows that G00 (R0 )R0 gz is equal to gA . Given the stationary values of the UE and
EU rates in (2.1) and (2.1), it is immediate to see that the unemployment rate in
(2.19) satisfies the stationarity condition (2.8).
In the previous steps, we have shown that all the equilibrium conditions for a BGP
are satisfied as long as there are a reservation quality R0 and a tightness θ that satisfy
the optimality conditions (2.16) and (2.17) for t = 0. We have also shown that the
BGP is uniquely pinned down up to R0 and θ. We now turn to solving for R0 and
θ. The solution to (2.16) for R0 exists and is unique for all θ ≥ 0, and we denote it
as R0∗ (θ). It is easy to verify that R0∗ (0) = b0 /y0 , R0∗0 (θ) > 0 and R0∗ (∞) = ∞. The
solution to (2.17) for θ exists and is unique for all R0 ≥ 0, and we denote it as θ∗ (R0 ).
It is easy to verify that θ∗ (0) = ∞, θ∗0 (R0 ) < 0, θ∗ (∞) = 0. From these observations,
it follows that there exists one and only one pair (R0 , θ) ∈ R2+ that solves (2.16) and
(2.17). Hence, a BGP exists and is unique.
Theorem 2 (Existence and Properties of a BGP) Let gA > 0 and gy ≥ 0. A BGP
exists iff: (a) F is Pareto with coefficient α > 1; (b) gb , gk = gy + gA /α; (c)
r > gy + gA /α. If a BGP exists, it is unique and such that:
(i) u, θ, hue , heu are constant, with
hue = A0 p(θ)[1 − F (R0 )], heu = gA ,
(ii) Gt (z exp(gz t)) = G0 (z), with gz = gA /α and
G0 (z) =

F (z) − F (R0 )
1 − F (R0 )

(iii) labor productivity grows at the rate gy + gA /α.
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Theorem 1 states that a BGP exists if and only if the sampling distribution of
match quality is Pareto with some coefficient α > 1, and unemployment benefits
and vacancy costs both grow at the same rate as labor productivity. In a BGP,
unemployment, market tightness, vacancies, UE and EU rates all remain constant
over time even though the efficiency of the search technology keeps growing at the
rate gA . While improvements in the search technology do not lower unemployment,
they do contribute to labor productivity growth.
Let us provide some intuition for the UE rate being constant over time. Growth
in the efficiency of the search technology has two effects on the UE rate. On the one
hand, it increases the rate at which an unemployed worker meets a firm. On the other
hand, it increases the worker’s option value of unemployment and the reservation
match quality and, for this reason, it lowers the probability that a match between an
unemployed worker and a firm is consummated. When the sampling distribution F is
Pareto with coefficient α and the unemployment benefit grows at the same rate as
labor productivity, the reservation quality grows at the rate gA /α and the probability
that a firm-worker match is consummated falls at the rate gA . Hence, the two effects
that the growth in the efficiency of the search technology has on the UE rate exactly
cancel each other out.
Next, let us explain why the EU rate remains constant over time. Employed
workers are initially distributed across match qualities according to the sampling
distribution F truncated at the reservation quality R0 . As the reservation quality
grows, the employed workers who are in matches with a quality that falls behind Rt
become unemployed, and the employed workers who survive are distributed according
to F truncated at Rt . The unemployed workers who become employed are also
distributed according to F truncated at Rt . Hence, the overall distribution Gt of
employed workers is equal to F truncated at Rt . Since Gt has always the same shape,
the flow of employed workers who become unemployed remains constant over time.
Since the UE and EU rates are constant, so is the unemployment rate.
Finally, let us explain why the tightness of the labor market remains constant over
time. The benefit of a vacancy is given by the product between the rate at which the
vacancy meets a worker, which grows at the rate gA for a constant tightness θ, and
the expected surplus of a meeting between the vacancy and a worker, which grows at
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the rate gy − (α − 1)gA /α. When the cost of a vacancy grows at the rate gy + gA /α,
the benefit and the cost grow at exactly the same rate for a constant tightness θ.
In a BGP, improvements in the search technology translate into labor productivity
growth. To see this, note that the average labor productivity is given by
Z
α
yt Rt .
(2.22)
yt zG0t (z)dz =
α−1
Rt

Average labor productivity is proportional to the product of the common component
of productivity, yt , and the reservation idiosyncratic component of productivity, Rt .
Hence, average labor productivity grows at the rate gy + gA /α, the sum of the growth
rate of the aggregate component of productivity and the growth rate of the efficiency
of search divided by the tail coefficient of the sampling distribution F . Growth in the
efficiency of search translates into labor productivity growth because it allows firms
and workers to become pickier with respect to their match quality. The rate at which
growth in the efficiency of search translates into labor productivity growth depends
on the thickness 1/α of the tail of the sampling distribution F , as this thickness
determines the return to faster search.

2.3

Generalizations and variations

In this section, we extend Theorem 2 to two natural generalizations of the baseline
environment. We consider a generalization in which workers may search off and on
the job, and one in which the measure of workers may grow over time and the search
process may have non-constant returns to scale. We then derive versions of Theorem
2 for alternative specifications of the baseline environment. The first variant of the
environment is such that workers and firms only observe noisy signals about the quality
of their match. The second variant considers alternative bargaining solutions. The
third variant is such that workers and firms are ex-ante heterogeneous.71
71

We also examined versions of the model with endogenous search effort. Suppose that the flow
payoff for an unemployed worker is υ(bt , et ), where et denotes the fraction of time devoted to search.
First, we show that—under the conditions of Theorem 2—there exists a BGP in which effort, UE,
EU, u and v rates are constant iff υ(bt , et ) has the form bt φ(et ). This condition is analogous to one
of the necessary conditions for the existence of a BGP in the neoclassical growth model (see King,
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Generalizations
Search on the job. We first want to extend the baseline model to allow workers to
search the labor market both when they are unemployed and when they are employed,
albeit with different intensity. This is a crucial extension. First, search on the job is
empirically relevant. The rate at which workers move directly from one employer to
another is around 1.5% a month, which is almost as high as the rate at which workers
move from employment into unemployment. Second, search on the job affects the
key trade-offs facing workers and firms. An unemployed worker’s decision to accept
or reject a job offer depends on whether he can keep searching for a better job once
he becomes employed. A firm’s decision of how many vacancies to open depends
on how many searching workers are unemployed—and, hence, have a weak outside
option—and how many are employed—and, hence, have a stronger outside option.
We consider a version of the model in which unemployed workers search for jobs
with an intensity normalized to 1 and employed workers search with an intensity
of ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Firms search for workers by opening vacancies. The outcome of the
search process is a flow At M (st , vt ) of random, bilateral meetings between workers
and vacancies, where st ≡ ut + ρ(1 − ut ) is the intensity-weighted measure of searching
workers. An unemployed worker meets a vacancy at the rate At p(θt ), where θt ≡ vt /st .
An employed worker meets a vacancy at the rate ρAt p(θt ). When a worker and
a vacancy meet, they observe the quality z of their match and decide whether to
consummate the match or not. If they do, they bargain over the terms of a bilaterally
efficient contract. If the worker is unemployed, his outside option is the value of
unemployment. If the worker is employed, his outside option is the joint value of the
match with his current employer.72
We find that the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a BGP
are the same in the model with search on the job as in the baseline model. Since
the stationarity condition for the UE rate is the same as in the baseline model, the
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988). Second, we show that—except for knife-edge cases—there exists no
function υ(bt , et ) that supports a BGP in which the UE rate is constant because the search effort et
falls at the rate gA while the reservation quality Rt remains constant. That is, income effects alone
cannot generically support a BGP.
72
This is a common assumption, see, e.g., Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin (2006), Bagger et al.
(2014), or Herkenhoff et al. (2018)
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sampling distribution F must be Pareto. Given that F is Pareto, we can show the
expected surplus of a meeting between a firm and an unemployed worker grows at
the same rate gy − (α − 1)gz as in the baseline model. Similarly, the expected surplus
of a match between a firm and a randomly selected employed worker grows at the
rate gy − (α − 1)gz . This is true even though the surplus of a meeting includes the
worker’s option of searching on the job.
The reservation quality is equal to the unemployment benefit plus a fraction 1 − ρ,
rather than a fraction 1, of the option value of searching while unemployed. Since the
option value of searching while unemployed grows at the rate gA + gy − (α − 1)gz , the
reservation quality grows at the constant rate gz = gA /α and the UE rate remains
constant iff the unemployment benefit grows at the rate gb = gy + gA /α. This is the
same condition as in the baseline because, even though search on the job affects the
level of the reservation quality, it does not affect its growth rate. The benefit of a
vacancy is equal to the meeting rate times an average between the expected surplus
of meeting an unemployed worker and the expected surplus of meeting an employed
worker. Since the expected surplus of both meetings grows at the rate gy − (α − 1)gz ,
the benefit of a vacancy grows at the rate gA + gy − (α − 1)gz = gy + gA /α. The
tightness θ, thus, remains constant iff the vacancy cost grows at the same rate as
the benefit, i.e. gk = gy + gA /α. This is the same condition as in the baseline model
because, even though search on the job affects the composition of workers encountered
by a firm, it does not affect the growth rate of the surplus of those meetings. Given
the proper initial conditions for u and G0 , unemployment remains constant over time
and the distribution of employed workers grows at the constant rate gz = gA /α.
The properties of a BGP are essentially the same as in the baseline model. The
only difference is that the distribution Gt of employed workers across match qualities
is not equal to the sampling distribution F truncated at the reservation quality Rt .
Instead, because of search on the job, the distribution Gt is a Fréchet truncated at
Rt . The shape parameter of the Fréchet is α, the tail coefficient of the sampling
distribution F . The scale parameter of the Fréchet depends on the intensity of search
on the job and on the tightness of the labor market.
Theorem 3 (On the Job Search). Let gA > 0 and gy ≥ 0. A BGP exists iff: (a) F
is Pareto with coefficient α > 1; (b) gb , gk = gy + gA /α; (c) r > gy + gA /α. Any BGP
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is such that:
(i) u, θ, hue , heu are constant, with
hue = A0 p(θ)(1 − F (R0 )), heu = A0 p(θ)(1 − F (R0 ))ρ

H(R0 )
;
1 − H(R0 )

(ii) Gt (z exp(gz t)) = G0 (z), with gz = gA /α and
 

H(z) − H(R0 )
A0 p(θ)ρ  z` α
G0 (z) =
, H(z) = exp −
;
1 − H(R0 )
gA
z
(iii) labor productivity grows at the rate gy + gA /α.
Proof. Appendix C.
Population growth. Next, we want to extend the baseline model to allow for
population growth. If the search process has constant returns to scale, the assumption
of constant population is essentially without loss of generality. If, in contrast, the
search process has non-constant returns to scale, population growth does matter. The
extension reveals an important and natural link between technological improvements
in the search technology and returns to scale in the search process.
We consider a version of the baseline model in which population grows at some
constant rate and the search process features arbitrary returns to scale. The measure
of workers in the labor market at date t is Nt , which grows at the constant rate gN ≥ 0.
The flow gN Nt of new-born workers enters the market in the state of unemployment.
Unemployed workers and vacant jobs search for each other. The outcome of the search
process is described by a flow At Ntβ M (Nt ut , Nt vt ) of random, bilateral meetings
between unemployed workers and vacant jobs, where ut is the unemployment rate, vt
is the vacancy rate, and M is some increasing, constant returns to scale function. The
coefficient β controls the returns to scale of the search process. If β > 0, the process
has increasing returns to scale. If β < 0, the process has decreasing returns to scale.
If β = 0, the process is scale independent.73
We model increasing returns to scale as AN β M (N u, N v) where M is a constant returns to scale
function and β > 0. Alternatively, one could model increasing returns to scale as AM̂ (N u, N v) where
73
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The crucial observation is that the version of the model with population growth
and non-constant returns to search is identical to the baseline model, except that
the efficiency of the search process is given by At Ntβ rather than by At . Thus, the
efficiency of the search process grows at the rate gA + βgN rather at the rate gA . That
is, with population growth and non-constant returns to scale, the efficiency of the
search process grows not only because of technological improvements in search, as
captured by gA , but also because of the increasing market size, as captured by βgN .
Theorem 4 (Population growth). Let gA ≥ 0, gN ≥ 0, gy ≥ 0 with gA + βgN > 0. A
BGP exists iff: (a) F is Pareto with coefficient α > 1; (b) gb , gk = gy + (gA + βgN )/α;
(c) r > gy + (gA + βgN )/α. Any BGP is such that:
(i) u, θ, hue , heu are constant, with
hue = A0 N0β p(θ)(1 − F (R0 )), heu = gA + βgN ;
(ii) Gt (z exp(gz t)) = G0 (z), with gz = (gA + βgN )/α and
G0 (z) =

F (z) − F (R0 )
;
1 − F (R0 )

(iii) labor productivity grows at the rate gy + (gA + βgN )/α.
Proof. Appendix D.

Variations
Imperfect signals. In the baseline model, we assume that matches are perfect
inspection goods. Here, we consider an alternative specification of the model in which
matches are imperfect inspection goods, in the sense that the firm and the worker
observe a noisy signal about the quality of their match upon meeting. Specifically, let
M̂ itself has increasing return to scale. The first formulation implies that the flow of meetings increases
more than proportionally with market size N , and the flow of meetings increases proportionally with
u and v. The second formulation implies that the flow of meetings increases more than proportionally
(and with the same constant of proportionality) with both N and u, v. To the extent that u and v
are constant along a BGP, the two formulations are conceptually equivalent. In general, they are not.
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ζ denote the signal about the quality of the match and with F1 the c.d.f. of signals.
Based on ζ, the firm and the worker decide whether to consummate the match or
not. If they do, the quality of the match is observed after t∗ units of time. Let z = ζ
denote the quality of the match, where  is a random variable with mean 1 distributed
according to a c.d.f. F2 .
The key condition for the existence of a BGP is that the distribution of signals F1 is
Pareto with coefficient α. In the model with noisy signals, there is a reservation signal
Qt that controls the creation of an employment relationship, and a reservation quality
Rt that controls the destruction of an employment relationship of a known quality.
For the UE rate to be constant, the distribution F1 of signals needs to be Pareto.
Given that ζ is distributed as a Pareto and that z is a random variable proportional
to ζ, the expected surplus of a meeting between a firm and a worker grows at the
constant rate gy − (α − 1)gz , the reservation signal Qt grows at the rate gA /α, and the
UE rate is constant. The reservation quality Rt grows also at the rate gA /α. Thus,
the probability that a match with signal ζ > Qt turns out to be of quality z < Rt+t∗
is constant over time and so is the EU rate.
Proposition 5 (Imperfect signals) A BGP exists iff: (a) F1 is Pareto with coefficient
α > 1; (b) gb , gk = gy + gA /α; (c) r > gy + gA /α. Any BGP is such that: (i) u, θ,
hue , heu are constant; (ii) Gt (z exp(gz t)) = G0 (z), Qt = Q0 exp(gz t), Rt = R0 exp(gz t)
with gz = gA /α; (iii) labor productivity grows at the rate gy + gA /α.
Proof. Appendix E.
Bargaining. In the baseline model, we assume that the outcome of the bargain
between a worker and a firm is the axiomatic Nash solution given that the outside
option of the worker is the value of unemployment and the outside option of the
firm is the value of a vacancy. This is the standard assumption in the literature (see,
e.g., Pissarides (1985), Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), Shimer (2005), etc..). Hall
(2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Hall (2017) have, however, advocated for different
bargaining solutions.
We consider a version of the model in which the bargaining outcome between a
firm and a worker in a match of quality z at date t is such that the worker captures a
fraction γ t (z) of the gains from trade, where γ t (z) is a function of t and z. As long as
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the worker’s share of the gains from trade is such that γ t (z exp(gz t)) = γ 0 (z), a BGP
exists under the same conditions as in the baseline model. In words, γ t must have
the property that the worker’s share of the gains from trade is the same at date 0
in a match of quality z and at date t in a match of quality z exp(gz t). The property
guarantees that the worker’s expected gain from a meeting with a firm and the firm’s
expected gain from a meeting with a worker grow at the rate gy − (α − 1)gz , as they
do in the baseline model. The property is satisfied by several bargaining solutions
proposed in the literature74 : (i) alternating-offer games with a risk of breakdown; (ii)
alternating-offer games with a time-delay (in the spirit of Hall and Milgrom (2008);
(iii) wage norms that grow at the same rate as the economy (in the spirit of Hall
(2005)).
Proposition 6 (Bargaining) Let the worker’s share γ t (z) of the gains from trade be
such that γ t (z exp(gz t)) = γ 0 (z). Then, a BGP exists iff conditions (a), (b) and (c)
in Theorem 2 hold. A BGP satisfies properties (i), (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 2.
Proof. Appendix F.
Ex-ante heterogeneity. In the baseline model, we assume that workers and firms
are ex-ante homogeneous but the quality of the match between different workers
and different firms is ex-post heterogeneous. The assumption is common (see, e.g.,
Pissarides (1984), Moscarini (2005), or Menzio and Shi (2011)). The assumption is
heuristically motivated as a reduced-form representation of fundamental differences
among workers and firms which interact to determine the quality of the match between
a particular worker and a particular firm. What are then the BGP restrictions on the
production function that maps the worker’s and firm’s types into quality?
74
Specifically, suppose that the firm and the worker bargain over the wage every dt units of time.
The bargaining protocol involves alternating offers and takes place in virtual time. If, after an offer
is rejected, there is a small probability that the firm and the worker separate forever, the outcome is
a wage that gives to the worker a constant fraction of the gains from trade, i.e. γ t (z) = φ. If, after
an offer is rejected, there is a small probability that the firm and the worker cannot produce for the
next dt units of time but the two parties remain in contact with each other, the outcome is a wage
wt (z) = max{bt + φ(yt z − bt ), yt Rt }. That is, the worker and the firm share the flow income unless
the worker’s individual rationality constraint binds. Alternatively, suppose that wages are determined
by social norms subject to individual rationality constraints. Specifically, suppose that the social
norm is a wt∗ > yt Rt which grows at the rate gy + gz and the wage is wt (z) = min{wt∗ , yt z}.
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Consider an alternative specification of the model in which workers and vacancies are
ex-ante heterogeneous and the quality of their match is determined by the interaction
of their types. Specifically, workers are ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their
type i, which is distributed uniformly along a circle of perimeter 1. Firms create
vacancies that are ex-ante heterogeneous with respect to their type j, also located
along the unit circle. The quality of a match between a worker of type i and a firm of
type j is z(δ), where δ denotes the shortest distance between i and j along the circle
and z is a decreasing function.
Since worker and firm heterogeneity is horizontal, it is natural to focus on a
symmetric equilibrium in which unemployed workers and vacant jobs are both uniformly
distributed along the unit circle. In a symmetric equilibrium, the distance between an
unemployed worker and a vacant job is uniform over the interval [0, 1/2] and, hence,
the distribution of qualities across matches between a randomly-selected unemployed
worker and a randomly-selected vacant job is given by
P (z) = 1 − 2δ −1 (z).

(3.1)

Clearly, the model with ex-ante heterogeneous workers and firms is isomorphic to
the baseline model, with the endogenous c.d.f. P taking the place of the exogenous
sampling distribution F . Therefore, a BGP exists if and only if bt and kt grow at the
same rate as labor productivity and P is a Pareto with same tail coefficient α > 1 or,
equivalently, if and only if the production function z(δ) is
z(δ) = z` (2δ)−1/α .

(3.2)

Proposition 7 (Ex-ante heterogeneity) A BGP exists iff: (a) The production function
z(δ) has the form z` (2δ)−1/α for α > 1; (b) gb , gk = gy + gA /α; (c) r > gy + gA /α.
Any BGP satisfies properties (i), (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 2.

2.4

Identification and calculations

We conclude by discussing some empirical implications of our theory. If the conditions
for a BGP are satisfied, the fact that u, v, hue and heu have no clear secular trend is
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not informative about the growth rate gA in the search technology, nor it is informative
about the returns to scale βgN of the search process. For the same reason, the fact
that u, v, hue and heu are not systematically different across large and small cities
does not convey information about the returns to scale of the search process. Is there
a way, then, to identify the growth rate in the search technology, the returns to scale
to the search process, and their contribution to economic growth?

Identification
According to our theory, the overall decline in search frictions can be inferred by
looking at the growth rate in the number of workers that a firm meets before filling
its vacancy. A firm meets an average of nt workers before filling its vacancy, where
nt = At Ntβ q(θ) ·

1
At Ntβ q(θ)[1

− F (Rt )]

.

(4.1)

The first term on the right-hand side of (4.1) is the number of workers that a firm
meets per unit of time. The second term is the time it takes for a firm to fill a
vacancy, which is the inverse of the vacancy-filling rate. The first term grows at the
rate gA + βgN . The second term is constant, as At Ntβ p(θ)[1 − F (Rt )] is constant and
q(θ) = p(θ)/θ. Therefore, nt grows at the rate gz + βgN .
The returns to scale in the search process can be inferred by looking at the number
of workers that a firm meets before filling its vacancy in large and small markets.
Consider two markets with the same search technology At but different populations
N1,t and N2,t . The average number of workers n1,t and n2,t entertained by firms in the
two markets is such that
β
β
At N1,t
q(θ1 ) At N2,t
q(θ2 )[1 − F (R2,t )]
n1,t
=
·
.
β
β
n2,t
At N2,t q(θ2 ) At N1,t q(θ1 )[1 − F (R1,t )]

(4.2)

Assume that in the two markets unemployment benefits and vacancy costs are equal
to the same fraction of local wages (as they would in the version of the model with
endogenous b and k developed in Appendix B). Under these assumptions, the tightness
in the two markets is the same, i.e. θ1 = θ2 , and the reservation quality in the two
markets is such that Rt,1 /Rt,2 = (Nt,1 /Nt,2 )β/α . Hence, nt,1 /nt,2 is equal to (Nt,1 /Nt,2 )β .
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The contribution of declining search frictions to growth depends on the tail
coefficient α of the sampling distribution F . The coefficient α can be inferred from
the distribution of wages. Suppose that wages are continuously renegotiated, as is the
case in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Then, in the model without search on the
job, a worker in a match of quality z earns
wt (z) = γyt z + (1 − γ)yt Rt .

(4.3)

The cross-sectional wage distribution Lt (w) is not Pareto. However, the right tail of
Lt is well approximated by a Pareto with coefficient α, as d log(1 − Lt (w))/d log w
converges to −α. In the model with search on the job, it is the right tail distribution
of wages for workers hired directly out of unemployment that is well approximated by
a Pareto with coefficient α.
The above observations imply the following identification theorem.
Theorem 8 (Identification): Let data on meetings per vacancy and population, nt
and Nt , cross-sectional data on meetings per vacancy and market size, ni and Ni , and
the wage distribution, Lt , be available. Then β, gA and α are identified: (i) β is the
elasticity of ni with respect to Ni ; (ii) gA + βgN is the growth rate of nt , and gA is the
growth rate of nt net of βgN ; (iii) α is the tail coefficient of Lt .

Back-of-the-envelope calculations
Implementing the identification strategy outlined in Theorem 4 presents some challenges, both at the conceptual and at the data level. In the model, a meeting between
a firm and a worker is an event in which the two parties become aware of each other
and inspect (either perfectly or imperfectly) the quality of their match. In the model,
any meeting between a firm and a worker has a quality that is drawn from the same,
time-invariant distribution. Then, the growth rate in number of workers that a firm
meets before filling its vacancy coincides with the decline in search frictions. The best
empirical measure of the number of workers met by a firm is probably the number
of applications received by a firm. The measure is far from perfect, as it may either
under or overestimate the decline in search frictions. On the one hand, workers may
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get a signal about the quality of the match when they become aware of the vacancy
and, based on such signal, decide whether or not to send an application. In this case,
the threshold for sending an application increases over time—as the hiring threshold
rises—and, hence, applications become better and better, and the growth rate of
applications per vacancy underestimates the decline in search frictions. On the other
hand, the cost of sending an application may fall over time. In this case, the threshold
for sending an application falls and, hence, applications become worse and worse,
and the growth rate of applications per vacancy overestimates the decline in search
frictions.
In terms of data, there is no available time-series for applications per vacancies
in the US. There are, however, measures of applications per vacancy at two points
in time. Faberman and Menzio (2018) analyze the Employment Opportunity Pilot
Project (EOPP), a survey of US firms conducted in 1980 and 1982 that contains
information about job openings, applications and recruitment outcomes. They find
that the average number of applications per vacancy is 24. Marinescu and Wolthoff
(2016) analyze data from Career-Builder.com, the largest online job site in the US
that contains over 1 million jobs at a time and is visited by approximately 11 million
unique job seekers per month. They find that the average number of applications per
vacancy is 59 in the first quarter of 2011 (the focus of their study). In related work,
Faberman and Kudlyak (2019) study data from Snag-a-Job, an online search engine
that mainly focuses on hourly-paid jobs, between September 2010 and September
2011. They find that the average number of applications per vacancy is 31.
The above findings suggest that the number of applications per vacancy increased
from 24 in 1982 to somewhere between 31 and 59 in 2011. If we take an average
between 31 and 59, these figures imply an average yearly growth rate of 2.2% in
applications per vacancy. Subject to the caveats about the possible discrepancy
between meetings per vacancy in the model and applications per vacancy in the data,
2.2% is an estimate of the rate gA + βgN at which search frictions declined between
1982 and 2011.
The data from Carreer-Builder.com has also information on the number of applications per vacancy across different markets in the US. Ioana Marinescu kindly agreed
to run for us a regression of log applications per vacancy on log population in the
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commuting zone of the vacancy. She estimates a regression coefficient of 0.52. She
estimates a similar coefficient after controlling for occupation. Subject to the caveat
about the discrepancy between meetings per vacancy in the model and applications
per vacancy in the data, 0.52 is an estimate of the returns to scale β in the search
process.75 The 1982 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)
contains information about the number of firms contacted by a worker during his
most recent job search. Martellini (2019) regresses the log of the number of firms
contacted by a searching worker on the log of the population in the commuting zone
of the worker. He estimates a regression coefficient of 0.12. Subject to the same caveat
about the mapping between data and model, 0.12 also represents an estimate of β.
The average of the two estimates gives us β = 0.32.
Given our estimates of gA + βgN ad β, we can break down the decline in search
frictions into a component due to increasing returns to scale in the search process and
a component due to improvements in the search technology. To this aim, note that
the US labor force grew from 108 to 152 million people between 1982 and 2011, a
yearly growth rate gN of 1.1%. Then, increasing returns to scale in the search process
contribute to a βgN = 0.35% decline in search frictions per year, while improvements
in the search technology contribute to a gA = 2.2% − 0.35% = 1.85% decline. Hence,
increasing returns contribute to about 1/6 of the decline in search frictions and
technological improvements to approximately 5/6.
In order to translate the decline in search frictions into a contribution to labor
productivity growth, we need an estimate of α, the tail coefficient of the sampling
distribution F . As stated in Theorem 8, α can be estimated from the shape of the
wage distribution. However, this is not a simple task. In the model, workers are
inherently identical and the wage dispersion is entirely caused by differences among
workers in the quality of their match. In the data, workers are not inherently identical,
and wage dispersion reflects both differences in match quality and differences in skills,
human capital, etc... Thus, to estimate α, we would need to purge the wage data from
all fundamental differences among workers, which is a task beyond the scope of this
paper. Instead, we shall present the implications of the model for different, reasonable
75

Note that the estimate of β may also be biased if the search technology At is systematically
different in larger than in smaller commuting zones.
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values of α.
If α = 5, the 90-50 percentile ratio in the distribution of match qualities is 37%. In
this case, the decline in search frictions contributes to a 0.44 percentage point increase
in labor productivity per year. This is about 23% of the 1.9% yearly growth rate
in output per worker in the US non-farm business sector between 1982 and 2011. If
α = 10, the 90-50 percentile ratio in the distribution of match qualities is 17%. In this
case, the decline in search frictions contributes to a 0.22 percentage point increase
in labor productivity per year, which is about 11% of the total yearly growth rate in
output per worker. Overall, the contribution of declining search frictions to economic
growth is far from negligible for both α = 5 and 10, which are conservative estimates
of α. In fact, using a model of search on the job in which workers are heterogeneous in
human capital, Martellini (2019) estimates α to be 3.6. Using a model of on-the-job
search stratified by industry, Bontemps, Robin, and Van Den Berg (2000) estimate a
match quality distribution that is Pareto with a tail coefficient of 2.5.
Our estimates of the returns to scale in the search process have implications for
understanding the city-size wage premium. If α = 5, increasing returns in the search
process alone make productivity and wages in a market with 2.2 million people—the
average size of US metro areas with more than 0.75 million people—19% higher than
in a market with 0.14 million people—the average size of US metro areas with less
than 0.75 million people. This is approximately 2/3 of the empirical wage gap between
large and small metro areas in the US (Martellini (2019)). If α = 10, increasing
returns in search alone make productivity and wages 9% higher in a market with 2.2
rather than 0.14 million people. This is approximately 1/3 of the empirical wage gap.
In either case, the contribution of increasing returns to scale to the wage differential
between large and small cities is substantial.
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2.A

Appendix

Data
Unemployment rate
The unemployment rate is constructed using the NBER macro-history files from 1927
to 1947, and the Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) from 1948 to 2018. Data
before 1948 is obtained by concatenating 3 series of seasonally-adjusted monthly
unemployment rates: NBER data series m08292a (January 1929-February 1940),
NBER data series m08292b (March 1940-December 1946), NBER data series m08292c
(January 1947-December 1947). Starting from 1948, the time series corresponds to the
seasonally-adjusted civilian unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(FRED series id: UNRATE).
Vacancy rate
The vacancy rate series is the concatenation of 4 different series: the MetLife helpwanted advertising index, NBER data series m08082a (January 1927-December 1959),
the help-wanted advertising index from the Conference Board (January 1960-December
1994), the composite print and online help-wanted index from Barnichon (2010)
(January 1995-December 2000), the job openings series from the Job Openings and
Labor Turnover Survey, JOLTS, (January 2001-October 2018).
The MetLife index includes help-wanted ads published in 45 US cities on 100 newspapers (1927 to the early 1940s) or on 60 newspapers (thereafter). The construction of
the Conference Board index tightly follows the MetLife index. The three main aspects
in which the Conference Board differs from MetLife are the use of 51 newspapers in
51 different cities, the adjustment of the index to account for the different number of
Sundays in each month (help-wanted ads were usually published on Sundays), and
the weighting of the index computed in each city by the city’s employment share (see
Zagorsky (1998) for additional details). The two series coexisted between January 1951
and August 1960. The two series are merged by rescaling the Conference Board index
so that it takes the same value as the MetLife index in January 1960. Once rescaled,
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the second series closely tracks the first one during the entire period of overlap. This
suggests that the meaning of a 1% change remains the same across the two series.
As online advertising became widespread after the mid 1990s, the Conference
Board index had increasingly lost its ability to represent the actual dynamics of job
vacancies. To address this issue, Barnichon (2010) combines data on print and online
help-wanted ads. He weights their relative importance by assuming that the diffusion
of online postings followed a similar pattern as the diffusion of internet use among US
households. This assumption allows him to create a composite print-online index. The
composite print-online index is rescaled so as to coincide with the Conference Board
index in January 1995. In the period of overlap, the two series diverge, as printed ads
became less and less relevant.
Starting from 2001, vacancies are computed using data from the JOLTS, which is
a survey of 16 thousands establishments. The JOLTS series is turned into a vacancy
index. To this aim, the JOLTS series is rescaled so as to take the same value as the
vacancy index in January 2001. The rescaled JOLTS series tracks very closely the
vacancy index during the period of overlap from January 2001 until December 2016.
Again, this suggests that the meaning of a 1% change is the same for the JOLTS series
and the vacancy index.
Having constructed a vacancy index for the entire sample period, the index is
transformed into a vacancy rate. To this aim, the index is divided by the contemporaneous labor force and then rescaled so as to take the value of 2.05% in 1965, which
Zagorsky (1998) documents to be the actual vacancy rate in that year. We think
it is very reassuring that, in the period of overlap, the vacancy rate constructed by
Petrosky-Nadeau and Zhang (2013) tracks closely a vacancy rate directly computed
from JOLTS. This observation suggests that the print-online index constructed by Barnichon (2010)—and used to rescale the JOLTS series into a vacancy index—accurately
captures the actual behavior of vacancies.

Endogenous vacancy cost and unemployment benefit
In this Appendix, we analyze a version of the baseline model in which the cost
of a vacancy and the benefit of unemployment are endogenous. We show that, in
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this version of the model, the vacancy cost and the unemployment benefit grow
endogenously at the same rate as the economy. Hence, in this version of the model,
the only substantive condition for a BGP is that the distribution of productivity for
new firm-worker matches is Pareto.
There are two types of firms, production firms and recruitment firms. Production
firms are the firms described in Section 2, which operate a constant returns to scale
technology that turns one worker into yt z units of output, where yt is the common
component of productivity and z is the component of productivity that is idiosyncratic
to a firm-worker match. Recruitment firms are firms that create the hiring services
required by production firms to maintain their vacancies. In particular, production
firms need to purchase 1 unit of hiring services to maintain a vacancy. Recruitment
firms create hiring services according to a constant return to scale production function
which turns 1 unit of labor into Ah > 0 units of hiring services. Recruitment firms hire
labor in a frictionless and competitive market and sell hiring services in a frictionless
and competitive market. We assume that recruitment firms hire labor in a frictionless
market to guarantee that, even when every worker is unemployed, the economy does
not shut down. Finally, the unemployment benefit is determined by the government
as a fraction η > 0 of the average output of workers employed by production firms.
We assume that the unemployment benefit is proportional to average output so as to
make it independent of any particular wage determination rule.
Let wh,t denote the wage paid by recruitment firms to their employees. Let ph,t
denote the price at which recruitment firms sell hiring services to productions firms.
Let eh,t denote the measure of workers who are employed by recruitment firms. The
endogenous variables wh,t , ph,t and eh,t are such that
wh,t = rUt − Ůt ,

(B.1)

ph,t = wh,t /Ah ,

(B.2)

eh,t = uθ/Ah .

(B.3)

Intuitively, the wage wh,t makes an unemployed worker indifferent between taking a
job at a recruitment firm and searching for a job at a production firm. The price ph,t
makes the profit of a recruitment firm equal to zero. The employment eh,t is such that
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the aggregate supply of hiring services is equal to the aggregate demand of hiring
services.
The joint-value Vt , the reservation quality Rt , and the surplus St are such that
t+d
R −r(τ −t)
Vt (z) = max
e
yτ zdτ + e−rd Ut+d ,
(B.4)
d≥0

t

Rt = (rUt − Ůt )/yt ,
St (z) = Vt (z) − Ut .

(B.5)
(B.6)

The value Ut of unemployment to a worker and the tightness θ of the labor market
are such that
Z
Z
rUt = η
yt ẑdGt (ẑ) + Ât p(θ)γ
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ) + Ůt ,
(B.7)
Rt
Rt
Z
yt Rt /Ah = At q(θ)(1 − γ)
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ).
(B.8)
Rt

Conditions (B.4), (B.5) are the same as the conditions (2.1) and (2.3). The difference
between (B.7) and (2.4) is that, here, the unemployment benefit is a fraction η of the
average productivity of labor rather than the exogenous bt . The difference between
(B.8) and (2.5) is that, here, the cost of a vacancy is the price of a unit of hiring
services rather than the exogenous kt . Note that the price ph,t of a unit of hiring
services is equal to yt Rt /Ah because wh,t = yt Rt and ph,t = wh,t /Ah .
The stationarity conditions for the UE, EU and unemployment rates are
At p(θ)(1 − F (Rt )) = hue ,

(B.9)

G0t (Rt )R̊t = heu ,

(B.10)

uhue = (1 − u − uθ/Ah )heu .

(B.11)

The stationarity conditions for the UE and EU rates are the same as (2.6) and (2.7).
The difference between (B.11) and (2.8) is that, here, the flow into unemployment is
given by the product between the measure of workers employed in the production
sector (rather than the total measure of employed workers) and the EU rate.
The constant-growth condition for the distribution of workers employed in the
production sector is such that
(1 − u − uθ/Ah )G0t (zt (x))zt (x)gz + uAt p(θ)[F (zt (x)) − F (Rt )]
=

(1 − u − uθ/Ah )G0t (Rt (x))Rt (x)gz .
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(B.12)

The difference between (B.12) and (2.9) is that, here, the first term on the left-hand
side is the measure of workers employed in the production sector (rather than the
total measure of employed worker) times the rate at which these workers fall below
the x-th quantile of the distribution. Similarly, the term on the right-hand side is the
measure of workers employed in the production sector times the rate at which these
workers become unemployed.
It is easy to show that a BGP may exist only if the sampling distribution F is
Pareto with tail coefficient α > 1 and the discount rate r is greater than gy + gA /α.
Given these restrictions on the fundamentals, it easy to show that a BGP exists and
is unique as long as η < (α − 1)/α.76 In the BGP, the reservation quality Rt grows at
the rate gz = gA /α and R0 is equal to

1/α
A0 p(θ)γΦ
R0 =
.
(B.13)
1 − ηα/(α − 1)
The labor market tightness θ is such that


R0α
−1
.
θ=q
Ah A0 (1 − γ)Φ

(B.14)

The UE, EU and unemployment rates are
hue = A0 p(θ)(z` /R0 )α ,

(B.15)

heu = gA ,

(B.16)

gA
u =
A0 p(θ)(z` /R0 )α + gA

(B.17)

The distribution of workers employed by production firms grows at the rate gz = gA /α
and G0 is equal to
 α
R0
G0 (z) = 1 −
.
(B.18)
z
The wage wh,t paid by recruitment firms is equal to yt Rt and, hence, grows at the
rate gy + gz /α with wh,0 = y0 R0 . The price ph,t of hiring services is equal to wh,t /Ah
and, hence grows at the rate gy + gz /α with ph,0 = y0 R0 /Ah . Employment eh,t at
recruitment firms is constant and equal to uθ/Ah .
We have thus established the following proposition.
76

This condition is necessary and sufficient for the unemployment benefit to be lower than the
reservation quality.
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Proposition 9 (Existence and Properties of BGP) Let gA > 0 and gy ≥ 0. A
BGP exists iff: (a) F is Pareto with tail coefficient α > 1; (b) r > gy + gA /α; (c)
η < (α − 1)/α. If the BGP exists, it is unique and such that:
(i) u, θ, hue , heu are constant;
(ii) Gt (z exp(gz t)) = G0 (z) with gz = gA /α;
(iii) labor productivity grows at the rate gy + gA /α;
(iv) vacancy cost and unemployment benefit grow at the rate gy + gA /α.

Search on the job
In this Appendix, we define a BGP for the version of the model generalized to allow
for the possibility that workers might search off and on the job. We then prove the
existence of a BGP and characterize its properties.
Definition of a BGP
The joint value Vt (z) of a firm-worker match with quality z is such that
 t+d
Z
Vt (z) = max

e

d≥0

−r(τ −t)


µτ


yτ z + Aτ p(θ)ργ (Vτ (ẑ) − Vτ (z))dF (ẑ) dτ(C.1)
R

z

t


−rd
+e µt+d Ut+d ,
where µτ denotes the probability that the match is still active at date τ and is equal
to
 Z τ

µτ = exp −
Ax p(θ)ρ[1 − F (z)]dx .
t

Conditional on the firm-worker match surviving to date τ , the sum of the worker’s
labor income and the firm’s profit is equal to yτ z. Moreover, at date τ , the worker
meets a poaching firm at rate Aτ p(θ)ρ. If the idiosyncratic productivity ẑ of the
match between the worker and the poaching firm is greater than z, the worker moves
to the poaching firm. In this case, the worker’s value is Vτ (z) + γ(Vτ (ẑ) − Vτ (z)) and
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the incumbent firm’s value is zero. Hence, the joint value of the firm-worker match
increases by a fraction γ of the gains from trade Vτ (ẑ) − Vτ (z). If the idiosyncratic
productivity ẑ of the match between the worker and the poaching firm is smaller than
z, the worker stays with the incumbent firm and there is no change in their joint value.
Conditional on the firm-worker match surviving to date t + d, the worker and the firm
voluntarily break up. In this case, the value to the worker is Ut+d and the value to
the firm is zero. Since the firm-worker match breaks up at the rate Ax p(θ)ρ[1 − F (z)]
at date x, the probability that the match survives until τ is given by µ(τ ).
The optimal break-up date d must satisfy
Z
yt+d z + At+d p(θ)ργ (Vt+d (ẑ) − Vt+d (z))dF (ẑ) + Ůt+d ≤ rUt+d , and d ≥ 0,

(C.2)

z

where the two inequalities hold with complementary slackness. The left-hand side of
(C.2) is the marginal benefit of delaying the break-up of the match, which is the sum of
the flow of output of the match, the option value of searching, and the time-derivative
of the worker’s value of unemployment. The right-hand side of (C.2) is the marginal
cost of delaying the break-up of the match, which is given by the annuitized values
that the worker and the firm can attain individually.
The reservation quality Rt is defined as
Z
yt Rt = rUt − Ůt − At p(θ)ργ

(Vt (ẑ) − Vt (Rt ))dF (ẑ).

(C.3)

Rt

The definition (C.3) implies that a firm and a worker prefer staying together rather
than being apart iff the idiosyncratic productivity of their match is greater than Rt .
Similarly, a firm and an unemployed worker prefer consummating their match rather
than staying apart iff the idiosyncratic productivity of their match is greater than
Rt . Note that the reservation quality Rt characterizes the choice of whether a firm
and a worker should be together or alone. In contrast, the choice of whether a worker
should stay with an incumbent firm or move to a poaching firm is characterized by
the ranking of the idiosyncratic productivity of the two available matches.
The surplus St (z) of a firm-worker match with idiosyncratic productivity z is
defined as
St (z) = Vt (z) − Ut .
(C.4)
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The definition (C.4) implies that the surplus of a firm-worker match is strictly positive
for z > Rt and equal to zero for all z ≤ Rt . Hence, a firm and a worker prefer staying
together rather than being apart iff the surplus of their match is strictly positive.
A firm and an unemployed worker prefer consummating their match rather than
searching for alternative partners iff the surplus of their match is strictly positive.
The value of unemployment to a worker, Ut , is such that
Z
rUt = bt + At p(θ)γ
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ) + Ůt .

(C.5)

Rt

The tightness of the labor market, θ, is such that
Z
u
(1 − γ)
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ)
At q(θ)
u + ρ(1 − u)
Rt

Z Z
ρ(1 − u)
+At q(θ)
(1 − γ)
(Vt (ẑ) − Vt (z)) dF (ẑ) dGt (z) = kt .
u + ρ(1 − u)
Rt
z

(C.6)

When workers search both off and on the job, a vacancy meets both unemployed and
employed workers and this is reflected in the right-hand side of (C.6). Conditional on
a meeting, the vacancy meets an unemployed worker with probability u/(u + ρ(1 − u)).
In this case, the firm captures a fraction 1 − γ of the expected gains from trade
St (ẑ). The vacancy meets a worker employed in a job of quality z with probability
[ρ(1 − u)/(u + ρ(1 − u))]G0t (z). In this case, the firm captures a fraction 1 − γ of the
gains from trade Vt (ẑ) − Vt (z).
The stationarity conditions for UE, EU and unemployment rates are
At p(θ)(1 − F (Rt )) = hue ,

(C.7)

G0t (Rt )R̊t = heu ,

(C.8)

uhue = (1 − u)heu .

(C.9)

The condition zt (x) = z0 (x) exp(gz t) for the constant growth of the distribution Gt of
employed workers across match qualities is
(1 − u)G0t (zt (x))zt (x)gz + uAt p(θ) [F (zt (x)) − F (Rt )]
=

(1 −

u)G0t (Rt )Rt gz

(C.10)

+ (1 − u)Gt (zt (x))ρAt p(θ)[1 − F (zt (x))].

The left-hand side of (C.10) is the flow of workers into matches with quality lower
than the x-th quantile. The first term is the flow of employed workers employed in
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a match of quality z that, in the next instant, fall below the x-th quantile, which
grows at the rate gz . The second term is the flow of unemployed workers who, in the
next instant, become employed in a match of quality z below the x-th quantile. The
right-hand side of (C.10) is the flow of workers out of matches with quality lower than
the x-th quantile. It includes the flow of employed workers who become unemployed,
as well as the flow of workers who–by searching on the job–move out of a match with
quality lower than the x-th quantile.
Existence of a BGP
It is easy to generalize the proof of Lemma 1 to show that a BGP may exist only
if: (a) F is Pareto with tail coefficient α; (b) gk and gb are equal to gy + gz ; (c) r is
greater than gy + gz . Moreover, in any BGP, the growth rate gz must be equal to
gA /α. Therefore, we shall assume (a), (b) and (c) as we solve for a BGP.
The joint value Vt (z) of a firm-worker match with quality z > Rt and the value Ut
of unemployment to a worker can be written as
Z
rVt (z) = yt z + At p(θ)ργ (St (ẑ) − St (z))dF (ẑ) + V̊t (z),
(C.11)
z
Z
rUt = yt Rt + At p(θ)ργ
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ) + Ůt .
(C.12)
Rt

The expression in (2.1) is obtained by taking the derivative of (2.1) with respect to
t. The expression in (2.1) is obtained from (C.5) after substituting in the definition
of reservation quality. From (2.1) and (2.1), it follows that the surplus St (z) of a
firm-worker match with quality z > Rt is given by
Z z

rSt (z) = yt (z − Rt ) − At p(θ)ργ
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ) + St (z)(1 − F (z)) + S̊t (z) (C.13)
Rt

We solve the partial differential equation in (C.13) by guessing that St is such that,
when evaluated at an idiosyncratic productivity that grows at the rate gz , the surplus
of a match grows at the rate gy + gz , i.e.
St (zegz t ) = S0 (z) · e(gy +gz )t .
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(C.14)

To verify the guess in (C.14), let us evaluate the partial differential equation (C.13)
at z exp(gz t) to obtain
R zegz t
rSt (zegz t ) = yt (zegz t − Rt ) − At p(θ)ργ R0 egz t St (ẑ)dF (ẑ)
(C.15)
−At p(θ)ργSt (zegz t )(1 − F (zegz t )) + S̊t (zegz t ).
Using the guess in (C.14) and the fact that yt = y0 exp(gA t), At = A0 exp(gA t),
Rt = R0 exp(gz t), 1 − F (zegz t ) = (1 − F (z)) exp(−αgz t) and gz = gA /α, we can
rewrite (C.15) as77

Rz
(gy +gz )t
rS0 (z) · e
=
y0 (z − R0 ) − A0 p(θ)ργ R0 S0 (ẑ)dF (ẑ)

0
−A0 p(θ)ργS0 (z)(1 − F (z)) + [(gy + gz )S0 (z) − zgz S0 (z)] · e(gy +gz )t .
(C.16)
The left-hand side of (C.16) is an expression that depends only on S0 and that grows
over time at the rate gy + gz . The right-hand side is an expression that depends only
on S0 and that grows over time at the rate gy + gz . Thus, the guess (C.14) satisfies
the partial differential equation (C.13) for all t ≥ 0, as long as the initial surplus S0
satisfies (C.16) at date t = 0.
To solve for S0 , we take (C.16) evaluated at t = 0 and we differentiate it with
respect to z. We obtain
rS00 (z) = y0 + [gy − σγ(1 − F (z))] S00 (z) − zgz S000 (z),

(C.17)

where σ is shorthand for A0 p(θ)ρ. The solution for S00 (z) to the differential equation
(C.17) which satisfies the smooth-pasting condition S00 (R0 ) = 0 is

Zz
 z i
y0
1
1 h σγ
0
S0 (z) =
exp −
(F (z) − F (s)) + (r − gy ) log
ds,
(C.18)
gz
s
gz α
s
R0

The solution for S0 (z) to the differential equation (C.18) that satisfies the valuematching condition S0 (R0 ) = 0 is




Z z Zx
h

i
y0
 1 exp − 1 σγ (F (x) − F (s)) + (r − gy ) log z
S0 (z) =
ds dx.
gz R 0
s
gz α
s
R0

(C.19)
77

The reader can find more details about the derivation of this and other expressions in Martellini
and Menzio (2018).
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Thus, the initial surplus S0 in (C.19) together with St (z exp(gz t)) = S0 (z) exp(gy + gz )t
provides a solution to the partial differential equation (C.13). While other solutions
may exist and may be associated with different BGPs, all these other balanced growth
paths satisfy the properties in Theorem 3.
Using the fact that St (zegz t ) = S0 (z) exp(gy + gz )t and that Gt (zegz t ) = G0 (z), we
can derive some useful properties of the expected gains from trade S u,t in a meeting
between a firm and an unemployed worker, the expected gains from trade Se,t (zegz t ) in
a meeting between a firm and a worker employed in a match with quality z exp(gz t),
and the expected gains from trade S e,t in a meeting between a firm and an employed
worker who is randomly drawn from the employment distribution Gt . We can show that
all of these expected gains from trade increase over time at the rate of gy − (α − 1)gz ,
i.e.
Z
gz t
Se,t (ze ) ≡
(St (ẑ) − St (zegz t ))dF (ẑ) = Se,0 (z)e(gy −(α−1)gz )t ,
zegz t

Z

Se,t (z)dGt (z) = S e,0 e(gy −(α−1)gz )t ,

S e,t ≡

(C.20)

R

Zt
S u,t ≡

St (ẑ)dF (ẑ) = Su,0 e(gy −(α−1)gz )t .

Rt

Note that the expected gains above are well-defined only if the tail coefficient α of the
distribution F is greater than 1.
We are now in the position to construct a BGP. The reservation quality Rt is given
by
yt Rt = bt + At p(θ)(1 − ρ)γS u,t .

(C.21)

Let R0 be a solution of (C.21) for t = 0. Then Rt = R0 exp(gz t) solves (C.21) for all
t > 0 iff gz = gA /α. To see why this is the case, note that the left-hand side grows at
the rate gy + gz . The first term on the right-hand side grows at the rate gy + gz . The
second term grows at the rate gA + gy − (α − 1)gz . Thus, the left and the right hand
side grow at the same rate iff gz = gA /α.
The market tightness θ is given by


u
ρ(1 − u)
kt = At q(θ)(1 − γ)
S u,t +
S e,t .
u + ρ(1 − u)
u + ρ(1 − u)
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(C.22)

Let θ be a solution of (C.22) for t = 0. Then the same θ also solves (C.22) for all
t > 0. The left-hand side grows at the rate gy + gz . The right-hand side grows at the
rate gA + gy − (α − 1)gz . The two growth rates are the same because gz = gA /α.
The constant-growth condition for the distribution Gt of employed workers across
match qualities is
 z α


`
(1 − u)G0t (zegz t )zegz t gz = u + (1 − u)ρGt (zegz t ) At p(θ)
.
(C.23)
g
ze z t
At t = 0, (C.23) is a differential equation for the initial distribution G0 which depends
on the unemployment rate u. The unique solution for G0 and u that satisfies the
differential equation and the boundary conditions G0 (R0 ) = 0 and G0 (∞) = 1 is
 

H(z) − H(R0 )
A0 p(θ)ρ  z` α
G0 (z) =
, with H(z) = exp −
,
(C.24)
1 − H(R0 )
gA
z
and
u=

ρH(R0 )
,
1 − (1 − ρ)H(R0 )

(C.25)

To verify that the distribution grows at the constant rate gz = gA /α, it is sufficient to
check that Gt (zegz t ) = G0 (z) satisfies (C.23) for all t > 0.
The UE and EU rates are respectively given by
hue
heu

α
z`
= At p(θ) (z` /Rt ) = A0 p(θ)
,
R0
 α
H(R0 )
z`
0
= Gt (Rt )Rt gz = A0 p(θ)
R0
1 − H(R0 )
α



(C.26)
(C.27)

The UE rate is constant over time, as At grows at the rate gA and 1 − F (Rt ) grows at
the rate −gz /α, which is equal to −gA . The EU rate is constant over time, as G0t (Rt )
grows at the rate −gz and Rt grows at the rate gz . Using (2.1) and (2.1), it is easy to
verify that the unemployment rate in (C.25) equates the flow of workers in and out of
unemployment and, hence, is constant over time as well.
The analysis above implies that a BGP exists as long as there is a reservation
quality R0 and a market tightness θ that solve the equations (C.21) and (C.22)/ at
t = 0. We can show that there exists such a pair (R0 , θ) that solves (C.21) and (C.22).
Hence, a BGP exists. However, we are not able to show that there exists a unique
pair (R0 ,θ) that solves (C.21) and (C.22). Hence, there may be multiple BGPs.
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Population growth
In this Appendix, we define a BGP for the version of the model generalized to allow for
the possibility that population might grow over time and that the search process might
have non-constant returns to scale. We then establish conditions for the existence and
properties of a BGP.
Definition of a BGP
The joint value Vt , the reservation quality Rt , and the surplus St are such that
Vt (z) = max
d≥0

t+d
R

e−r(τ −t) yτ zdτ + e−rd Ut+d ,

(D.1)

t

yt Rt = rUt − Ůt ,

(D.2)

St (z) = Vt (z) − Ut .

(D.3)

The value Ut of unemployment to a worker and the tightness θ of the labor market
are such that
Z
rUt = bt + Ât p(θ)γ
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ),
(D.4)
Rt
Z
kt = Ât q(θ)(1 − γ)
St (ẑ)dF (ẑ).
(D.5)
Rt

Conditions (D.1)-(D.3) are the same as in section 2. Conditions (D.4)-(D.5) are the
same as conditions (2.4)-(2.5) with Ât ≡ At Ntβ replacing At .
The stationarity conditions for the UE, EU and unemployment rates are
Ât p(θ)(1 − F (Rt )) = hue ,

(D.6)

G0t (Rt )R̊t = heu ,

(D.7)

Nt uhue = Nt (1 − u) (heu + gN ) .

(D.8)

The stationarity conditions (D.6)-(D.7) for the UE and EU rates are the same as
(2.6)-(2.7) with Â replacing At . The stationarity condition (D.8) for unemployment is
different from (2.8). The unemployment rate is stationary when the flow of workers
out of unemployment, Nt uhue , is equal to the flow of workers entering unemployment
from employment, Nt (1 − u)heu , plus the flow of workers entering unemployment
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from outside the labor market, Nt gN , multiplied by the difference 1 − u between the
unemployment rate of entering and existing workers.
The condition guaranteeing that the employment distribution Gt grows at the
constant rate gz –in the sense that zt (x) = z0 (x) exp(gz t) where zt (x) denotes the x-th
quantile of Gt –is
Nt (1 − u)G0t (zt (x))zt (x)gz + Nt uÂt p(θ)[F (zt (x)) − F (Rt )]
= Nt (1 − u)G0t (Rt (x))Rt (x)gz + Nt gN (1 − u)Gt (zt (x)).

(D.9)

The left-hand side of (D.9) is the flow of workers into matches with quality lower than
the x-th quantile. The first term is the flow of workers who are employed in a match
of quality z who, in the next instant, fall below the x-th quantile. The second term
is the flow of unemployed workers who, in the next instant, become employed in a
match of quality z below the x-th quantile. The right-hand side of (D.9) is the flow of
workers out of matches with quality below the x-th quantile. The first term is the
flow of workers who are employed and, in the next instant, move into unemployment.
The second term is the flow of workers entering the labor market times the difference
between the fraction of existing workers who are employed in matches below the x-th
quantile (which is (1 − u)Gt (zt (x))) and the fraction of new workers who are employed
in matches below the x-th quantile (which is zero).
Note that the definition of BGP is the same as in Section 2, except that: (i) At
is replaced with Ât in all of the BGP conditions; (ii) the stationarity condition for
unemployment and the constant-growth condition for the employment distribution
are modified to account for the flow of workers entering the labor market.
Existence of a BGP
Following the same steps as in Section 2, we can show that the necessary conditions
for a BGP are: (i) F is Pareto with coefficient α > 1; (ii) gb and gk are equal to gy + gz ;
(iii) r is greater than gy + gz . Under these conditions, a BGP exists and is unique and
is such that the reservation quality Rt grows at the rate gz = (gA + βgN )/α and R0 is
equal to
−(α−1)
y0 R0 = b0 + Â0 p(θ)γ Φ̂y0 R0
,
(D.10)
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where Φ̂ is a positive constant that only depends on parameters. The labor market
tightness θ is such that
−(α−1)

k0 = Â0 q(θ)(1 − γ)Φ̂y0 R0

.

(D.11)

The UE, EU and unemployment rates are
hue = Â0 p(θ)(z` /R0 )α ,

(D.12)

heu = gA + βgN ,
gA + (1 + β)gN
u =
Â0 p(θ)(z` /R0 )α + gA + (1 + β)gN

(D.13)
(D.14)

The distribution of employed workers grows at the rate gz = gA /α and G0 is equal to
 α
R0
G0 (z) = 1 −
.
(D.15)
z

Imperfect signals
In this Appendix, we define a BGP for the version of the model in which firms and
workers only observe a noisy signal about the quality of their match. We then establish
conditions for the existence of a BGP.
Definition of a BGP
The joint value Vt (z) of a match of known quality z is given by
Vt (z) = max
d≥0

t+d
R

e−r(τ −t) yτ zdτ + e−rd Ut+d .

(E.1)

t

The reservation quality Rt is defined as
yt Rt = rUt − Ůt .

(E.2)

It is easy to verify from the optimality condition for d in (E.1) that the reservation
quality Rt is the lowest quality for which a match is maintained. That is, a match of
known quality z is maintained at date t if z > Rt and it is destroyed if z ≤ Rt .
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The joint value Ṽt (ζ) of a match of unknown quality with a signal ζ is given by
Z t+t∗

Z
−r(τ −t)
−rt∗
Ṽt (ζ) = max
e
yτ ζdτ + e
Vt+t∗ (ζ)dF2 (), Ut .
(E.3)
t

Note that, implicit in the formulation of Ṽt , is the assumption that a match cannot
be destroyed before the quality is revealed. The assumption is only for the sake of
simplicity. The reservation signal Qt is defined as
Ṽt (Qt ) = Ut .

(E.4)

Since Ṽt (ζ) is increasing in ζ, it follows that, a firm and a worker consummate their
match at date t if ζ > Qt , and they keep searching the labor market if ζ ≤ Qt .
We define the surplus of a match of know quality z and the surplus of a match of
unknown quality with signal ζ as
St (z) = Vt (z) − Ut ,

S̃t (ζ) = Ṽt (ζ) − Ut .

(E.5)

From (E.1) and (E.2), it follows that St (z) > 0 if z > Rt , and St (z) = 0 otherwise.
From (E.3) and (E.4), it follows that S̃t (ζ) > 0 if ζ > Qt and S̃t (ζ) = 0 otherwise.
The value of unemployment to a worker, Ut , is such that
Z
rUt = bt + At p(θ)γ
S̃t (ζ̂)dF1 (ζ̂).

(E.6)

Qt

The tightness of the labor market, θ, is such that
Z
kt = At q(θ)(1 − γ)
S̃t (ζ̂)dF1 (ζ̂)

(E.7)

Qt

The expressions in (E.6) and (E.7) are analogous to those in (2.4) and (2.5).
The stationarity conditions for the UE, EU and unemployment rates are

1−u−n 0
n
Gt (Rt )R̊t +
1−u
1−u
t−t∗

At p(θ) [1 − F1 (Qt )] = hue ,

(E.8)

F2 (Rt /ζ)dHt−t∗ (ζ) = heu ,

(E.9)

Z
uhue = (1 − u)heu .
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(E.10)

In the conditions above, n denotes the measure of employed workers who have yet
to find out the quality of their match, nt−s denotes the flow of workers who become
employed at date t − s, and Ht−s (ζ) is the c.d.f. of their signals. Clearly, we have
Z

t∗

n=

nt−s ds, nt−s = uhue , Ht−s (ζ) =
s=0

F1 (ζ) − F1 (Qt−s )
.
1 − F1 (Qt−s )

(E.11)

Condition (2.1) is the same as (2.6), except that the firm-worker pair decision’s to
consummate their match is based on the comparison between the signal ζ and the
reservation signal Qt . Condition (2.1) is the same as (2.7), except that, here, the EU
rate includes the flow of employed workers who learn that the quality z of their match
is below the reservation quality Rt .
The constant growth condition for Gt is
R
(1 − u − n)G0t (zt (x))zt (x)gz + nt−t∗ [F2 (zt (x)/ζ) − F2 (Rt /ζ)] dHt−t∗ (ζ)
R
= (1 − u − n)G0t (Rt )R̊t + nt−t∗ F2 (Rt /ζ)dHt−t∗ (ζ).
(E.12)
Condition (E.12) is the same as condition (2.9), except that the flow of workers into
matches of quality below the x-th quantile includes the flow of workers who learn that
the quality z of their match is above the reservation quality Rt and below the x-th
quantile zt (x).
Existence of a BGP
Following the same steps as in Section 2, we can show that a BGP may only exist
if: (a) F1 is Pareto with coefficient α > 1; (ii) gb and gk are equal to gy + gz ; (iii) r is
smaller than gy + gz . Moreover, in any BGP, gz = gA /α.
Under the necessary conditions above, we can show that the surplus St (z) of a
firm-worker match with known quality z > Rt is


h
r−gy i
r−gy −gz i
z h
R
t
St (z) = yt
1 − (Rt /z) gz −
1 − (Rt /z) gz
. (E.13)
r − gy
r − gy − gz
The expected surplus at date t + t∗ of a firm-worker match created at date t with
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signal ζegz t is
Z

St+t∗ (ζegz t )dF2 ()

Rt+t∗ /ζegz t

(

#
#)
"
"
y
y −gz
  r−g
  r−ggz
gz t
g t
∗e z
ζe

R
gz
t
=
yt∗ egy t
−
dF2 ()
1 − Rζt∗
1 − Rζt∗
r
−
g
r
−
g
−
g
y
y
z
Rt∗ /ζ
Z

=
St∗ (ζ)dF2 () e(gy +gz )t .
Z

Rt∗ /ζ

(E.14)
The surplus S̃t (ζegz t ) of a firm-worker match created at date t with signal ζegz t is
gz t

S̃t (ζe )

Z

t+t∗

=

e

−r(τ −t)

gz t

(yτ ζe

−rt∗

Z

St+t∗ (ζegz t )dF2 ()

− yτ Rτ ) dτ + e

Rt+t∗ /ζegz t

t

Z

t∗
−rτ

=

e

−rt∗



Z

(yτ ζ − yτ Rτ ) dτ + e

St∗ (ζ)dF2 ()

0

e(gy +gz )t

Rt∗ /ζ

= S̃0 (ζ)e(gy +gz )t .
(E.15)
The expected surplus of a firm-worker meeting at date t is
Z
Z
 α
 α
ζ`
ζ`
α
α
−gz t
(gy +gz )t
S̃t (ζ) ζ
S̃
(ζe
)
dζ
=
e
dζ
0
ζ
ζ
ζ
Q0 egz t

Qt

= e(gy +gz )t

Z
S̃0 (ζ̃)
Q0

(gy −(α−1)gz )t



ζ`
ζ̃egz t

Z
S̃0 (ζ̃)

=e

Q0

α

α
dζ̃
ζ̃

 α
ζ`
ζ̃

(E.16)

α
dζ̃,
ζ̃

where the second line is obtained by changing the variable of integration from ζ to
ζ̃ = ζ exp(−gz t).
The reservation quality Rt is such that
Z
yt Rt = bt + At p(θ)γ

S̃t (ζ)dF1 (ζ).

(E.17)

Qt

Let R0 be a solution of (E.17) for t = 0. Then, Rt = R0 exp(gz t) is a solution of
(E.17) for all t > 0 iff gz = gA /α. In fact, the left-hand side of (E.17) grows at the
rate gy + gz . The first term on the right-hand side grows at the rate gy + gz . The
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second term on right-hand side grows at the rate gA + gy − (α − 1)gz . The left and
the right-hand sides grow at the same rate iff gz = gA /α.
The reservation signal Qt is such that
S̃t (Qt ) = 0.

(E.18)

Let Q0 be a solution of (E.18) for t = 0. Then, Qt = Q0 exp(gz t) with gz = gA /α is a
solution of (E.18) for all t > 0. This follows directly from (E.15).
The tightness θ is such that
Z
kt = At q(θ)(1 − γ)

S̃t (ζ)dF1 (ζ).

(E.19)

Qt

Let θ be a solution of (E.19) for t = 0. Then, the same θ is also a solution of (E.19) for
all t > 0. In fact, the left-hand side of (E.19) grows at the rate gy + gz . The right-hand
side grows at the rate gA + gy − (α − 1)gz . And the two rates are equal, as gz = gA /α.
Finally, one can easily verify that there exist an initial distribution G0 and an initial
unemployment u such that Gt grows at the constant rate gz = gA /α, unemployment
is constant, and the UE and EU rates are constant.

Alternative bargaining
We consider a generic bargaining outcome such that the joint value of a firm-worker
match is maximized, the fraction of the gains from trade accruing to the worker
is γ t (z), and the fraction of the gains from trade accruing to the firm is 1 − γ t (z),
with γ t (z) ∈ [0, 1]. Along a BGP, the bargaining outcome has the property that
γ t (z exp(gz t)) = γ 0 (z), where gz denotes the endogenous growth rate of the distribution
of employed workers across match qualities. It is easy to verify that the bargaining
outcomes described in Section 3 satisfy this property.
The joint value Vt , the reservation quality Rt , and the surplus St are such that
Vt (z) = max
d≥0

t+d
R

e−r(τ −t) yτ zdτ + e−rd Ut+d ,

(F.1)

t

yt Rt = rUt − Ůt ,

(F.2)

St (z) = Vt (z) − Ut .

(F.3)
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The value Ut of unemployment to a worker and the tightness θ of the labor market
are such that
Z
rUt = bt + At p(θ)
γ t (ẑ)St (ẑ)dF (ẑ),
(F.4)
Rt
Z
kt = At q(θ)
(1 − γ t (ẑ))St (ẑ)dF (ẑ).
(F.5)
Rt

The stationarity conditions for the UE, EU and unemployment rates are
At p(θ)(1 − F (Rt )) = hue ,

(F.6)

G0t (Rt )R̊t = heu ,

(F.7)

uhue = (1 − u)heu .

(F.8)

The constant growth condition for Gt is
(1 − u)G0t (zt (x))zt (x)gz + uAt p(θ)[F (zt (x)) − F (Rt )]
=

(1 −

u)G0t (Rt (x))Rt (x)gz .

(F.9)

As in Section 2, we can show that the necessary conditions for the existence of a
BGP are: (i) F is Pareto with coefficient α > 1; (ii) gb and gk are equal to gy + gz ;
(iii) r is greater than gy + gz . Assuming that these conditions hold, we can now prove
the existence of a BGP.
The surplus of a match of quality z > Rt is given by


h
r−gy i
r−gy −gz i
z h
Rt
gz
gz
St (z) = yt
1 − (Rt /z)
−
1 − (Rt /z)
.
r − gy
r − gy − gz

(F.10)

Let S w,t denote an unemployed worker’s expected gain from meeting a firm, and let
S f,t , denote the firm’s expected gain from meeting a worker. That is,
Z
S w,t =
γ t (z)St (z)dF (z),
(F.11)
Rt
Z
S f,t =
(1 − γ t (z))St (z)dF (z).
(F.12)
Rt
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Using (F.10) to substitute out St in (2.1), we obtain
S w,t
Z


γ t (z)yt

=
Rt

Z

z
r−gy

−gz t

=

γ 0 (ze


1−


)yt

R0 egz t

z
r−gy



Z

= e

(gy +gz )t

= e

(gy −(α−1)gz )t

γ 0 (z̃)y0
R0

Rt
z

z̃
r−gy

y
 r−g
g
z


1−

1−


−
Rt
z

Rt
r−gy −gz

y
 r−g
g



z

R0
z̃



y
 r−g
g

−

1−

Rt
r−gy −gz



z

−

 r−ggy −gz





 r−ggy −gz

Rt
z

R0
r−gy −gz

z

1−

1−

Rt
z

R0
z̃


z` α α
dz
z
z


z

 r−ggy −gz
z




z` α α
dz
z
z
α α
z`
dz̃
g
t
z̃e z
z̃

S w,0 .

(F.13)
The second line in the expression above makes use of the fact that γ t (z) = γ 0 (z exp(−gz t)).
The third line is obtained using the fact that Rt = R0 exp(gz t) and yt = y0 exp(gy t)
and, then, by changing the variable of integration from z to z̃ = z exp(−gz t). Following
the same steps, we can show that
S f,t = e(gy −(α−1)gz )t S f,0 .

(F.14)

The reservation quality Rt and the tightness are such that
yt Rt = bt + At p(θ)S w,t ,
kt = At q(θ)S f,t

(F.15)
(F.16)

Let R0 denote a solution of (2.1) for t = 0. Then, Rt = R0 exp(gz t) is a solution of
(2.1) for all t > 0 iff gz = gA /α. Let θ denote a solution of (2.1) for t = 0. Then, the
same θ is also a solution of (2.1) for all t > 0.
The constant growth condition (F.9) is satisfied for gz = gA /α iff G0 and u are
given by
 α
R0
G0 (z) = 1 −
,
(F.17)
z
gA
u =
.
(F.18)
A0 p(θ)(z` /R0 )α + gA
The UE and EU rates are constant and given by
hue = A0 p(θ)(z` /R0 )α ,

(F.19)

heu = gA + gN .

(F.20)
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Clearly, given (2.1) and (2.1), the unemployment rate (2.1) is stationary. Finally, note
that a BGP exists because there is a solution of the equations (2.1) and (2.1) for R0
and θ.
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